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ABSTRACT 
ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 
AN EFFICIENT MARKETS ANALYSIS 
(February 1985) 
Harold Barrett Tamule, B.A. Colby College 
M.S.B.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
Directed by: Professor Ben Branch 
This study examines the merger arbitrage opportunities accompanying 
corporate takeovers. The two empirical issues addressed are: (1) 
whether merger arbitrage investments yield average profits in excess 
of their forecasted returns; and (2) whether the results are sensitive 
to various methodologies of capital market event studies. 
The sample of proposed corporate acquisitions, either by merger or 
tender offer, shows that the most successful merger arbitrage 
opportunities occur during the preevent period. The null hypothesis 
of no abnormal returns of merger arbitrage hedge portfolios formed in 
the period prior to the initial public disclosure is rejected at a 
high probability level in favor of positive returns. Smaller, but 
still statistically significant positive returns in excess of their 
forecasted value are available to arbitrageurs who invest immediately 
after the public announcement. These postannouncement portfolio 
returns apparently stem from a positive capital market reaction as the 
likelyhood of a succesful outcome increases. When observations are 
vi 
segmented according to actual outcome, the distinction between 
successful and unsuccessful bids is very noticeable and stresses the 
arbitrageur's ability to invest consistently in successful takeovers. 
With regard to the second research issue, sensitivity analysis 
indicates that the initial conclusions should be cautiously 
interpreted. While non-synchronous trading of sample firm securities 
or a size anomaly do not affect performance statistics, applications 
of alternative return-generating models, index proxies, and 
significance statistics generally temper the previous assessments of 
merger arbitrage returns. Most importantly, after full application of 
the trading frictions, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected during 
the earlier postannouncement holding period. These results support 
the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis and infer that 
investors cannot systematically earn abnormally positive gains from 
available public information (i.e. takeover proposals). 
vii 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Introduction 
In contrast to the notorious monopoly-creating mergers of the late 
1800’s and the oligopolistic mergers of the 1920’s (81, 90) 
contemporary merger activity is considered an acceptable means of 
achieving certain corporate goals. Acquisitions have been and 
continue to be a corporate strategy of expansion and diversification. 
For instance, the pressures of inflation have encouraged corporate 
expansion through acquisition. Since replacement costs of existing 
assets have risen more rapidly than equity prices, it has been 
contended that merger has become a frequently cheaper investment 
alternative than internal development of a similar subsidiary. 
Moreover, unlike de novo entry, external growth does not create 
additional plant and equipment, so that overcapacity is avoided. 
Beyond strategic considerations, the financial consequences of 
merger are important to management and shareholders, as well as 
interested investors. The acquiring firm’s management must first make 
an adequate offer to ensure a high probability of success of its bid. 
Subsequently, the target firm's executives must evaluate and respond 
to the offer. Finally, the affected shareholders are likely to 
compare the bid with the characteristic returns of merger activity 
1 
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when voting to accept or reject the proposed combination. Also, 
investors are likely to be aware of the profit potential of merger 
activity and will act accordingly. While these various groups 
interact in the course of a merger, one influencing another, the 
investor is the primary interest of this study. 
An important investment opportunity arising from merger 
negotiations is an arbitrage. While classical arbitrage is a 
riskless, simultaneous purchase and sale of the identical asset at 
different prices in separate markets, merger arbitrage is a risky 
hedge investment consisting of long and short positions in the common 
stock (or its equivalent) of the merger participants. Merger 
arbitrage has not been examined extensively in the literature 
vis-a-vis its profitability as a risk-adjusted investment. Moreover, 
the available work is generally aimed at practitioners rather than 
academicians (69, 108, 119). 
The financial literature contains many tests of the profitability 
of certain investment strategies. These established techniques can be 
applied to merger arbitrage, such that the profitability of this 
activity can be described. In the process various aspects of capital 
market efficiency will be examined.1 This study will model and test 
the profitability of merger arbitrage with special references to the 
methodology of efficient markets research. 
3 
Problem Statement 
Both professional and individual investors should be concerned 
with merger-pricing dynamics if such knowledge can help them exceed 
the expected return of a competing asset or portfolio at a comparable 
risk level in a given market environment. Alternatively, if capital 
markets are efficient, the share price of the target firm will adjust 
very rapidly upon the public disclosure of the merger offer to reflect 
the information content of the acquisition bid. This adjustment will 
fall short of the offering price to recognize both the probability of 
unsuccessful termination of the merger negotiations and the holding 
costs of maintaining the investment until the merger is completed. 
Therefore, arbitrageurs should be particularly interested in the 
apparent postannouncement disequilibrium pricing of the bidding and 
target firms. Since target and bidder firm shareholders may develop 
differing expectations of the postannouncement returns, both groups 
may offer their shares to an arbitrageur. In the case of an 
acquisition proposal involving a stock-for-stock exchange, 
arbitrageurs can create a hedge by purchasing a long position in the 
shares of the target firm and simultaneously selling short the shares 
of the bidder firm. A somewhat different strategy can be formulated 
when the exchange involves cash or some other type of security. 
Regardless of the form of the exchange, this arbitrage activity is 
entered into with the expectation that the merger will occur as 
4 
planned. If the merger is consummated, the arbitrageurs will receive 
a profit of the merger price less acquisition cost of the hedge and 
other expenses upon closing their positions (89, 119). 
This study will examine the profit possibilities of merger 
arbitrage. Specifically, the study will investigate: 
1. The profitability of merger arbitrage during the period 
1975-1980: More significantly, the merger arbitrage returns 
will be risk-adjusted. In an efficient market, capital 
assets are priced such that their expected return is 
compensated according to return variability, whether measured 
by systematic or total risk. A merger arbitrage hedge 
may totally eliminate market risk if the shares of the 
merger partners trade as the same item; it may not if the 
shares continue to trade as distinct, separate securities. 
On the other hand, if market forces do not adequately 
explain return variability, total variability 
will more realistically describe the arbitrageur's risk. 
Estimating the level of hedge risk is an important and 
necessary step of this analysis. 
2. The methodology of efficient markets research: The empirical 
findings of efficient markets research may be sensitive 
to the designated index proxy, estimation interval, grouping 
procedure, or any other specification that is a component of 
any research design. For instance, the researcher 
may choose a simple mean-return process, which is unsupported 
5 
by any specific theory as a return-generating model 
or some variant of the capital asset pricing model 
such as Black’s zero beta version or Sharpe/Lintner 
2 
risk-free model. This study extensively tests the null 
hypothesis of market efficiency and includes a thorough 
sensitivity analysis of the procedures generating the test 
statistics. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Review of Merger Theory Literature 
In the broadest sense, acquisitions can be classified into either 
value-maximizing or non-value-maximizing groups. A value-maximizing 
bidder firm hypothesizes that merger gains from either economic 
efficiencies, financial benefits, or target firm management 
realignment are possible and justifies their intended corporate 
takeover by forecasting estimated benefits in excess of or equal to 
the acquisition costs of the target firm. These residual benefits can 
be expressed as the net present value of the expected incremental cash 
flow to be realized from the business combination. In other words, 
the sole rationale of an acquisition is a concomitant increase in 
bidder firm shareholder wealth (53). Non-value-maximizing bidder 
firms do not seek potential gains that offset the costs of the 
acquisition and should suffer an overall wealth loss. Such firms are 
assumed to be interested in acquisitions primarily for corporate 
growth. 
To attain value maximization, the bidder company may forecast that 
3 
real synergies will be realized from the acquisition. Thus, many 
mergers are motivated by the expected enhanced economic profitability 
from the consolidated operations. Many authors (27, 89, 100, 105, 
109) support the case for technical economies of production 
6 
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at the plant and product level. Marketing activity (i.e., sales 
promotion and advertising) and research and development expenditures 
may be proportionally reduced as the merged firm avoids unnecessary 
duplication of effort (100, 109). Moreover, tangible economies may be 
realizable with more efficient use of managerial talent and financial 
controls (55, 109). 
The market power of the amalgamated firm may be increased via a 
horizontal merger as competition is decreased (100). First, as its 
market share increases, the firm may realize economies of scale and 
develop absolute cost advantages that serve as barriers to entry by 
either discouraging potential competitor firms or damaging actual 
competitors (111). Second, the increased market power may enable the 
firm to increase its selling prices above its marginal costs of 
production (73). The ability to hold this price rise will depend on 
the firm’s increase in market share (i.e., its market power) and the 
inelasticity of its product demand curve. Subsequently, after prices 
are increased, and if the resulting decrease in output is greater than 
the reaction allowed by competitor firms elasticity of production, 
4 
monopoly profits will be increased. 
Another theoretical justification for mergers is the financial 
synergy argument. If such gains exist, then the amalgamated firm 
value becomes greater than the sum of the two separate firm values 
simply as a result of the merger itself. For instance, if the price 
earnings multiple of the new conglomerate exceeds a weighted average 
PE of the two individual firms, an instantaneous gain in aggregate 
8 
shareholder wealth occurs (75, 109). Financial synergy is, however, 
inconsistent with the value additivity principle. This fundamental 
financial concept restricts the capitalization of the cash flow 
received by investors to a uniform market value regardless of how that 
income is combined. Investors at equilibrium can effectively 
duplicate the income flow from a postmerger firm by first purchasing a 
weighted average of shares in the individual firms (76). Therefore, 
if the value additivity principle holds, no magical increase in the 
value of the combined firm should occur (53). 
A pure value-maximizing financial theory of merger (88) is the 
existence of accumulated tax-loss carryovers. The cash flow 
advantages of these tax credits make any firm having recently suffered 
net operating losses an attractive merger candidate. If such a firm 
becomes marginally profitable, the full advantage of the tax-loss 
carryovers may not be exploited over the presently allowable maximum 
carryforward period of seven years. A highly profitable firm may 
elect to buy via merger a firm and the remaining value of the target’s 
unused tax loss carryovers to reduce, subject to tax restrictions, the 
aggregate corporate tax liability (78).5 A similar tax savings 
arises when a high dividend-paying, stagnant firm is merged into a 
low- or non-dividend-paying growth firm (27). Investors should 
hypothetically gain if cash flow, which is retained rather than 
distributed as dividends, is eventually turned into capital 
appreciation and qualifies for the more favorable long-term tax 
treatment. Halpern (55) describes merger as a means to redeploy 
9 
excess cash balances as corporate wealth moves from non-interest 
bearing deposits or low-risk, low-return money market instruments to 
higher risk, higher return investments. Halpern concedes that in an 
informationally efficent market the existence of large cash balances 
should signal the probability of a subsequent takeover and currently 
be reflected in the share price. Such reasoning can be extended to 
explain and characterize the other financial conditions. 
In addition, as its probability of bankruptcy diminishes, an 
enlarged postmerger corporation benefits from a merger as borrowing 
costs decrease (78). Alternatively, Levy and Sarnat (76) assert that 
a pure conglomerate merger, per se, cannot result in any economic 
advantage from risk reduction even if the respective cash flows 
combined in the merger are less than perfectly correlated. Investors 
can produce "homemade" diversification by purchasing shares in the 
related companies without the need for merger. In perfect markets 
equity prices will reflect these diversification possibilities; 
however, some risk reduction benefits are possible in less than 
perfect markets. They conclude that a "somewhat stronger case for 
conglomerate mergers can be made when economies in capital costs are 
considered" (76, p. 801) and view evidence of larger firms borrowing 
more cheaply than small firms as an indication of this diminished 
lender’s risk. 
From the borrower’s perspective, however, merger does provide a 
financial benefit (77). The probability of bankruptcy will be reduced 
if the income streams of the two firms are less than perfectly 
10 
correlated. This advantage enables lenders to commit more funds 
without increasing their risk and, in the Modigliani/Miller tradition, 
as its debt capacity increases, so does the firm’s value. 
A perfect capital market assumes that information is costlessly 
and freely available to all participants. In an imperfect market 
bidder firms may possess unique information concerning a potential 
target firm that is unavailable to other investors. Such information 
asymmetry may motivate value-maximizing mergers. Gort’s 
disequilibrium theory of economic disturbance states that differences 
between management and outsider expectations of future firm income 
which arise from the confusion and uncertainty of rapid technological 
progress or unusual stock price movements produce an atmosphere that 
is conducive to widespread merger activity (51). Halpern speculates 
that the bidder firm may generate a more accurate analysis of the true 
target firm value than the market consensus or it may be aware of 
superior operating strategies to enforce on the target firm's managers 
and product line. The ensuing takeover bid should correct the 
information asymmetry. 
A non-value-maximizing explanation of merger, managerial theory, 
originates from Simon’s (106) behavioral theory of satisficing 
(i.e., suboptimal) behavior as contrasted to profit maximization in 
certain instances (7). Some managers may be interested in maximizing 
sales growth, subject to a profit constraint, rather than the profit 
rate itself (10); merger may be an effective strategy for meeting this 
corporate goal. Others (82, 88) hypothesize that the growth rate is 
11 
an important consideration in determining executive compensation. 
Hence, management may select a managerial approach to merger as a 
second best decision. If economies of scale cannot be realized, at 
least the status of high market share and market power can be attained 
via external acquisition. 
Corporate control, a logical extension of managerial theory, has 
evolved from Jensen and Meckling’s theory of the firm (65). As the 
complexity and size of modern corporations has increased, the sectors 
of ownership (i.e. shareholders) and control (i.e., managers) have 
become increasingly separate. This dichotomous relationship implies 
that the absentee owners essentially hire the managers as their agents 
to operate the business. Since managerial compensation is generally 
not tied directly to profits, managers may not be motivated to 
maximize profits but rather strive to increase their consumption of 
corporate resources. To prevent such an abuse, the shareholders may 
possibly expend nontrivial monitoring costs. If shareholders are not 
willing to incur such costs, the value of the firm necessarily 
diminishes by an estimate of the perquisites consumed by management. 
Fama conceives of the split between the risk-bearing owners and 
management as an efficient form of organization, and the discipline 
arising from the managerial labor market resolves the separation 
problem (43). Halpern deduces that excesses of managerial consumption 
and non—value—maximizing operating policies depress stock prices and 
motivate bidder firms to make merger offers based on expected removal 
of existing executives and subsequent capital appreciation. Not only 
12 
may the newly installed managers supervise and coordinate activities 
more effectively than their predecessors, but more important they may, 
as the agents of change, initiate new procedures and exploit 
underutilized firm resources (109). 
Jensen and Ruback (66) extend the development of the agency 
problem by viewing the firm as a series of contracts among interested 
parties. This view of corporate organization contains no owners per 
se. Stockholders become risk-bearing specialists who can easily 
transfer their claims at low cost in the capital markets. A 
shareholder's option of selling ownership to a competing management 
team enforces external control and discipline on corporate executives. 
Moreover, competing, value-maximizing managers will bid for the 
undervalued shares of companies whose managers tolerate inefficiencies 
or fail to realize all possible synergies. Within this dynamic market 
for corporate control, arbitrageurs perform the dual functions of 
facilitating the merger transaction and valuing the takeover proposal. 
A Review of Empirical Studies of Merger Pricing 
Although most research investigating merger pricing is 
empirical,6 the Larson-Gonedes (75) exchange ratio model describes 
theoretic pricing limits of a merger offer.7 The upper bound is set 
at the maximum price at which, if it is exceeded by management's bid 
for the target firm, the bidder firm shareholder wealth diminishes. 
Also, a lower bound is defined as the minimum acceptable price at 
13 
which the target firm s shareholders will not have their wealth 
four possible wealth outcomes of a merger are as follows: 
1. Both sets of shareholders gain from merger terms. 
2. Acquiring shareholders gain, acquired shareholders lose 
from merger terms. 
3. Acquired shareholders gain, acquiring shareholders lose 
from merger terms. 
4. Both sets of shareholders lose from merger terms. 
A subsequent empirical test by Conn and Nielsen (25) tests 131 
actual stock-for-stock merger offers from 1960 to 1969. If the merger 
price is a fair and equitable offer, the a priori expectation is 
outcome 1. While the majority of offers, approximately 60%, initially 
match outcome 1, after the announcement of the tender offer, the 
dynamics of the bidding process indicate an erosion away from the 
optimal situation and toward outcomes 2 and 3. Conn and Nielson 
conclude that the market’s initial valuation of the merger may be 
somewhat optimistic and the net readjustment during the 
postannouncement period reflects a reduction of the earlier 
assessment. Their study examines a limited interval, however, and 
fails to test for risk shifts during the merger event period. 
The majority of the empirical work studies the long-run 
consequences of mergers by comparing predicted risk-adjusted merger 
firm returns against subsequent capital market observations [see 
footnote 1]. The departure of security returns from their expected 
14 
value (i.e., significant positive residuals) is evidence of excess 
profits and can be measured using some variant of cumulative average 
residual analysis (44). in the six months preceding the merger, 
Mandelker (81).finds little movement of the cumulative average 
residuals (CAR) of acquiring firms (i.e., 4.8%-5.2%), but a growth in 
CAR of target firms of approximately 12%. Over an extended interval 
40 months before and after the merger, Mandelker finds a modestly 
positive premerger and a slightly negative postmerger bidder firm 
CAR. Target firms exhibit a slight negative trend far in excess of 
the takeover. Substantially before the merger, Ellert shows large 
negative abnormal target firm returns which become slightly positive 
by the merger month (37). While all acquiring firms show strong gains 
over a 100-month interval prior to merger, the majority of the gain 
has been realized well before the merger. 
Elgers and Clark show positive premerger abnormal returns to 
bidder firms 24 months prior to merger and little movement 
afterward (34). Target firms have strong postive CAR, doubling from 
21.8% to 42.6% in the six months prior to the merger. While excess 
returns of acquiring firms are higher (10%) by the month of the 
merger, subsequently CAR reflect the same randomness found by 
Mandelker. Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (118) report a CAR of 35% 
in the premerger period of acquired firms. 
An alternative methodology is Langetieg s (74) two factor market 
model, consisting of a market index and an uncorrelated industry 
index.^ His premerger target firm abnormal returns are consistent 
15 
with the trend of negative returns becoming positive near the merger. 
Bidder firm returns become negative immediately before and continuing 
long after the merger. The comparison of a matched nonmerging control 
group weakens these negative returns. Comparison of the experimental 
and control groups showed no significant difference in the excess 
returns of the postmerger firms, premerger acquired firms, nor 
acquired firms far in advance of the merger. Langetieg concludes that 
identical industry influences equally affect both merging and 
nonmerging firms. 
Malatesta (80) demonstrates that the characteristic pattern of 
target and bidder firm returns does not hold when the measurement 
variables are aggregate as opposed to relative wealth changes. While 
the premerger target firm excess wealth is positive, the loss in 
bidder wealth more than compensates for the target firm gain. When 
the measurement variable is relative wealth, his earlier conclusion 
about premerger bidder firm is reversed; however, the postmerger 
bidder firm wealth loss is invariant to the measurement. Small bidder 
firms of less than $300,000,000 in market value of equity are found to 
display significantly negative postmerger results, while larger firms 
display insignificantly positive returns. These abnormal negative 
bidder firm returns indicate that the stock market views the merger as 
a non-value—maximizing investment and such results support the 
size-maximization merger hypothesis. 
Other event studies measure the daily reaction of merger firm 
returns with the announcement of the takeover proposal and its 
16 
Abnormal 
Table 
Returns for Merger and 
1 
Tender Offer Event Studies 
Author(s) Sample Relevant 
Interval 
Target 
Firms 
Bidder 
Firms 
Mandelker 
(1974) 
241 FTC large 
mergers, 1948-1967 
Months* 
-6 to 0 
12.1% 0.03% 
Ellert 
(1976) 
387 FTC large 
mergers, 1950-1970 
Months* 
-6 to 0 
13.8% 2.3% 
Langetieg 
(1978) 
149 mergers from 
CRSP file 
Months* 
-6 to 0 
10.6% 2.82% 
Wansley et al 
(1981) 
. Ill mergers, 
1973-1977 
Months* 
-30 to -1 
35.0% n/a 
Elgers and 
Clark 
(1980) 
FTC major mergers, 
1957-1975 
Months* 
-6 to 0 
25.0% 2.2% 
Malatesta 
(1983) 
256 large FTC 
mergers, 1969-1974 
Monthly* 
-4 to 0 
19,671 
($000) 
-27,646 
($000) 
Dodd 
(1980) 
151 proposed NYSE 
mergers, 1971-1977 
Daily** 
-40 to 0 
23.38% 
S 23.86% 
F 24.57% 
4.97 % 
S 4.56% 
F 5.27% 
Asquith 
(1983) 
All WSJ reported 
mergers bids, 
1962-63, 1967-68, 
1974-75 
Daily** 
-40 to 0 
S 13.7% 
F 10.1% 
S 0.9% 
F 0.2% 
Choi and 
Phillappatos 
84 large FTC 
mergers, 1964-75 
Daily** 
-40 to 0 
16.49% 3.23% 
(1981) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Tender Offers 
AuthorC s) Sample Relevant Target Bidder 
Interval Firms Firms 
Kummer and 88 tender offers, Monthly** 23.0% 4.75% 
Hoffmeister 1958-74 -6 to 0 PS 20.4% n/a 
(1978) RF 20.4% n/a 
RS 25.0% n/a 
Dodd and Ruback 386 tender offers, Monthly** S 22.88% S 3.38% 
(1979) many sources -6 to 0 F 27.16% F 10.0% 
Bradley, Desai 112 tender offers, Monthly** 27.38% 1.10% 
and Kim 1958-80 -6 to 0 TL 40.86% n/a 
(1983) NL 25.87% n/a 
n/a not available 
* relative to event consummation 
** relative to event announcement 
S subsample of successful takeovers 
F subsample of failed takeovers 
PS target management passive, successful takeover 
RF target management resisted, failed takeover 
RS target management resisted, successful takeover 
TL target subsequently acquired after initial takeover offer 
NL target not acquired after initial takeover offer 
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outcome. Dodd shows target (23.38%) and bidder (4.97%) firms 
experience positive abnormal returns in the 40-day preannouncement 
period (31). The cancelation of the merger bid, however, has a 
substantial negative effect on target firm returns. Furthermore, 
while the preannouncement target firm gain does not predict a 
subsequent failure, the postannouncement period return correlates with 
the probability of success. Target firm CAR begins to drop 
immediately after the merger offer announcement that later proves to 
be unsuccessful. Thus, the market quickly anticipates the 
cancelation. Choi and Philappatos (23) report lower daily target firm 
CAR (16.49%), but while the magnitude is different, the upward 
postannouncement revaluation of the CAR is in the same direction. 
Asquith shows that the size of the preevent daily abnormal firm 
return predicts the outcome of the particular merger bid (3). 
Participant firms of successful mergers experience more pronounced 
return trends prior to the announcement day. That is, target firms 
show more negative premerger abnormal returns and bidder firms earn 
premerger abnormal returns than firms involved in unsuccessful 
transactions. In agreement with other daily studies, Asquith 
demonstrates strongly positive target firm excess return and 
insignificant bidder firm announcement day results. In light of the 
large abnormal negative premerger target returns and the negative 
impact of merger failure on target firms, Asquith concludes that 
control of the target is valuable and his results are consistent with 
the inefficient management merger hypothesis. 
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The third group of research investigates returns to tender offers, 
takeover bids that proceed directly to target shareholders. Kummer 
and Hoffmeister study cash tender offers and discover an abnormal 
positive target firm return of approximately 20% in the six months 
preceding the offer (72). Moreover, the size of the target firm 
return was affected neither by the attitude of the incumbent 
management concerning the offer nor by the ultimate outcome. While 
the subsets are small samples, the time series of preevent returns 
shows that the size of the abnormal target return is related to the 
group identity. Very negative abnormal returns accrue to shareholders 
of target firms whose managers subsequently successfully resist the 
tender, thereby remaining in control and perpetuating those operating 
policies that resulted in poor prior performance. Bidder firms show 
positive abnormal returns prior to the tender, slight positive returns 
in the tender month, and normal posttender returns. Dodd and 
Ruback’s (32) segmentation of tender offers into successful and 
unsuccessful categories demonstrates little difference in the trend of 
significant positive returns of either group subsequent to the tender 
offer. The segmentation of the sample into groups based on the 
outcome of the tender reveal differential returns, and furthermore, 
the excess residuals of the target firms involved in unsuccessful 
offers do not vanish over a five year period. 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (12) further investigate the upward 
revaluation of target firm shares after an unsuccessful tender offer. 
that the postcancelation revaluation is evidence of They demonstrate 
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the market s expectation of a subsequent tender offer. The entire 
amount of the primary gain of those targets not receiving a second bid 
is totally eroded. In addition, bidder firms who lose the target to 
another bidder also show significantly negative returns. Bradley et 
al. conclude that the acquisition of the target firm's assets is 
responsible for the gains, and their results are consistent with the 
acquisition synergy hypothesis. 
The observed target firm acquisition gains may originate from 
either financial or real sources. If the merger is ostensibly 
motivated by real economies (i.e., horizontal or vertical expansion), 
identifying the unique source of the gain is difficult. On the other 
hand, conglomerate mergers should be motivated predominantly by 
financial considerations. Asquith and Kim hypothesize that the gain 
from financially motivated mergers may arise from a wealth transfer 
between various classes of the affected firms' security holders (4). 
First, two competing hypotheses are derived. Asquith and Kim argue 
that a merger, a type of long-term corporate investment, provides the 
incentive for management (65) to increase the bidder firm risk; the 
wealth of the stockholders is thereby increasing at the expense of the 
bondholders (49). On the other hand, a diversification of a 
conglomerate merger should reduce the combined firm cash flow 
variability and the bondholders should gain at the expense of the 
equity holders. No support is found for either hypothesis and the 
source of the financial gain cannot be determined. Therefore, merger 
arbitrage opportunities cannot be predicted to originate from value 
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transfer between various classes of merger firm securities. 
These diverse empirical findings, which differ variously in data 
bases and methodology, lead to several common conclusions. First, 
target firms show negative abnormal returns as much as five years in 
advance of a takeover proposal, and this underperformance appears 
related to a later acquisition proposal. While the bidder firm 
apparently seeks to acquire an undervalued firm, the majority of the 
results shows normal bidder firm returns. The evidence indicates that 
the intent of bidder firm merger activity is value maximizing, but the 
market for target firms is efficient and abnormal profits are not 
realized (74). 
Whether the gain to the target's shareholders represents the 
economic benefits from disciplining poor management or a revaluation 
of the target’s assets to their true value has not been determined. 
The empirical evidence does not clearly resolve whether the bidder’s 
offer may be motivated by the desire to gain control of the target’s 
assets (i.e., economic synergy aims) or to replace the target's 
inefficient management. No evidence has been provided concerning any 
postmerger rearrangement of target firm management or any 
redisposition of the target’s assets. Moreover, unusual methodologies 
produce conflicting and often vexing results which lead some to accept 
the growth maximization hypothesis. 
The crucial implication for arbitrage is that shareholders of 
acquired firms gain significantly from merger, while those of 
acquiring firms do not. After the merger bid is announced, both 
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securities may be viewed as the same item on the arbitrageur's 
assumption of a successful merger or tender offer. However, the 
entire reaction to the takeover bid does not occur on the announcement 
day. The market's uncertainty to the takeover offer is not resolved 
until new, relevant information becomes available and is discounted 
into participant firm shares' prices. This partial revaluation of the 
target firm's shares presents an opportunity for an arbitrageur to buy 
and sell essentially equivalent securities at different prices. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AM) PROPOSITIONS 
Introduction 
Individuals who forgo current consumption in favor of future 
consumption confront a time dimension and necessarily make their 
investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty. These investor 
choices under uncertainty are assumed to agree with the principles of 
9 
cardinal utility. Investors thus make assumed rational and 
consistent investment decisions from an opportunity set of many 
competing assets (45). 
Individuals are further assumed to reflect a preference of more 
wealth to less when forming their investment strategies. Investor 
desires can be mapped into utility functions that characterize and 
rank combinations of risky assets. Investors can then be described as 
maximizers of their expected utility of wealth. While three types of 
individual investment behavior, risk-indifference, risk-seeking, and 
risk-averse, are possible, the latter is assumed to be the most 
general description of investor activity. These investors have 
strictly concave and increasing utility of wealth functions. Marginal 
utility of wealth is therefore positive and increasing, but at a 
decreasing rate (45). 
Capital markets are assumed to be complete and offer no riskless 
23 
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arbitrage opportunities. Security prices are set according to a 
positively sloped, linear tradeoff between expected return and risk. 
Fisher separation is assumed to hold such that individual consumption 
(portfolio selection) decisions are independent of investment (pricing 
of assets) decisions. As market prices adjust to discount new 
information, investors buy and sell assets to rearrange and rebalance 
their portfolios according to their subjective utility preferences. 
This research examines the ex post returns of merger arbitrage 
investments. The desired setting of such investments is described by 
Renshaw (93, p. 6): ". . .classical arbitrage arises when two firms 
agree to merge their assets on the basis of a share exchange ratio 
that differs from the current price ratio prevailing in the market 
place. If they complete the merger and exchange all shares, C 
(correlation of stock prices) will approach unity and s (parity 
price of target firm's shares) will eventually equal s^ (price of 
acquiring firm's shares) by definition." 
The empirically demonstrated movement in equity returns of merger 
participants (3, 12, 23, 31, 32, 33, 37, 74, 80, 81) justifies the 
creation of a merger arbitrage hedge. The timing of the hedge 
formation will depend on the sequence of events leading to the 
merger. Stavrou (108) has defined three stages in the merger process: 
prenegotiation, preliminary negotiation, and printed agreement. 
Prenegotiation is the stage prior to any merger discussions. While 
trading in the target’s shares reflects the company's fundamental 
outlook and general market conditions, some target firm feature exists 
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that may possibly attract a corporate suitor (7). During the 
subsequent period of preliminary negotiation, the potential acquirer 
actively seeks the target firm but withholds a concrete offer. 
Speculative buying and selling in anticipation of the takeover bid may 
produce extreme volatility in each firm’s stock price. The third 
stage, printed agreement, occurs after a tangible offer is made for 
the target firm. Subsequent to this initial public disclosure of the 
proposed merger, the arbitrageur is assumed to establish a hedge. 
Immediately upon the announcement of the tender offer, the stock 
prices of the two parties should adjust to reflect the valuation 
implications of the merger terms, the future expected cash flows of 
the combined firm, and the prior probability of the merger bid’s 
success. Usually, the target firm's stock price rises while the 
bidder firm's shares remain relatively unchanged (3, 23, 34, 37, 81). 
The arbitrageur’s investment opportunity depends on the market not 
fully revaluing the shares of the takeover candidate to their parity 
price on the announcement day. This discount from the merger value 
reflects the risk that the merger offer will not succeed as a result 
of management disfavor, government opposition, inadequacy of offer, or 
adverse stock market conditions. In effect, the securities are 
efficiently priced at less than their parity value. If the merger is 
unsuccessful, the shares of the target will likely decline toward 
their previous trading range, but some gain persists as a permanent 
revaluation of the share’s value (3, 31, 32, 12). The persistent 
target firm gain reflects the market's expectation of a subsequent 
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takeover bid. 
Because of these considerations, prospective merger value will 
generally exceed the immediate postannouncement price of the target 
firm. The arbitrageur seeks to capitalize on those differences that 
he or she believes greater than justified by the costs and risks of 
maintaining the hedge. When the takeover involves a stock-for-stock 
exchange, the bidder firm's shares can be sold short and a parity 
amount of the target firm's shares bought. When and if the merger is 
actually consummated, the arbitrageur can cover the short position 
with the securities obtained from the merger. The residual profit 
will equal the initial short price minus the original long price of 
the target less commissions and financing costs. Similar strategies 
can be devised when the exchange involves cash or some other security 
for the shares of the acquired firm. If the merger fails, the 
arbitrageur will then liquidate the hedge by selling the shares of the 
takeover candidate and covering the short position in the bidder 
firm. This study will test whether the returns from merger arbitrage 
are statistically different from the return in a fair game (i.e., if 
J X 11 
the actual return differs from the expected return;. 
Tests of Merger Arbitrage Returns 
A fair game test is descriptive and does not explain the source of 
the profitability of merger arbitrage investment. A more analytic 
approach examines the causal relationship between the arbitrage return 
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and any relevant explanatory factor. The major source of the 
potential arbitrage return comes from the continued upward revaluation 
of the target’s shares. The potential arbitrage gain (Q ) equals 
the difference between the announced merger value of a share of the 
Ith target firm (PnO and its immediate postannouncement price 
(Pa^ and can be described in the following fashion: 
Q. = Pm. - Pa. , 
1 l l 
and 
Pa. = f(X.), j = l,n 
i J 
therefore 
Q. = f(X.), j = l,n 
i J 
where and Pa^ are generally positive to reflect conservation of 
12 
value and X is any explanatory variable. A list of possible 
n 
explanatory factors of the magnitude of Pa^ would include: 
1. X : Arbitrageur's subjective assessment of the prior 
probability of the merger bid’s success. The more likely the 
successful conclusion of the merger, Pa^ should be higher 
and arbitrageur’s potential profit will be smaller. 
2. X^: Market risk of the arbitrage hedge. While the hedge 
should reduce and possibly eliminate nondiversifiable 
risk, any remaining systematic variability should be 
compensated with higher expected return (i.e., Q^) and be 
reflected in a lower Pa^ 
X3: Changes in asset structure. Any prospective operating 
efficiencies resulting from the combination will be 
3. 
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priced into the Pa_^ and lower the potential arbitrage 
profit 
4. X^: Any rearrangement in capital structure. A 
redistribution in capital structure could increase 
(reduce) leverage and increase (decrease) the firm 
value and be positvely reflected in Pa^ and lower the 
potential arbitrage gain Q_^. 
5. X^: Costs of maintaining the hedge position. Any 
institutional or market forces beyond X^ that would 
limit the arbitrageur's willingness to hold the 
hedge should be priced into Pa^ and increase the gross 
potential arbitrage profit Q . 
6. X : Random variation. Random variation is assumed to 
6 
be cross-sectionally and time series independent 
with mean zero. Any unexplained hedge return that 
is statistically different from zero will be the 
excess return of merger arbitrage. 
In an efficient market, the preannouncement prices of target and 
bidder firms not only will reflect all publicly available financial 
information but also will contain expectations of any relevant 
information. In this event, investors will have homogeneous 
expectations of the merger’s consequences, the demand curve for these 
securities will be perfectly elastic, and speculative profits will be 
nonexistent. Premerger assessments of the above variables are mostly 
subjective, however, and measurement problems ensue. The difficulty 
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of controlling for every variable reduces the feasibility of this 
analysis. Recognizing that fair game test statistics may not be white 
noise is important, nevertheless, because correlation between the 
return statistics and these explanatory variables is possible. 
Sample Identification 
A universal index of merger proposals has not been found to be 
publicly available from government, security industry, or media 
sources. Therefore, the Wall Street Journal is designated a master 
file of all current business events and is used as the main source for 
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all reported merger proposals. A screening procedure based on the 
following criteria selected announced merger offers most compatible 
with the aims of the research. 
1. All mergers proposed by firms that are prior owners of 
greater than 5% of the target* s outstanding equity are 
deleted from the sample. If this particular limit is 
reached, the owner of the minority stock interest must 
file Schedule 13D-1 with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to disclose publicly the extent of the 
investment. This restriction eliminates any price 
distortions attributable to speculation over an eventual 
consolidation. 
2. Only those merger bids or tender offers whose stated aim 
is substantially all the outstanding common stock of the 
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target are included in the sample. While arbitrage 
of a partial takeover bid is feasible, inclusion of this 
type presents data collection and analysis problems.^ 
3. All proposed mergers of banks, insurance companies, 
airlines, and railroads are withheld from the sample to remove 
any potential price effects of regulatory agency proceedings. 
4. A minimum market value of target firm equity as offered in 
the merger bid is arbitrarily set at $10,000,000 to eliminate 
insignificant transactions. 
5. All proposed mergers involving firms whose shares are 
privately or closely held are excluded from the sample set. 
Such firms would present obvious difficulties as little or 
no stock would be available for the arbitrageur’s purchase. 
The sample of merger offers must closely approximate an 
arbitrageur's opportunity set and must be unbiased. First, the sample 
selection process does not artificially ignore a particular type of 
merger bid and therefore distort a specific group’s probability of 
success or failure.15 Therefore, the proportion of successful to 
unsuccessful mergers should closely approximate the actual ratio of 
the arbitrageur’s opportunity set. In addition, no distinctions 
between negotiated merger proposals and unsolicited tender offers are 
drawn; these are viewed as alternative stratagems toward the same 
bidder firm corporate goals. 
Furthermore, all proposed acquisitions involving firms for which 
unavailable are deleted from the sample. continuous market data are 
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For instance, those stock mergers involving foreign corporations whose 
shares are not traded as American Depository Receipts (ADR), or 
non-NASDAQ, unlisted firms are not retained, since monitoring 
arbitrage hedges for such firms is difficult. Second, mergers that 
contain uncertain terms are withheld from the sample set. For 
example, accurate hedge returns cannot be calculated when the merger 
offer consists of undisclosed or fluctuating terms and conditional 
payments. Also, if an acquiring firm offers a new issue of bonds, 
convertible preferred securities, or warrants, the arbitrageur cannot 
sell short any of that particular security to construct the hedge. If 
the issue is convertible into common stock and a subsequent high 
correlation between the common and convertible is assumed, a hedge may 
be effectively formed by buying the target* s shares and selling short 
a conversion value of the bidder's shares. This simulated conversion 
allows a plausible test on this subsample. 
The data collection is governed by two expectations. First, the 
interval 1975-1980, a period characterized by a brisk level of merger 
activity (20), provides a sufficient number of observations from which 
significant parameter estimates and error metrics can be 
calculated (14, 17, 24, 63). Second, a daily investment holding 
period measures more accurately the dynamics of the merger process. 
Not only do daily returns precisely capture the exact effect of the 
merger announcement, but they also reflect an arbitrageur s relatively 
active trading. Daily returns may be affected by certain measurement 
errors (18, 24, 70, 97, 101), however, and several adjustment 
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procedures are used to monitor for the effect of any statistical 
biases. The CRSP daily data tape of the Center for the Research of 
Security Prices of the University of Chicago is the major source of 
security and index returns, the Wall Street Journal, Barron* s, or 
Mergers and Acquisitions supply any missing pertinent information. 
A final difficulty arises with companies frequently engaged in 
merger activity. Researchers conventionally delete these firms from 
their sample because previous merger transactions could bias the 
associated return series. Operationally, this distortion is 
unmanageable when monthly stock returns are utilized because of data 
availability. The interval necessary to estimate regression 
coefficients of actively merging firms from daily prices is 
sufficiently small to reduce the incidence of this distortion, thereby 
supporting their retention in the sample. 
Return-Generating Models 
The choice of the most appropriate return-generating model is 
vitally important to efficient markets research design because a 
misspecified model may generate biased parameter estimates and 
performance measures from which incorrect conclusions could be drawn. 
Sensitivity analysis is important to determine the extent to which the 
results are contingent on the choice of a particular model (17, 18). 
The first choice involves a very simple construction. If the joint 
distribution of all security prices indicates a stationary process, 
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the best fit is a mean-return model. Any cross-sectional differences 
between securities may reflect differing levels of perceived risk. 
The ex ante prediction of the Ith firm's return (Ri ) is an 
intertemporal constant (K_^)and is stated as follows: 
Cla) Rit = K.t + elt. 
If equation la describes the stochastic return-generating process, the 
Ith firm’s return is centered around its historical mean, and is 
serially uncorrelated, and its error is distributed around zero. The 
mean-return model is much more simplistic than any market-based 
models, but its use avoids the problems of measurement error of the 
index proxy (94, 95) and specification error of the exact relationship 
between the security and market return (83). 
A second return-generating process adds an univariate market 
adjustment (R ^_). Ex ante predicted returns of all securities are 
equal, but not constant. This presumption of a systematic risk 
parameter of unity is measured as: 
(lb) R. = R + e , 
it mt it 
where under assumptions similar to those of equation la, and with 
equation lb as the true explanatory return process, the disturbance 
term has mean zero. 
The third formulation, commonly used in various forms, 
incorporates both market and risk adjustments. The diversity of these 
market models presents another problem for the researcher. For 
example, Mandelker (81), Kummer and Hoffmeister (72), and Ellert (37) 
utilize Black’s zero beta variant of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
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Langetieg (74) employs both the Sharpe-Lintner and the Black models 
but demonstrates no apparent difference in the respective results. 
Several recent studies (3, 31, 32, 34) generate residuals with 
Sharpe’s single index market model. 
This variety is confusing and limits the comparability of previous 
research findings. Brenner (14) investigates the effect of five 
different market models on the conclusions of efficient markets 
studies. Although his results indicate some sensitivity attributable 
to the model, he is unable to recommend the superiority of any 
1 ft 
specific form. Also Brown and Warner’s (17, 18) simulation 
analysis shows little impact of the choice of any of the various 
market-based return models on the rejection of market efficiency. 
Black’s zero beta variant of the Capital Asset Pricing Model did not 
improve the robustness of the rejection of market efficiency. For 
these reasons, in addition to its relative simplicity, the single 
index market model is selected from these market models. From the 
assumption of a single factor linear model with no arbitrage 
possibilities, the following linear relationship is defined: 
Uc) Rlt = «lt + eitRmt + elt. 
Assumed characteristics of this model are the market proxy as a lone 
explanatory variable, distribution of the errors around a mean of zero 
(i.e., E(e^t) = 0), time series independence of the errors 
(i.e., cov(eit»eit_1) = and finite variances. 
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Merger Arbitrage Hedge Returns 
As previously stated, the hedge consists of a short position in 
the shares of the bidding firm and a corresponding long position of 
parity value of the target's shares. Parity is the ratio of the 
target firm’s shares necessary to yield the equivalent number of the 
acquiring firm’s shares as a result of the merger terms. For example, 
if firm A offers 0.5 shares of their common for each outstanding share 
of firm B, then a parity of B's shares will be twice the number of A’s 
shares or 1,000 long B and short 500 shares of A. The cost of 
establishing each hedge (X 1) equals the capital invested plus 
expenses as follows: 
(2) X - PTjt_x + MCPB.^p + Cjt-1 
whe re: 
PT 
PB 
C 
= purchase price of a parity amount of Jth hedge’ 
target shares in time period t-1, 
M = short selling margin requirement, 
= short sale price of bidder firm’s shares of 
jt-1 
Jth hedge, 
„ = commissions costs of establishing Jth. hedge 
jt-l 
s 
(nonzero only at t-l-0). 
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The Jth hedge absolute return equals the appreciation of the target 
firm shares and any net dividend income less any losses on the short 
sale and any trading frictions as follows: 
(3) Y. = ( PT -PT. i) - (PB -PB ) + D* - C* - M* 
Jt JL JL _L Jt JL -L 
where: 
PT = price of target’s shares, 
PB = price of bidder's shares, 
D* = dividends of target received less dividends of bidder 
arbitrageur is liable for during hedge (not necessarily 
received simultaneously), 
M* = daily interest income foregone on short selling margin 
deposited with broker, 
C* = commissions costs of unraveling Jth hedge (nonzero in only 
one holding period). 
Finally the one period percentage return (Z^) on t^ie ^e^Se equals: 
(4) zjt" Vxjt-r 
As a useful approximation, commissions costs will be assumed to be l/° 
1 -] 
of the trade. Also, the opportunity cost interest rate on the 
short selling margin is the daily equivalent of the 90 day annualized 
Treasury Bill rate published in the Wall Street Journal. 
Adjustments for Special Cases 
If a bidding firm offers a cash payment to a target’s 
shareholders, the arbitrageur’s investment simplifies. Since one side 
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of the hedge is a constant, the potential gain is immediately apparent 
and an offsetting short sale of the acquiring firm’s stock is not 
required. Here the dollar value of the offer will be substituted for 
PB, M will equal zero, and PB will equal the dollar bid, 
(2a) X. = PT + C , 
jt-1 jt-1 jt-l 
(3a) Y = (PT. - PT. .) + D*. 
Jt Jt jt-1 
When the bidding firm makes a mixed offer of stock or cash to the 
target firm shareholders, confusion may exist over the hedge 
formation. Conceivably, this situation can be handled in three ways: 
1. Arbitrageur buys target's shares to tender for bidder’s cash 
payment. 
2. Arbitrageur buys target’s shares to tender for bidder’s 
stock. 
3. Arbitrageur buys target's shares to tender for cash and stock 
in the designated ratio as offered by the bidding company. 
Given these choices, the type of hedge the arbitrageur will construct 
must be specified. While no guarantee exists that the arbitrageur 
will obtain the desired payment, a simple rule covers this dilemma. 
Since the discontinuity of ownership upon consummation of the merger 
eliminates the need for a stock-for-stock exchange, the stock-for-cash 
option is selected because of its simplicity and lower transactions 
costs. 
Offering convertible securities for the outstanding shares of the 
target firm is a common bidder firm takeover strategy. The two most 
obvious motives of convertible financing are the prevention of 
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immediate postmerger parent firm earnings per share dilution and also 
the reduced component financing costs of convertibles as contrasted to 
conventional coupon bonds or preferred stock. From the researcher's 
perspective, however, convertible-for-stock exchanges are difficult to 
evaluate. Those cases presenting the option of accepting cash or 
convertible securities can be treated as the above case. 
Alternatively, convertible securities are often not seasoned issues 
and short selling is impossible except when the security market allows 
trading on a when-issued basis. Full conversion of the convertible 
bonds or preferred stock is assumed and its value monitored as the 
exact value of the offer, even though a premium might well exist after 
trading begins. Equation 2 is altered to reflect a full conversion 
value of the bidder firm's shares (CvPB) which are sold short. All 
other terms will remain the same as a stock sale. 
(2b) X.t_x= PTjt+MCvPB.t_1 + 0.^, 
(3b) Y. = ( PT -PT . n )-(CvPB . -CvPB . . )-®*-C*-M*. 
Jt jt jt-1 Jt jt-1 
While not the optimal solution, nonetheless this is a workable and 
acceptable procedure. As a precaution, these observations are 
initially examined separately before inclusion into the sample. 
Another special situation involves a bidding war of two or more 
firms over a target. If the contesting management teams both offer 
cash bids, the higher bid is substituted for the bidding firm’s 
price (PA). If the competing firms are proposing common stock offers, 
the more attractive bid must take precedence. For the purposes of 
this analysis, the arbitrageur is assumed to maintain the hedge by 
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covering the short position in the initial bidder firm and 
establishing a short position in the shares of the higher bidder 
company. Additional terms and commissions costs are included in the 
return equation to reflect the closed short sale of the first bidder 
and the following short sale in the subsequent bidder's shares. 
If the merger occurs, the actual return is calculated as outlined 
above. If the merger fails, the hedge is liquidated on the day that 
cessation of merger negotiations is formally announced by selling the 
shares of the target and buying sufficient shares of the bidder to 
cover the short position. The merger may fail, but the residual 
return from the hedge may still be positive. Assuming that the 
arbitrageur waits until the public announcement to unravel the hedge 
may be unrealistic, but such a conservative procedure should not 
contain any bias in favor of finding a profitable merger arbitrage 
relationship. 
Hypothesis and Tests of Excess Returns 
A risk-adjusted return of the merger arbitrage hedges is modeled 
with the methods described in the previous section. If capital 
markets are efficient, the arbitrage hedge portfolios return will show 
a normal risk-adjusted return. The question being addressed in this 
study is whether the returns conform to their expected value; a second 
concern is the dependence of the results on the particular research 
methodology. 
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The parameter estimates for all hedges in the sample are 
calculated for each of the several feasible return models. The 
estimation period excludes returns from the merger period itself and 
adjacent preannouncement, but possibly biased returns. Keown and 
Pinkerton (70) show positive bias in Ordinary Least Squares residuals 
up to 25 days prior to the merger announcement that may reflect 
preannouncement price changes due to information leaks, disguised 
insider trading, or fortuitous speculation; a preannouncement buffer 
period is likewise set at this limit. After the estimated parameters 
and the actual returns of the hedges are calculated, the forecast 
error terms across each model are calculated over the merger period as 
follows: 
(5a) e' = R - K. , 
Jt Jt Jt’ 
(5b) e ’ . = R. - R , 
jt jt mt 
(5c) e* = R. - a - S r 
Jt Jt jt jt mt 
These forecast errors (e’^) are assumed homoscedastic and 
cross-sectionally independent. Testing forecast errors rather than 
absolute returns possibly removes cross-sectional correlation owing to 
market or time series return factors and strengthens the independence 
assumption. Significant departure of these errors from their expected 
value indicates abnormal returns assuming constant systematic risk of 
the securities. 
41 
Statistical Tests 
Since the true return-generating process is not known with 
certainty, any particular model implies some degree of estimation and 
measurement error. For example, direct application of the standard 
event analysis (i.e., cumulative average residual analysis) could 
produce biased error statistics. Provisions are taken therefore to 
ensure consistency of the characteristics of the forecast errors with 
the assumptions of the relevant test statistics. Hong, Mandelker and 
Kaplan (63) argue that the cross-sectional correlation and the unique 
distributions of the individual stock returns violates the normality 
assumption of the forecast errors and causes biased t-tests. For 
mergers announced on the same day, this problem is likely to be 
severe. An appropriate correction for this bias is the formation of 
equal-weighted portfolios of these simultaneous daily observations. 
By averaging these returns and treating them as one observation, bias 
is reduced. 
An acceptable and unbiased test of the time series mean-return 
model, equation 5a, is the Comparison Periods Returns Test (83). This 
procedure compares mean returns before the merger offer announcement 
(i.e., comparison returns) to those during the merger negotiation 
period (i.e., experimental returns). Since the true mean is not 
known, any estimation error is minimized by forming a portfolio of all 
merger arbitrage hedges and assuming independence across securities. 
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In addition, because the merger announcements are random events and 
occur noncontemporaneously, the error attributable to the market 
factor will also be independent across firms. As sample size 
increases, the return of the portfolio of merger arbitrage hedges will 
approach a normal distribution and an unbiased t-statistic with 
T^+T^-2 degrees of freedom can be calculated as follows: 
(6) t = _R(l) - R(tO)_ 
1/2 
((T1-1)s1-KT2-1)s2/T1+T2-2)/(1/T1+1/T2), 
where: 
= number of daily comparison-period hedge returns, 
= number of daily experimental-period hedge returns, 
R(l) = daily comparison-period mean return, 
R(tO) = day t experimental-period mean return, 
s^ = comparison-period mean return standard deviation, 
s^ = experimental-period mean return standard deviation. 
The following null hypothesis of no difference between the two mean 
returns and its alternative are tested and a confidence level of 5% is 
necessary for rejection. 
Ho: R(l) - R(tO) = 0, 
Ha: R(l) - R(t0) ¥ 0. 
Significance testing of the forecast errors generated by the two 
market-based return models (equations 5b and 5c) requires a different 
methodology. Parameter estimates are calculated for every hedge 
portfolio and the standard residual analysis can be applied. The 
average forecast error (AFE) is then calculated by summing all i 
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hedges on the same relative day and dividing by the n number of hedges 
as follows: 
n 
(7) AFE = 1/n .Z e' . 
t i=l it 
The cumulative average forecast error (CAPE) for some relevant 
interval is derived by summing these average forecast errors over the 
t successive days as follows: 
t 
(7a) CAFE = Z AFE . 
t t=i t 
This summary statistic is the measure of the abnormal performance 
earned by investing in a merger arbitrage hedge. 
Since normality of daily return data is often 
questionable (42, 18), nonparametric significance tests are superior 
alternatives to a t-test. The attractiveness of the Fisher Sign Test 
and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is their minimal requirements of a 
symmetric distribution and mutual independence of the test data, 
conditions likely to be met with daily returns (42). 
The Fisher Sign Test assigns for each error a value contingent on 
its relation to zero. Therefore, f*^t (i.e. ef^t) is defined: 
(8) flt - 1, if eit> 0, 
(8a) f*it = 0, if < 0. 
A second variable, Q^, is defined as the sum of the number of all 
positive residuals where: 
n 
(9) % = i=i f'if 
The decision criteria concerning the testable hypothesis are: 
reject Ho, if Qt> q(a,n,l/2), 
do not reject Ho, if Q < q(a,n,l/2). 
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For large samples the approximation Q* holds where: 
(10) Q*t = Q(t) - (n/2) 
1/2 
((n/4)). 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test first arranges the error terms in 
descending order and assigns a rank (x^) to each. Then a dummy 
measurement variable (r' ) is defined where: 
(11) r’it = 1, if e’it >0, 
(11a) r’it = 0, if e’ <0. 
Then taking the sum of the n products of rank and measure, a test 
statistic (T* ) is defined for all positive signed ranks where: 
n 
(12) T* = £ (r’. )(x. ). 
t i=l it it 
The decision criteria are: 
Fo 
reject Ho, if T*t > t(a,n), 
do not reject Ho, if T*t<t(a,n). 
r large samples, T*^ is approximated: 
(13) rt = T* - (N(n+l)/4) 
1/2 
(n(n+l)(2n+l)/24) . 
The decision criteria are then: 
reject Ho, if T' > z(a), 
do not reject Ho, if T’ < z(a). 
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These two nonparametric statistics give a two-sided test of the 
following null and alternative hypotheses, 
Ho: CAFEt = 0, 
Ha: CAFEt i 0. 
A 5% confidence interval is the criterion assumed necessary to reject 
the null hypotheses of normal risk-adjusted merger arbitrage hedge 
returns. 
Risk Measurement 
The possible instability of the estimated risk parameters of the 
target and bidder firms is a potentially serious methodological 
problem. Some researchers (35, 38, 72, 81) apply a portfolio approach 
for estimation of these coefficients on a moving-average basis. In 
general, while some shift is detected, the movement is minor and does 
not materially affect the forecast errors. Any moving-average process 
introduces a potential conflict, however, by including the variability 
of the merger period itself to calculate risk parameters and then 
using these estimates to describe the risk-adjusted profitability of 
the experimental period. 
While generally the best estimate of the true beta is assumed 
obtainable from preevent observations, Brown (19) finds that preevent 
daily data estimation of regression coefficients can be associated 
with positively biased alphas. A subsequent pooling of pre- and 
postperiod observations still reflects a nonzero intercept; only when 
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postperiod observations alone are used is the bias eliminated. A 
similar finding of a nonzero alpha could be interpreted as evidence of 
1 o 
premerger information of merger target’s attractiveness. 
Dodd (31) employs a pooled estimation period of observations to 
19 
capture any risk shift associated with the merger process. If 
capital markets are efficient, postevent data should be free of any 
20 
informational bias. Nonetheless, operations similar to Brown's 
are performed to investigate daily systematic risk parameter stability 
21 
over the duration of this sample. 
Discontinuous Trading 
Recent financial research has dealt with the problems of daily 
returns, specifically, the bias attributable to discontinuous trading 
of securities. Furthermore, the research methodology of portfolio 
performance evaluation may be so vulnerable to this distortion that 
certain rejections of market efficiency (i.e., small firm effect, low 
PE performance) may be erroneously concluded (97, 98). Measured 
returns may serve as a proxy for the real unobservable return because 
the published closing security price can occur prior to the end of the 
reporting period. The resulting leads and lags of the correlation 
between the security and the market-index proxy influence systematic 
risk parameter estimates. For instance, inactively traded shares have 
their covariance understated because of the lag between the last 
transacting price and the closing index value. Frequently traded 
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shares may be biased, although the direction is not certain. 
This bias may be corrected directly by substituting simultaneous 
trade-to-trade prices of the security and the market proxy as inputs 
for the standard methodology. This information is very difficult to 
obtain and this method is confined to applications involving 
infrequently traded assets (102). A second process centers on the 
time lag between the security price and closing market measurement. 
Assuming independence and identical distribution of these leads and 
lags, Scholes and Williams (103) show that estimated systematic risk 
parameters are underestimated (overestimated) for actively and 
inactively (averagely) traded shares. On the whole, average 
parameters asymptotically approach true parameters. From the 
variance/covariance relationship, an unbiased estimate of the true 
parameters becomes: 
6 _ 3 ,3,3 
(14) it - it-1 + it + it+1 
I~+~Zp^ 
/s. ^ /\ 
8 6 6 
where the parameter estimates, ^ and are the 
successively derived OLS systematic risk parameters of the regression 
of the lagging, simultaneous, and leading market returns on the Ith 
security’s return and pm is the first order correlation coefficient of 
the market proxy. 
A third process (30) does not require successive transaction 
information or a continuously traded market index. Given some 
probability of a share trading in a period, observed security prices 
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can be viewed as an expected value of a weighted average of past 
prices. Following this approach, Dimson shows that inactively 
(actively) traded shares have understated (overstated) covariance with 
the market index and downward (upward) biased systematic risk 
parameters. His unbiased estimate of the true parameter is: 
(15) 8 
it 
n 
= Z 
t=-n (<L,). it 
where t indicates the sequence of the sum of the multiple regression 
parameters estimates of leading, lagging, and simultaneous index proxy 
values from day -n to day n* . 
Nonsynchronous-trading corrective procedures may well generate 
less biased parameter estimates and more valid tests of the null 
hypothesis. Dimson’s supporting evidence not only was based on 
estimation intervals greater than one month but also relied on foreign 
market data. A second consideration is the incidence of inactively 
traded shares in this sample, but data describing the trading activity 
of the sample firms are not readily available. In addition, the bias 
appears greater for portfolios than for individual securities. While 
Keown and Pinkerton (70) report no benefit from either of the two 
procedures, Roll (97) indicates that the Dimson estimation reduces the 
understatement of portfolio risk attributed to infrequent trading. 
These contrasting results provide additional motivations to test these 
adjusted estimations of beta. 
The second facet of the joint hypothesis covers the validity test 
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of the nonsynchronous trading adjustments. A validity test is 
necessary to determine whether the nonsynchronous bias reduction 
occurs as predicted or in a random, unsystematic fashion. The 
individual sample firms will be segmented into buyer and seller 
groups, a precaution dictated by the possible "double bias" of the 
hedge returns. Size, as operationally defined as the market 
capitalization of the sample firms, will be the criterion for dividing 
each group into five portfolios. As mean size increases, 
preannouncement observations should exhibit progressively higher 
measured returns. A reduction in the postannouncement bias is 
expected, although Reinganum reports a persistence of the small firm 
effect (69). 
Testing the forecast error sensitivity to the alternative 
estimation processes with a standard t-test of the difference of two 
means is difficult because the assumption of intergroup independence 
no longer holds. While the difference between the two means is still 
an unbiased estimate of the true difference, the standard error will 
be affected by the correlation between the two samples. If 
observations are paired and differences (D^ are computed, however, 
a t statistic with N-l degrees of freedom is generated by calculating 
the mean difference (M*) and an estimate of the standard error of the 
differences (SE(D_^)) as follows: 
(16) t = M* - E(M*) 
SE(D±). 
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Similarly one can test with the nonparametric Sign and Wilcoxon tests 
by again calculating the differences of the paired observations to 
control the dependence problem. All three statistics will provide a 
two-tailed test of the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: e. • 
o
 
ii QJ 
1 
it Jt 
Ha: e. - e . i 0, 
it Jt 
where the 5% confidence level will be necessary for rejection. 
Index-Proxy Problem 
The results of efficient markets research are subject to growing 
scrutiny, and the choice of an optimal market index is a foremost 
22 
concern. The operational necessity of using a market proxy as a 
surrogate for the true unobservable market index could influence the 
error metrics. Previous research results concerning the market-index 
problem are not consistent. Frankfurter (48) demonstrates that the 
selection of an index proxy does not alter the composition of 
mean-variance efficient portfolios in such a way to affect ex post 
returns. Although Foster (47) supports the theoretical justification 
of a value-weighted proxy, he cannot demonstrate its superiority. 
Morgan (87) shows that parameter estimates calculated with an 
equal-weighted index have lower prediction errors. Elgers and 
Murray (36) show sensitivity of risk parameters to the market proxy 
and find more stable and more efficient parameter estimates derived 
from an equal-weighted index. Brown and Warner (17) show a noticeably 
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greater tendency for equal-weighted index residuals to reject market 
efficiency. 
Several proxies test the sensitivity of the risk-adjusted 
performance statistics with respect to the index. Use of three 
indices, CRSP value-weighted, CRSP equal-weighted and Standard and 
Poor’s 500, will test the invariance of the daily results to the 
proxy. An equal-weighted proxy should have a higher variance than a 
value-weighted proxy (which proportionately weights more highly 
capitalized firms that are presumably less risky). From the 
definition of beta and holding other factors constant, lower 
systematic risk estimates should be obtained. No general prediction 
of the tendency of rejecting market efficiency across the market 
proxies can be made. The null hypothesis of no difference between the 
groups is tested in the same manner as the preceding section at the 5% 
confidence level. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF INITIAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
The experimental set consists of 167 merger proposals occurring 
from January 1975 to March 1980 and includes 167 target and 160 bidder 
firms. Nearly 70% (117 out of 167) of the merger offers were 
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successfully concluded. Classification of the merger proposals 
into broadly defined subsamples reveals four major groupings: 
(1) 110 observations of proposed mergers of paired bidder 
and target firms; 
(2) 22 additional observations of group 1 firms involved in 
merger negotiations subsequent to their initial reported 
merger activity; 
(3) 15 observations of proposed mergers that escalated into a 
bidding war between 2 prospective buyers over a target firm; 
(4) 22 observations of merger bids tendered by non U.S. bidder 
firms to domestic U.S. target firms. 
Categorizing the data into these subgroups reflects analysis 
requirements rather than any hypothesized differences. Nonetheless, 
9 / 
this ad hoc separation provides useful background information. 
The size profile of the sample companies is displayed in Table 2. 
The operational definition of firm size, market value of common equity 
in the year prior to merger, is calculated by multiplying the total 
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Table 2 
Size Distribution of Sample Firms 
(in dollars) 
TYPE MEAN SE N 
All firms 401,100,000 44,780,000 327 
All Bidder Firms 711,000,000 82,860,000 160 
All Target Firms 94,830,000 11,080,000 167 
All Target Firms/Success 100,600,000 14,230,000 117 
All Target Firms/Fail 80,710,000 15,690,000 50 
All Bidder Firms/Fail 506,700,000 84,390,000 64 
All Bidder Firms/Success 841,300,000 123,100,000 96 
Difference t -statistic 
Bidder - Target 7.37** 
Bidder(s) ■ - Bidder(f) 2.24* 
Target(s) ■ - Target(f) 0.94 
** significant at the 1% confidence level 
* significant at the 5% confidence level 
number of common shares outstanding by the closing stock price of the 
year prior to the acquisition offer (6, 90). The relationship between 
the various subgroups is measured with a simple t-test of the 
difference of two means. The difference between bidder and target 
firm mean size is strongly significant and intuitively follows from 
the theoretical value-maximizing foundations of merger. Large 
corporations may attempt purchase of smaller firms to develop or 
exploit possible gains such as improved management or economies of 
scale in functional areas of operation. In addition, bidder firm size 
may be highly correlated with the financial resources necessary to 
accomplish a successful merger. 
Further distinctions of the sample firms are not as readily 
apparent. For instance, the relationship of merger proposal outcome 
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and firm size is not consistent across bidder and target firm groups. 
Absolute target firm size is not an identifiable characteristic of the 
merger proposal’s outcome. The lack of statistical difference leads 
to the speculations that larger relative target firms have neither the 
incentive nor the demonstrated ability to defeat a merger bid and that 
smaller target firms are not intrinsically less attracted to merger 
proposals. On the other hand, the significantly greater size of 
successful, as opposed to unsuccessful, bidder firms may be a proxy 
for the benefits, or market power, of relative size in producing 
greater negotiating leverage vis-a-vis the target firm. 
Additional important sample set information is the cross-sectional 
industry distribution of each firm category. Arranging both bidder 
and target firms according to the individual two digit SIC code of 
their major business line generates the frequencies found in 
25 
Table 3. The bidder and target firm subsets are not heavily 
concentrated in any specific industry sector, nor do these two 
categories appear separately distributed. In addition, the time 
series distributions of the bidder and target SIC codes described in 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate no recognizable patterns. Most important, 
among the most active SIC industry segments, particularly among the 
energy and manufacturing sectors, no readily pronounced trend can be 
discerned. A preliminary conclusion of importance, although perhaps 
naive, suggests low incidence of cross-sectional sample firm 
correlation. 
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Table 3 
Industry Classification of Sample according to Two Digit SIC Code 
SIC Code General Category Target Bidder 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
20 
21 
22 
23 
25 
26 
27 
28 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
42 
45 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Agricultural Production 
Coal Mining 
Crude Petroleum, Oil and 
Gas Drilling 
Non-Metallic Minerals 
General Building Construction 
Food and Kindred Products 
Tobacco Products 
Textile Mills 
Apparel and Finished Clothing 
Wood (Building and Furniture) 
Paper Products 
Newspapers and Publishing 
Chemicals 
Footware and Leather Goods 
Glass, Cement and Pottery 
Steel, Smelting and Refining 
Hardware, Plumbing, Heating 
Fixtures, Fabricated Metal 
Products 
Engines, Machinery, Oil 
Equipment, General Indus¬ 
trial Machinery and Equipment 
Computers, Electronics 
and Refrigation 
Industrial Controls, 
Household Appliances, Radio 
TV, Electronic components 
Motor Vehicles 
Engineering, Industrial, 
Optical, Medical, and Photo 
Equipment 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Trucking 
Air Transport 
Telephone 
Electrical Services Natural 
Gas Pollution Control 
Wholesale Auto Parts 
Wholesale Drugs 
Retail Lumber Products 
Retail (Department,Variety) 
Retail (Grocery) 
3 2 
1 3 
11 
1 
1 
9 
0 
2 
1 
1 
7 
5 
6 
0 
6 
2 
15 
10 
2 
0 
12 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
12 
1 
4 
8 
7 
17 14 
15 14 
9 8 
13 5 
4 
2 
0 
1 
0 
7 
2 
1 
3 
4 
0 
1 
1 
4 
0 
2 
2 
1 
5 
1 
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Table 3 (continued) 
SIC Code General Category Target Bidder 
56 Retail (Apparel and Shoes) 2 0 
57 Retail (Appliances) 2 0 
58 Retail (Eating) 4 1 
59 Retail (Drugs, Jewelry, 
Sewing) 3 1 
61 Savings and Loan, Financial 
Services 0 3 
63 Insurances 0 2 
65 Real Estate Management 1 0 
67 Real Estate Investment Trusts 8 10 
70 Hotels 1 
73 Service 3 1 
75 Automotive Repair 1 1 
78 Motion Pictures 1 3 
79 Amusements and Recreation 1 0 
80 Health Care Management 2 0 
89 Engineering and Architectural 
Service 2 1 
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Table 4 
Temporal Distribution of Target Firms 
according to Two Digit SIC Code 
SIC Code 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
20 
22 
23 
25 
26 
27 
28 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
42 
48 
51 
52 
53 
56 
57 
58 
59 
65 
67 
73 
75 
78 
79 
80 
89 
1 1 
1 
2 3 3 
12 1 
1 
1 
2 
2 1 
1 4 
1 2 
1 
12 4 
2 2 6 
4 3 
3 2 
3 4 
1 2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 1 
112 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 3 
1 
2 1 11 
1 1 
1 1 
5 9 
1 2 
1 
1 1 
5 7 
2 5 
1 6 
2 16 
1 2 
3 5 15 
5 2 17 
4 4 15 
2 2 9 
4 2 13 
1 4 
2 2 
1 
1 
1 1 
114 
1 2 
2 
2 14 
1 3 
1 1 
13 8 
13 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
2 
1 2 
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Table 5 
Temporal Distribution of Bidder Firms 
according to Two Digit SIC Code 
SIC Code 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 
10 
12 
13 
16 
20 
21 
23 
24 
27 
28 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
45 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
58 
59 
61 
63 
67 
70 
73 
75 
78 
89 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 3 
1 
1 4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
5 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
13 2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 
3 1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
10 
2 
12 
1 
1 
2 
3 
12 
1 
4 
8 
7 
14 
14 
8 
5 
7 
2 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
10 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
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Comparison to Merger Research 
A second and important dimension of the preliminary discussion 
relates and contrasts initial output to previous reports of merger 
firm returns. Substantial congruence will strengthen the external 
validity of this study. Most authors vary sample size, sample 
selection criteria, and operational definitions to accommodate their 
particular methodologies. Likewise, this data sample is unique but 
realistic, since bidding wars, multiple observations of actively 
merging firms, and foreign buyouts of U.S. domestic firms are 
included to reflect the full range of the arbitrageur’s opportunities. 
Because most previous studies use some variant of cumulative 
average residual analysis, the initial results, reported in Table 6, 
are derived from the OLS single index market model (equation 5c) to 
provide a more valid comparison. During the 25 day preannouncement 
period, market expectation of the acquisition is evident. The target 
firm cumulative average forecast errors (CAFE) become increasingly 
positive and reach 12.33% by the day prior to the acquisition offer 
announcement. More than half the preproposal period gain occurs in 
the week immediately preceding the announcement, indicating some 
unbiased event anticipation based on public information that signals 
an increased probability of a takeover (66) or possibly insider 
trading (70). Moreover, the nonparametric Sign and Wilcoxon tests 
(Table 7) closely agree on the significance of these excess return 
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measures. 
The average announcement day excess return performance (AFE) is 
17.19% and highly significant. Not only are almost 90% of the 
forecast errors positive but according to the nonparametric tests 
they are significant at the 1% probability level. The market 
recognizes a very positive effect of takeover activity on target 
shareholders’ wealth. While the postannouncement CAFE rises 
gradually over the next 20 trading days, few of the daily AFE are 
significant. Thereafter a downward trend begins, and the sample 
loses about one tenth of the initial merger gain. Many more of the 
AFE are significantly negative. This movement reflects the market’s 
revised assessment of merger activity as merger negotiations are 
terminated but does not imply that the market’s initial upward 
revaluation of the target firm was excessive. 
A direct comparison references the data in Table 6 to other 
merger research based on daily stock returns. While these target 
firm forecast errors are higher than those reported in most studies, 
they are not excessively greater. Such differences may be 
attributable to the choice of the event date. For instance, some 
researchers use the publication date of the merger announcement. In 
contrast this study identifies the actual date of the announcement; 
therefore, a greater capital market reaction should be measured and 
these forecast errors should appear more peaked. Also, the 
announcement day AFE is higher than merger samples (i.e., Dodd (12%) 
and Asquith (9.5% - 5 day preannouncement CAFE)) but is lower than 
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Table 6 
Excess Return Measure OLS Market Model 
Target Firms 
(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) % positive % negat 
-25 -.0009 -.0009 .446 .554 
-24 -.0006 -.0015 .387 .613 
-23 .0036 .0021 . 464 .536 
-22 .0050 .0071 .512 .488 
-21 -.0027 .0044 .429 .571 
-20 .0046 .0050 .470 .530 
-19 .0042 .0132 .512 .488 
-18 -.0002 .0130 .476 .524 
-17 .0006 .0136 . 464 .536 
-16 .0015 .0151 .524 .476 
-15 .0008 .0159 .482 .518 
-14 -.0009 .0150 .452 .548 
-13 .0041 .0191 .512 .488 
-12 .0049 .0240 .482 .518 
-11 .0038 .0290 .458 .542 
-10 .0012 .0371 .488 .512 
-9 .0081 .0371 .512 .488 
-8 .0023 .0394 .482 .518 
-7 .0059 .0452 .482 .518 
-6 .0080 .0532 .524 .476 
-5 .0047 .0579 .565 .435 
-4 .0083 .0662 .542 .458 
-3 .0099 .0762 .583 .417 
-2 .0167 .0928 .643 .357 
-1 .0305 .1233 .750 .250 
0 .1719 .2952 .875 .125 
1 .0039 .2991 .506 .494 
2 -.0002 .2989 .482 .518 
3 .0000 .2989 .404 .596 
4 -.0022 .2967 .422 .578 
5 .0040 .3007 .461 .539 
6 -.0012 .2996 .399 .601 
7 -.0001 .2995 .472 .528 
8 .0004 .2999 .460 .540 
9 .0002 .3001 .416 .584 
10 .0020 .3021 .431 .569 
11 .0022 .3043 .506 .494 
12 .0003 .3046 .418 .582 
13 .0017 .3063 .405 .595 
14 -.0011 .3052 .446 .554 
15 -.0012 .3040 .458 .542 
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Table 6 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) % positive % negative 
16 .0005 .3045 .468 .532 
17 .0017 .3062 .586 .414 
18 . -.0011 .3051 .400 .600 
19 -.0000 .3051 .473 .527 
20 -.0001 .3050 .497 .503 
21 -.0008 .3042 .466 .534 
22 -.0000 .3042 .466 .534 
23 -.0029 .3013 .395 .605 
24 -.0014 .2999 .479 .521 
25 -.0035 .2964 .424 .576 
26 -.0002 .2962 .451 .549 
27 -.0036 .2927 .507 .493 
28 -.0018 .2909 .472 .528 
29 -.0017 .2892 .404 .596 
30 .0008 .2900 .464 .536 
31 -.0007 .2893 .423 .577 
32 .0011 .2904 .463 .537 
33 -.0029 .2875 .356 . 644 
34 -.0023 .2852 .474 .526 
35 -.0003 .2848 .447 .553 
36 -.0024 .2824 . 446 .554 
37 -.0021 .2812 .388 .612 
38 -.0020 .2792 .477 .523 
39 -.0030 .2762 .384 .616 
40 -.0046 .2716 .382 .618 
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Table 7 
Nonparametric Significance Statistics OLS AFE 
Target Firms 
(two-tailed probability in parentheses) 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 .77 (.44) -.75 ( .45) 
-24 2.63 (.01) -1.71 ( .09) 
-23 .77 (.44) -.09 ( .92) 
-22 .46 ( . 64) -1.62 ( .10) 
-21 1.86 (.06) -1.62 ( .10) 
-20 .62 (.54) -.14 ( .88) 
-19 .31 (.75) -.14 ( .89) 
-18 1.24 (.22) -1.18 ( .24) 
-17 .77 (.44) -.98 ( .32) 
-16 0.00 (1.0) -1.19 ( .23) 
-15 .77 (.44) -.49 ( .62) 
-14 1.24 (.22) -.66 ( .51) 
-13 0.00 (1.0) -1.50 ( .13) 
-12 . 46 (.64) -.20 ( .84) 
-11 .77 (.44) -.44 ( .66) 
-10 1.08 (.28) -.17 ( .86) 
- 9 0.00 (1.0) -1.08 ( .31) 
- 8 . 46 (.35) -.73 ( .46) 
- 7 1.24 (1.0) -.82 ( .40) 
- 6 .62 ( . 64) -1.33 ( .18) 
- 5 1.39 ( .22) -1.34 ( .18) 
- 4 3.09 (.54) -1.89 ( .06) 
- 3 1.39 (.16) -3.23 ( .00) 
- 2 3.09 (.00) -4.13 ( .00) 
- 1 5.88 (.00) -6.69 ( .00) 
0 9.59 (.00) -10.24 ( .00) 
1 -.08 (.94) -.17 ( .86) 
2 .47 (.63) -.99 ( .32) 
3 2.21 (.02) -2.59 ( .01) 
4 .95 (.34) -1.26 ( .20) 
5 1.35 (.17) -.05 ( .96) 
6 2.94 (.00) -1.52 ( .13) 
7 1.03 (.30) -1.48 ( .14) 
8 .08 (.94) -.10 ( .92) 
9 1.68 (.09) -1.58 ( .11) 
10 1.78 (.07) -.63 ( .52) 
11 .41 ( .69) -1.02 ( .30) 
12 1.30 (.19) -.65 ( .52) 
13 2.11 (.03) -.18 ( .86) 
14 1.22 (.22) -.72 ( .47) 
15 1.80 (.07) -.61 ( .54) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
1.27 (.20) 
.24 (.81) 
1.44 (.15) 
2.64 (.00) 
1.44 (.15) 
1.20 (.23) 
.24 (.81) 
2.04 (.04) 
2.71 (.00) 
-.08 (.94) 
.82 (.41) 
.41 (.69) 
-.08 (.93) 
2.22 (.03) 
.75 (.45) 
1.75 (.08) 
1.91 (.06) 
-.08 (.93) 
.17 (.87) 
2.28 (.02) 
1.10 (.27) 
1.97 (.05) 
.26 (.80) 
2.51 (.01) 
.61 (.54) 
-.26 (.80) 
-.19 (.85) 
-.96 (.37) 
-1.56 (.12) 
-.95 (.34) 
-.41 (.68) 
-.26 (.80) 
-1.68 (.09) 
-2.57 (.01) 
-.42 (.67) 
-.81 (.41) 
-.93 (.35) 
-.12 (.90) 
-2.61 (.01) 
-1.46 (.14) 
-1.84 (.07) 
-2.08 (.04) 
-.46 (.65) 
-1.37 (.17) 
-1.42 (.16) 
-.28 (.76) 
-1.34 (.18) 
-.50 (.61) 
-1.83 (.07) 
-1.38 (.17) 
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results for samples of tender offers (Bradley et al., 35.5% 
announcement day AFE). Since this sample contains both merger and 
tender offers, a higher mean return is likely and a 30% CAFE is not an 
unreasonable finding. Still other differences may stem from 
uniquenesss in sample collection (3, 23, 31, 66, 70), heterogeneous 
bid types, or randomness. 
Most researchers (3, 32, 34, 37, 81) find a positive trend in 
seller firm excess return beginning approximately five to seven months 
prior to a merger's successful conclusion. Although these earlier 
studies utilize monthly stock returns and cannot pinpoint the effect 
of a public announcement of a merger proposal, their information 
content is well matched by these daily results (Tables 6 and 8). In 
comparison, the experimental period intervals are approximately 
equal. The duration of successful merger negotiations of this sample 
averages 92 trading days and the addition of a 25 day preannouncement 
buffer to measure any return bias creates an interval directly 
comparable to previous research.^ 
In a competitive capital market, the bidder firm stock returns 
(Table 8) should not reflect any merger gains as a result of the 
offer. Their AFE are therefore hypothesized not to be different from 
zero. The slightly negative announcement day AFE is significant at 
the 5% level as measured by the nonparametric tests (Table 9). This 
finding infers that acquisitions are perceived to be negative net 
present value investments because bidder firms offer an excessive 
value for the targets. While Dodd also reports a small significant 
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bidder firm announcement day excess return, Jensen and Ruback 
conjecture that Dodd* s negative announcement day results are sample 
specific and should be zero in a competitive capital market. While 
these forecast errors are on balance negative, the postannouncement 
AFE are mostly insignificantly negative. For only two daily 
observations do both nonparametric tests agree that the daily interim 
period bidder firm AFE are nonzero. Day 6 is significantly positive 
and day 23 is significantly negative; 27 out of 40 AFE are negative 
and day 40 CAFE is -1.84%, a slight negative return to bidding firms. 
Again these findings approximate the characteristic return of monthly 
merger reports. 
Unsuccessful mergers have received less coverage in the literature 
because most authors test the effect of the merger itself. While Dodd 
shows very little difference between the successful and failed 
categories up to the merger announcement, Table 10 shows a lagging 
preannouncement performance of the failed group over the entire 
preevent period and a noticeably weaker wealth adjustment to the 
merger announcement itself. The trend of the target firm CAFE is 
negative and approximately two-thirds of the significantly positive 
announcement day excess return is eroded. Although the failed group 
does not contain a large number of observations, this trend may 
reflect the market’s skepticism regarding a successful outcome, and 
the modest reaction may be seen as a precursor to the termination of 
the merger negotiations. Several researchers show a negative target 
firm return to the merger's cancelation; however, Dodd demonstrates 
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Table 8 
Excess Return Measure OLS Market Model 
Bidder Firms 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) % positive % negative 
-25 .0004 .0004 .509 .491 
-24 .0005 .0009 .497 .503 
-23 .0030 .0039 .590 .410 
-22 -.0017 .0022 .460 .540 
-21 -.0014 .0035 .516 .484 
-20 -.0002 .0033 .441 .559 
-19 .0004 .0037 .478 .522 
-18 -.0019 .0018 .478 .522 
-17 .0004 .0022 .447 .553 
-16 .0012 .0034 .559 .441 
-15 -.0020 .0014 .453 .547 
-14 .0010 .0024 .540 .460 
-13 .0019 .0043 .528 .472 
-12 .0006 .0049 .540 .460 
-11 .0004 .0053 .491 .509 
-10 .0001 .0053 .503 .497 
-9 .0003 .0057 .509 .491 
—8 .0015 .0072 .497 .503 
-7 -.0008 .0064 .478 .522 
-6 -.0002 .0061 .453 .547 
-5 -.0006 .0055 .503 .497 
-4 -.0012 .0043 .453 .547 
-3 -.0005 .0038 .447 .553 
-2 .0034 .0072 .453 .547 
-1 -.0002 .0070 .478 .522 
0 -.0048 .0022 .422 .578 
1 -.0030 -.0008 .466 .534 
2 .0023 .0015 .556 .444 
3 -.0002 .0012 .484 .516 
4 -.0001 .0012 .437 .563 
5 .0016 .0028 .561 .439 
6 .0026 .0054 .503 .497 
7 -.0002 .0052 .490 .510 
8 -.0013 .0039 .458 .542 
9 -.0007 .0031 .529 .471 
10 -.0032 -.0000 .430 .570 
11 -.0014 -.0015 .537 .463 
12 .0003 -.0011 .490 .510 
13 .0016 .0004 .559 .441 
14 -.0027 -.0023 .462 .538 
15 -.0024 -.0047 .507 .493 
16 .0010 -.0037 .524 .476 
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Table 8 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) % positive % negative 
17 -.0008 -.0046 .414 .586 
18 -.0030 -.0076 .457 .543 
19 -.0000 -.0076 .515 .485 
20 -.0007 -.0083 .504 .496 
21 -.0025 -.0108 .389 .611 
22 -.0014 -. 0122 .415 .585 
23 -.0015 -.0137 .457 .543 
24 -.0018 -.0155 .457 .543 
25 -.0002 -.0157 .484 .516 
26 .0019 -. 0139 .469 .531 
27 -.0001 -.0139 .520 .480 
28 -.0007 -.0146 .496 .504 
29 -.0028 -.0174 .416 .584 
30 .0017 -.0157 .460 .540 
31 .0004 -.0153 .508 .492 
32 .0015 -.0139 .504 .496 
33 .0011 -.0128 .471 .529 
34 -.0029 -.0157 .492 .508 
35 .0012 -.0145 .470 .530 
36 .0012 -.0133 .496 .504 
37 -.0006 -.0139 .487 .513 
38 -.0037 -.0176 .504 .496 
39 .0006 -.0170 .557 .443 
40 -.0014 -.0184 .407 .593 
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Table 9 
Nonparametric Significance Statistics of OLS AFE 
Bidder Firms 
(two-tailed probability in parentheses) 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 .53 ( .59) -.70 ( .48) 
-24 .84 (.40) -.28 ( .77) 
-23 1.18 (.23) -1.12 ( .26) 
-22 0.00 (1.0) -.01 ( .99) 
-21 .38 (.74) -.07 ( .94) 
-20 3.20 (.00) -3.40 ( .00) 
-19 1.30 (.18) -1.10 ( .26) 
-18 0.00 (1.0) -.68 ( .49) 
-17 .33 (.73) -.16 ( .87) 
-16 .50 (.61) -.10 ( .92) 
-15 0.00 (1.0) -.09 ( .93) 
-14 0.00 (1.0) -.58 ( .56) 
-13 .84 (.40) -.51 ( .61) 
-12 .67 (.50) -.07 ( .94) 
-11 .33 (.73) -.59 ( .55) 
-10 .50 (.61) -.01 ( .99) 
- 9 0.00 (1.0) -.99 ( .32) 
- 8 .33 (.74) -.44 ( .66) 
- 7 1.68 (.09) -1.95 ( .05) 
- 6 .33 (.74) -.04 ( .97) 
- 5 1.35 (.18) -1.52 ( .13) 
- 4 .50 (.61) -.76 ( .44) 
- 3 .50 ( .61) -.82 ( .41) 
- 2 1.57 (.12) -1.78 ( .68) 
- 1 0.00 (1.0) -.28 ( .78) 
0 1.99 (.05) -2.08 ( .04) 
1 2.10 (.04) -1.28 ( .20) 
2 .34 (.73) -.05 ( .96) 
3 .34 (.73) -.72 ( .47) 
4 1.46 (.14) -.88 ( .38) 
5 1.28 (.20) -1.47 ( .14) 
6 2.14 (.03) -2.08 ( .04) 
7 1.80 (.07) -1.64 ( .10) 
8 1.20 (.23) -.61 ( .60) 
9 .43 (.67) -.19 ( .85) 
10 .17 (.86) -.22 ( .82) 
11 .69 (.48) -.36 ( .72) 
12 .52 (.60) -1.11 ( .27) 
13 .96 (.33) -.82 ( .41) 
14 1.06 (.29) -.17 ( .87) 
15 .80 (.42) .13 ( .89) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
.09 (.93) -.61 ( .53) 
0.00 (1.0) .42 ( .68) 
1.18 (.24) -1.19 ( .24) 
.63 (.53) -1.27 ( .20) 
.63 (.53) -.20 ( .84) 
.81 (.42) -1.33 ( .18) 
.09 (.93) -.72 ( .47) 
2.62 (.01) -2.70 ( .01) 
.27 (.78) -.40 ( .69) 
. 64 (.52) -.06 ( .95) 
.09 (.93) -.29 (, .77) 
.18 (.85) -.50 (, .61) 
.46 (.64) -.56 (, .58) 
1.33 (.18) -1.63 ( .10) 
-.09 (.92) -.53 ( .60) 
0.00 (1.0) -.40 ( .69) 
.96 ( .34) -.66 (, .51) 
1.35 (.18) -1.36 (, .17) 
1.75 (.08) -1.83 (, .07) 
1.36 (.17) -1.09 (, .29) 
1.18 (.24) -1.07 ( .28) 
.49 (.62) -1.09 ( .28) 
.99 (.32) -1.07 (■ .28) 
1.79 (.07) 2.52 (, .01) 
.10 (.92) -.49 (, .62) 
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Table 10 
Excess Return Measure OLS Market Model 
according to Outcome 
Target Firms 
t(days) 
Successful 
AFE(t) 
Mergers 
CAFE(t) 
Failed 
AFE(t) 
Mergers 
CAFE(t 
-25 -.0018 -.0018 .0012 .0012 
-24 -.0020 -.0038 .0026 .0038 
-23 .0032 -.0006 .0046 .0083 
-22 .0046 .0040 .0062 .0145 
-21 .0002 .0042 -.0096 .0049 
-20 .0052 .0094 .0031 .0080 
-19 .0069 .0163 -.0021 .0060 
-18 -.0011 .0151 .0019 .0078 
-17 .0018 .0170 -.0022 .0056 
-16 -.0001 .0170 .0053 .0109 
-15 -.0003 .0165 .0035 .0144 
-14 -.0014 .0151 .0003 .0147 
-13 .0042 .0193 .0038 .0184 
-12 .0076 .0270 -.0014 .0170 
-11 .0050 .0320 .0009 .0179 
-10 .0005 .0325 .0027 .0207 
-9 .0090 .0414 .0061 .0268 
-8 .0021 .0435 .0027 .0295 
-7 .0063 .0498 .0050 .0345 
-6 .0064 .0562 .0116 .0460 
-5 .0078 .0640 -.0026 .0435 
-4 .0068 .0708 .0120 .0555 
-3 .0103 .0811 .0091 .0645 
-2 .0187 .0998 .0120 .0764 
-1 .0338 .1335 .0228 .0991 
0 .1899 .3234 .1295 .2285 
1 .0053 .3287 .0006 .2292 
2 -.0014 .3274 .0024 .2316 
3 .0007 .3281 -.0017 .2299 
4 -.0033 .3248 .0004 .2303 
5 .0029 .3277 .0070 .2373 
6 .0004 .3281 -.0053 .2320 
7 .0011 .3292 -.0033 .2287 
8 .0003 .3296 .0050 .2292 
9 .0033 .3329 -.0083 .2209 
10 .0028 .3357 -.0001 .2208 
11 .0031 .3388 -.0003 .2205 
12 .0036 .3424 -.0092 .2113 
13 .0028 .3452 -.0015 .2098 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
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Table 10 (continued) 
AFE(t) CAFE(t) AFE(t) CAFE(t 
.0004 .3456 -.0053 .2045 
.0005 .3461 -.0062 .1983 
.0042 .3503 -.0099 .1884 
.0018 .3521 .0014 .1897 
-.0013 .3508 -.0002 .1896 
.0003 .3511 -.0012 .1884 
.0005 .3516 -.0021 .1863 
.0006 .3523 -.0055 .1808 
-.0021 .3502 .0068 .1876 
-.0029 .3472 -.0028 .1848 
.0002 .3474 -.0067 .1781 
-.0029 .3444 -.0052 .1729 
-.0005 .3439 .0012 .1741 
.0003 .3442 -.0172 .1569 
-.0003 .3439 -.0070 .1499 
-.0004 .3435 -.0064 .1435 
-.0004 .3431 .0055 .1490 
.0004 .3435 -.0052 .1438 
.0012 .3447 .0003 .1442 
-.0026 .3421 -.0042 .1399 
.0000 .3421 -.0129 .1270 
.0006 .3428 -.0046 .1224 
-.0003 .3424 -.0118 .1105 
-.0009 .3415 -.0026 .1079 
-.0004 .3410 -.0098 .0981 
.0000 .3410 -.0178 .0803 
-.0037 .3374 -.0089 .0714 
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Table 11 
Significance Statistics for Target Firms 
according to Outcome 
(two-tailed probability in parentheses) 
Successful Mergers Unsuccessful Mergers 
t(days) Sign Test. Wilcoxon Test Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 1.93 (.05) -1.90 (.05) -.14 (.88) -.32 ( :.74) 
-24 3.40 (.00) -3.06 (.00) -.14 (.88) -.51 ( : .60) 
-23 .27 (.78) -.55 (.57) .42 (.67) -.87 ( :.38) 
-22 .27 (.78) -.99 ( .32) -.14 (.88) -.71 ( : .47) 
-21 .27 (.78) -.02 (.98) 2.40 (.01) -2.56 ( :.od 
-20 .09 (.92) -.81 ( .41) 1.27 (.20) -.54 ( :.58) 
-19 .27 (.78) -1.89 (.06) .42 (.67) -.97 ( :.33) 
-18 .64 (.52) -.88 ( .37) -.14 (.88) -.11 ( :.9D 
-17 .09 (.92) -.08 (.93) 1.27 (.20) -1.69 ( :.o9) 
-16 .27 (.78) -.12 (.90) .14 (.88) -.33 ( :.74) 
-15 .09 ( .93) -1.16 (.24) .42 (.67) -.25 ( ;.8o) 
-14 .83 (.40) -.53 (.59) .42 ( .67) -.43 ( .67) 
-13 .09 (.92) -1.06 (.28) .14 (.88) -.43 ( :.66) 
-12 .09 (.93) -1.19 (.23) .70 (.48) -.40 ( .69) 
-11 1.01 (.31) -.05 (.46) .14 (.88) -.16 ( .87) 
-10 .09 (.93) -.19 (.85) .14 (.88) -.91 ( .36) 
-9 1.01 (.31) -1.74 (.08) .99 (.32) -.14 ( :.89) 
-8 1.20 (.23) -.51 (.61) .70 (.48) -.95 ( .34) 
-7 1.20 (.23) -.36 (.71) .99 (.32) -1.11 ( :.26) 
-6 .46 ( .64) -.80 ( .42) .14 (.88) -.77 ( .43) 
-5 1.93 (.05) -2.25 (.02) .14 (.88) -.37 ( ;.7D 
-4 .46 (.64) -1.52 (.12) .70 (.48) -1.20 ( ; .23) 
-3 1.38 (.16) -2.65 (.01) 1.55 (.12) -2.38 ( :.02) 
-2 3.04 (.00) -4.12 (.00) 2.12 (.03) -2.47 ( .01) 
-1 6.16 (.00) -6.60 (.00) 2.12 (.03) -2.60 ( :-oi) 
0 8.19 (.00) -8.78 (.00) 4.95 (.00) -5.23 ( ;.oo) 
1 .09 (.92) -.41 (.67) .14 (.88) -.34 ( :.73) 
2 .46 ( .64) -.83 ( .40) -.14 (.88) -.51 ( ;.60) 
3 1.56 (.12) -1.55 (.12) 1.30 (.19) -1.38 ( :.i6) 
4 1.93 (.05) -2.12 (.03) .14 (.88) -.14 ( :.88) 
5 .83 (.40) -.03 (.98) 0.00 (1.0) -.62 (.53) 
6 1.93 (.05) -1.28 (.20) 1.79 (.07) -1.56 ( :.i2) 
7 -.09 (.92) -.38 (.70) 1.19 (.23) -1.14 ( :.25) 
8 1.19 (.23) -.50 (.61) 0.00 (1.0) -.24 ( :.8D 
9 1.75 (.08) -1.04 (.29) 1.52 (.12) -1.45 (.15) 
10 .55 (.59) -.01 (.99) 1.83 ( .07) -1.21 (.22) 
11 0.00 (1.0) -.53 (.59) .31 (.75) -.10 (.92) 
12 .55 (.59) -.09 (.92) 2.18 (.03) -1.83 (.07) 
13 2.59 (.01) -1.46 (.15) .31 (.75) -.06 (.95) 
14 .46 (.64) -.01 (.99) 1.87 ( .06) -1.80 (.07) 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Successful Mergers Unsuccessful Mergers 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
15 1.49 (.13) -.29 ( .77) .47 (.63) -.23 (.82) 
16 .47 ( .64) -.78 (.43) 2.10 (.04) -2.08 (.04) 
17 1.59 (.11) -1.24 (.22) 1.14 (.26) -.41 (.36) 
18 2.08 (.04) -2.30 (.02) .66 (.51) -.37 (.71) 
19 .19 (.85) -.46 ( .64) .98 (.32) -.78 (.44) 
20 .19 (.85) -.20 (.84) .50 ( .62) -.71 (.48) 
21 .75 (.45) -.86 (.39) .34 (.73) -.78 (.43) 
22 1.88 (.06) -1.70 (.10) 2.03 (.04) -1.80 (.07) 
23 2.17 (.03) -3.22 (.00) 1.69 (.09) -1.20 (.23) 
24 .19 (.85) -.53 (.59) .86 (.39) -1.16 (.12) 
25 1.42 (.15) -1.55 (.12) .88 (.34) -1.23 (.22) 
26 1.23 (.22) -1.51 (.13) .18 ( .86) -.11 (.91) 
27 .47 ( .64) -.48 (.63) .18 (.86) -1.01 (.31) 
28 .57 (.57) -1.75 (.08) 0.00 (1.0) -.65 (.52) 
29 1.52 (.13) -.86 (.33) 1.64 (.10) -.96 (.34) 
30 .76 (.45) -.39 (.70) 0.00 (1.0) -.66 (.51) 
31 1.81 (.07) -.84 (.40) 0.00 (1.0) -.91 (.36) 
32 -.10 (.92) -.72 ( .47) 1.37 (.17) -.60 (.55) 
33 2.87 (.00) -2.64 (.00) 1.76 (.08) -1.36 (.17) 
34 .19 (.85) -.26 (.79) .20 (.84) -1.37 (.17) 
35 1.15 (.25) -.70 (.48) 0.00 (1.0) -.03 (.97) 
36 .97 (.33) -.98 ( .33) .42 (.68) -1.03 (.30) 
37 1.93 (.05) -1.39 (.16) .97 (.28) -1.28 (.20) 
38 .49 (.03) -.83 (.40) 0.00 (1.0) -.41 (.69) 
39 1.97 (.05) -1.31 (.19) 1.76 (.08) -2.31 (.02) 
40 1.88 (.06) -1.72 (.09) 2.22 (.03) -1.96 (.05) 
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that the size of the downward postcancelation adjustment depends on 
the identity of the merger party initiating the termination in 
negotiations. While no similar categorization is made for this 
particular data base, nonetheless, failure is clearly perceived as a 
negative event. 
Segmenting the bidder firms into groups according to the outcome of 
their takeover offers in Table 12 reveals a differential reaction to 
the announcement. The day 0 returns to successful bidding firms are 
slightly negative (-0.14%) but insignificantly different from zero. 
On the other hand, the same day returns to unsuccessful bidders are 
significantly negative (-0.99%) and afterwards continue to trend 
downward, reaching -4.52% by day 40. 
The successful bidder firm returns conform to a competitive market 
for corporate control, since the market’s initial reaction is a normal 
return. The unsuccessful bidder firm return is more difficult to 
explain. As indicated by the significantly negative day 0 return, the 
market initially assigns different probabilities of success across the 
two groups. The subsequent downward trend may reflect either the 
market’s resolution of uncertainty regarding the ability of the bidder 
firm management to plan and execute the takeover (3) or the loss of an 
opportunity to control a valuable asset, the target firm. 
In summary, these initial results do agree with the conclusions of 
prior research about the impact of merger negotiations on bidder and 
target firms. Most important, the differences in sample selection and 
return interval do not materially affect the results. This 
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Table 12 
Excess Return Measure OLS Market Model 
according to Outcome 
Bidder Firms 
t(days) 
Successful 
AFE(t) 
Mergers 
CAFE(t) 
Failed 
AFE(t) 
Mergers 
CAFE(t 
-25 .0001 .0001 .0009 .0009 
-24 .0016 .0017 -.0012 -.0003 
-23 .0020 .0037 .0048 .0042 
-22 -.0019 .0018 -.0015 .0027 
-21 .0034 .0052 -.0017 .0010 
-20 .0014 .0067 -.0028 -.0018 
-19 -.0001 .0065 .0012 -.0006 
-18 -.0029 .0036 -.0004 -.0010 
-17 -.0008 .0028 .0023 .0012 
-16 .0007 .0034 .0021 .0034 
-15 -.0002 .0032 -.0046 -.0012 
-14 .0002 .0034 .0022 .0010 
-13 .0014 .0048 .0026 .0036 
-12 .0012 .0060 -.0002 .0033 
-11 .0001 .0061 .0007 .0040 
-10 -.0019 .0042 .0030 .0071 
-9 .0009 .0051 -.0006 .0065 
-8 .0008 .0059 .0025 .0091 
-7 .0010 .0069 -.0035 .0056 
-6 .0009 .0078 -.0021 .0036 
-5 -.0001 .0078 -.0016 .0020 
-4 -.0022 .0056 .0003 .0023 
-3 -.0011 .0045 .0004 .0027 
-2 .0027 .0072 .0046 .0072 
-1 -.0009 .0064 .0008 .0080 
0 -.0014 .0049 -.0099 -.0019 
1 -.0018 .0031 -.0049 -.0068 
2 .0014 .0045 .0037 -.0030 
3 .0025 .0070 -.0045 -.0076 
4 -.0001 .0069 .0000 -.0076 
5 .0014 .0083 .0019 -.0057 
6 .0019 .0101 .0038 -.0019 
7 .0003 .0105 -.0009 -.0028 
8 -.0009 .0096 -.0021 -.0049 
9 -.0003 .0093 -.0015 -.0064 
10 -.0014 .0079 -.0063 -.0127 
11 -.0003 .0076 -.0035 -.0162 
12 .0006 .0082 -.0002 -.0164 
13 .0019 .0101 .0009 -.0155 
14 -.0014 .0086 -.0052 -.0207 
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Table 12 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) AFE(t) CAFE(t) 
15 -.0001 .0086 -.0069 -.0276 
16 .0000 .0086 .0028 -.0248 
17 -.0024 .0062 .0023 -.0225 
18 -.0011 .0050 -.0068 -.0293 
19 .0002 .0053 -.0006 -.0299 
20 .0011 .0064 -.0045 -.0344 
21 -.0039 .0025 .0007 -.0337 
22 -.0007 .0018 .0031 -.0368 
23 -.0018 .0000 -.0008 -.0376 
24 -.0003 -.0003 -.0053 -.0429 
25 .0019 .0016 -.0052 -.0482 
26 .0008 .0024 .0045 -.0436 
27 -.0010 .0013 .0022 -.0414 
28 -.0030 -.0017 .0056 -.0383 
29 -.0020 -.0037 -.0048 -.0481 
30 -.0010 -.0046 .0087 -.0325 
31 .0011 -.0035 -.0017 -.0341 
32 .0008 -.0027 .0033 -.0308 
33 .0015 -.0012 -.0002 -.0310 
34 -.0014 -.0026 -.0073 -.0383 
35 .0001 -.0026 .0026 -.0336 
36 .0009 -.0017 .0022 -.0313 
37 .0006 -.0012 -.0047 -.0360 
38 -.0025 -.0037 -.0075 -.0435 
39 -.0005 -.0032 .0079 -.0427 
40 -.0010 -.0042 -.0025 -.0452 
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Table 13 
Significance Statistics for Bidder Firms 
according to Outcome 
(two-tailed probability in parentheses) 
Successful Mergers Unsuccessful Mergers 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 .20 (.84) -.53 ( .60) 0.00 (1.0) 
-24 1.02 (.31) -.89 ( .37) 1.26 ( .21) 
-23 1.83 (.07) -1.32 ( .19) 1.26 (.21) 
-22 0.00 (1.0) -.14 ( .89) 1.01 (.31) 
-21 .61 (.54) -.68 ( .50) .50 (.61) 
-20 1.22 (.23) -.51 ( .61) 1.01 (.31) 
-19 .81 (.42) -.35 ( .72) .25 (.80) 
-18 .20 (.84) -1.01 ( .27) .25 (.80) 
-17 1.62 (.10) -1.41 ( .16) 0.00 (1.0) 
-16 1.22 (.22) -.69 ( .49) .50 (.61) 
-15 .61 (.54) -.65 ( .52) 1.01 (.31) 
-14 .41 (.68) -.54 ( .59) 1.26 ( .21) 
-13 .20 (.84) -.21 ( .83) .76 (.45) 
-12 1.62 (.10) -1.08 ( .28) .50 (.61) 
-11 .81 (.42) -.82 ( .42) .50 (.61) 
-10 .81 (.42) -1.46 ( .14) .76 (.45) 
.20 (.84) -.22 ( .83) 0.00 (1.0) 
-8 .81 (.42) -.68 ( .50) .76 (.45) 
-7 0.00 (1.0) -.21 ( :.84) .76 (.45) 
-8 .61 ( .54) -.15 ( :.88) .76 ( .45) 
-5 0.00 (1.0) -.02 ( :.98) .25 (.80) 
-4 1.05 (.31) -2.26 ( :.02) .50 (.61) 
-3 1.42 (.16) -1.85 ( :.06) 0.00 (1.0) 
-2 1.02 ( .31) -.07 ( :.94) .25 (.80) 
-1 1.22 (.22) -1.25 (.21) .25 (.80) 
0 .61 (.54) -.80 ( : .42) 2.27 ( .02) 
1 .20 (.84) -.78 (.43) .76 (.45) 
2 .20 (.84) -.58 (.60) 1.65 (.10) 
3 .61 (.54) -.64 (.52) 1.54 (.12) 
4 1.42 (.16) -.37 (.71) .13 (.90) 
5 1.42 (.16) -.68 ( :.5o) .52 (.60) 
6 .20 (.84) -.02 < :.98) 0.00 (1.0) 
7 .20 (.84) -.11 ( :.9D .80 (.43) 
8 .81 (.42) -.98 1 :.33) .27 (.79) 
9 1.22 (.22) -.30 < (.77) .27 (.79) 
10 1.12 ( .26) -1.18 < (.24) 1.22 (.22) 
11 .92 (.36) -.39 < (.70) -.14 (.89) 
12 .10 (.92) -.83 i (.41) .42 (.67) 
13 1.23 (.22) -.79 (.43) .29 (.78) 
14 0.00 (1.0) -.74 ' ( .46) 1.14 (.25) 
-.60 (.55) 
-1.00 (.31) 
-1.40 (.16) 
-.67 (.50) 
-1.09 (.28) 
-1.10 (.27) 
-.06 (.96) 
-.31 (.76) 
-.18 (.86) 
-.69 (.49) 
-1.92 (.06) 
-1.31 (.19) 
-1.08 (.28) 
-.33 (.74) 
-.51 (.61) 
-1.07 (.29) 
-.21 (.83) 
-.44 (.66) 
-1.25 (.21) 
-1.02 (.31) 
-.84 (.40) 
-.57 (.57) 
-.16 (.88) 
-.57 (.57) 
-.64 (.52) 
-3.58 (.00) 
-1.65 (.10) 
-1.50 (.13) 
-1.64 (.10) 
-.09 (.93) 
-.36 (.72) 
-.58 (.56) 
-1.02 (.31) 
-.58 (.56) 
-.55 (.58) 
-.95 (.34) 
-.13 (.21) 
-.28 (.78) 
-.17 (.86) 
-.33 (.74) 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Successful Mergers Unsuccessful Mergers 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
15 1.14 (.26) -.39 (.70) 1.01 (.31) -2.43 (.02) 
16 .62 (.53) -.38 (.70) .43 (.66) -.38 (.70) 
17 2.19 (.03) -2.14 (.03) .15 (.83) -.10 (.92) 
18 .21 (.83) -.36 (.72) .56 (.55) -.77 (.44) 
19 .21 (.83) -.16 (.87) 0.00 (1.0) -.30 (.76) 
20 .21 (.83) -.87 (.38) -.15 (.88) -.32 (.76) 
21 2.21 (.03) -2.56 (.01) . 64 (.52) -.49 (.62) 
22 1.37 (.17) -1.70 (.09) 1.14 ( .26) -.70 (.48) 
23 1.16 (.25) -1.43 (.15) .16 (.87) -.50 (.62) 
24 .74 (.46) -.65 ( .51) .49 (.63) -1.59 (.11) 
25 .53 (.60) -.80 (.42) 1.32 (.19) -1.36 (.17) 
26 .53 (.60) -.12 (.90) 0.00 (1.0) -.99 (.32) 
27 .53 (.60) -.48 (.63) .17 (.87) -.14 (.89) 
28 1.16 (.25) -.87 ( .06) 1.50 (.13) -1.54 (.12) 
29 .74 ( .46) -1.23 (.22) 1.89 (.06) -2.11 (.04) 
30 1.37 (.17) -1.12 (.26) .70 (.49) -1.88 (.06) 
31 . 64 (.52) -.09 (.93) .53 (.60) -.73 (.47) 
32 0.00 (1.0) -.19 (.85) .36 (.72) -.61 (.54) 
33 .21 (.83) -1.36 (.17) 1.08 (.28) -1.39 (.16) 
34 .21 (.83) -.78 (.44) .94 (.34) -1.23 (.22) 
35 .42 (.67) -.34 (.73) 0.00 (1.0) -.34 (.74) 
36 .84 (.40) -.20 (.84) .77 (.44) -1.30 (.20) 
37 .21 (.83) -.62 (.54) .80 (.42) -1.17 (.24) 
38 .85 (.40) -.54 ( .59) 1.02 (.23) -1.84 (.06) 
39 1.27 (.20) -.75 (.45) 0.00 (1.0) -.47 ( .64) 
40 1.72 (.09) -1.58 (.11) .80 (.42) -.96 (.34) 
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underlying agreement will further strengthen the conclusions of this 
report on the profitability of merger arbitrage activity. 
Interval Estimation Period 
An intensive effort is required to establish the most appropriate 
estimation interval and thereby to estimate accurate statistics of 
return. No compelling argument can be made for a specific estimation 
interval; therefore, a sensitivity analysis represents the most direct 
avenue of establishing such optimum estimation inputs. To ensure 
consistency of this procedure, bidder firms are analyzed since that 
group alone has returns available both before and after the relevant 
event period. Utilizing target firm returns may introduce bias and, 
at best, be incomplete, since postevent (i.e., merger negotiation) 
returns are only available for target firms of failed mergers. 
The simplest test of the effect of interval estimations period on 
the average parameter estimate is an expansion of the preannouncement 
return series (i.e., the inputs of the estimation interval). These 
results are contained in Table 14. The alphas are close to zero and 
the beta estimates are strongly significant. Inclusion of additional 
returns to the estimation interval improves the estimates according to 
a single criterion; the cross-sectional standard errors decline 
constantly. While the beta estimates become more efficient as the 
intervals increase, however, the majority of the reduction occurs 
prior to a 150 day estimation interval. The low coefficient of 
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Table 14 
Sensitivity of Cross-Sectional Bidder Firm 
OLS Parameter Estimates to Estimation Interval 
Preevent Returns 
SPR 
Index Proxy 
CVW CEW 
50-Day Interval 
/\ 
a .0006 .0004 -.0003 
/\ 
3 .932 .995 1.108 
R2 .18 .19 .17 
se( 3 ) .354 .369 .42 
100^)ay Interval 
/s 
a .0008 .0005 -.0003 
3 .965 1.026 1.121 
R2 . .18 .19 .17 
se( 3 ) .244 .254 .287 
150-Day Interval 
S\ 
a .0007 .0005 -.0004 
3 .996 1.058 1.123 
R2 „ .18 .19 .17 
se( £ ) .200 .208 .231 
200-Day Interval 
a .0008 .0006 -.0002 
32 
R2 . 
1.00 1.063 1.095 
.19 .19 .17 
se( 3 ) .171 .178 .194 
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Table 15 
Sensitivity of Cross-Sectional Bidder Firm 
OLS Parameter Estimates to Estimation Interval 
Postevent Returns 
Index Proxy 
SPR CVW CEW 
50-Day Interval 
A 
a .0007 .0005 -.0003 
/\ 
B .832 .876 .961 
R2 .146 .151 .123 
se( g ) .395 .410 .455 
100-Day Interval 
a .0006 .0003 -.0003 
B .845 .891 .961 
R2 .149 .154 .129 
se( g ) .291 .303 .341 
150-Day Interval 
A 
a .0006 .0004 -.0003 
B .850 .894 .970 
R2 . .149 .154 .133 
se( B ) .244 .255 .289 
200-Day Interval 
/N 
a .0006 .0003 -.0003 
B .849 .892 .950 
R2 .148 .154 .140 
se( 6 ) .217 .227 .258 
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Table 16 
Sensitivity of Cross-Sectional Bidder Firm 
OLS Parameter Estimates to Estimation Interval 
Pre- and Postevent Returns 
SPR 
Index Proxy 
CVW CEW 
100-Day Interval 
a .0004 .0001 -.0006 
6 .970 1.027 1.115 
R2 .177 .185 .176 
se( § ) .254 .263 .294 
150-Day Interval 
a .0005 .0002 -.0004 
3 .965 1.020 1.087 
R2 .180 .187 .176 
se( 3 ) .209 .216 .237 
200-Day Interval 
a .0005 .0002 -.0004 
g .967 1.022 1.072 
R2 .179 .186 .170 
se( 3 ) .184 .190 .208 
250-Day Interval 
/\ 
a .0005 .0002 -.0004 
3 .973 1.031 1.080 
R2 . .177 .184 .166 
se( 3 ) .171 .177 .193 
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variation suggests that little short-run variability in security 
returns can be explained by systematic sources. 
The beta estimates increase as the market proxy is broadened from 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 (SPR) to the CRSP equal-weighted index 
proxy. A priori the CEW is expected to have a higher variance than 
the value-weighted proxies because smaller firm returns which are 
supposedly more variable receive the same influence as larger, more 
stable firms. Ordinary Least Squares parameter estimates derived from 
an equal-weighted index proxy, ceteris paribus, will be lower. The 
figures in Tables 14, 15, and 16, however, indicate the opposite. 
Roll identifies this phenomenon as a function of the return 
interval (97). Shorter interval return observations such as daily 
returns and especially those of an equal“weighted index proxy, suffer 
from high autocorrelation, and this autocorrelation causes a downward 
bias in risk measurement. This bias may result from small firm 
securities being infrequently traded and their measured returns 
deviating from their actual returns. The daily equal-weighted index 
parameters will therefore be positively biased relative to the 
value-weighted parameters. As the differencing interval increases, 
the effect of infrequent trading is reduced and results closer to the 
v , J 27 
hypothesized relationship are obtained. 
In a relative sense, larger firms such as the bidder firm sample 
should have a greater covariance with a value-weighted index proxy. 
Thus as the estimation interval increases, beta estimates become 
higher, most notably for SPR and CVW groups. Intuitively, the 
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upward shift in the systematic risk parameter estimates should have a 
negative impact on the forecast errors. While the three CVW return 
measures are reduced, the change seems minor. Most important, the 
announcement day AFE shows the least effect. The negative effect 
cumulates only to less than a 2% difference between the shortest and 
longest intervals. Based on these results, the previous conclusions 
about bidder firm merger profitability remain invariant to the 
„ 28 
estimation interval. 
An alternative methodology combines other adjacent data to derive 
parameter estimates (19). If the relevant firm event is widely 
anticipated, the preperiod returns will contain investors’ 
expectations and could yield biased Ordinary least Square parameters 
estimates. On the other hand, postevent returns should be purged of 
the information content of the event and should be free of such an 
effect. 
In comparison to preevent return parameters estimates, postperiod 
parameters (Table 14) are much more stable over the lengthening of the 
estimation interval. The standard error of the beta estimates 
asymptotically declines but not as steeply as the preperiod 
estimates. But neither are these parameter estimates more efficient 
2 
nor is the percent of explained variance (R ) as high. In addition 
the lower level of these systematic risk parameters could lead to 
positively biased performance measures. The difference between the 
two estimation intervals suggests that using postevent bidder firm 
returns to calculate risk parameter estimates is unlikely to produce 
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any statistical improvement. 
Finally, the pre- and postperiod returns are assembled into an 
combined return series. Again the Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
process (Table 16) does not produce more efficient estimates. The 
average explanatory power is no higher than previous procedures. 
Neither the coefficient of variation is higher nor is the standard 
error of the beta estimates any lower, in particular over the 
preperiod returns, the most naive formulation. In conclusion, no 
estimation interval substantially outperforms a 100 to 150 daily 
return interval of preevent returns. A 125-day-return interval is 
therefore selected to calculate relevant parameter estimates for the 
sample firms. 
The cross-sectional target firm parameters which can only be 
estimated from preevent observations are displayed in Table 17. In 
comparison to the cross-sectional bidder firm subsample, the target 
firm intercepts are positive and in all cases higher. On the other 
hand, the beta estimates are lower with the exception of the 
parameters estimated from the equal“weighted index proxy. The lower 
coefficient of variation infers that less variance of the target firm 
return is explained by the OLS model. The trend in the parameters 
does not mirror that exhibited by the bidder firms. In general, while 
the coefficients increase as the estimation interval is increased, the 
29 
increase is not constant across all time periods. 
Table 17 
Sensitivity of Cross-Sectional Target Firm 
OLS Parameter Estimates to Estimation Interval 
Preevent Returns 
SPR 
Index proxy 
CVW CEW 
50-days __ 
a .0015 .0013 . UUU4 
B .852 .925 1.140 
R2 .087 .093 .104 
se( 3 ) .501 .527 .620 
100-days 
/n 
a .0015 .0012 . LMJU4 
B .922 .996 1.182 
R2 .096 .102 .111 
se( B ) .355 .370 .423 
150-days 
a .0014 .0012 .0003 
g .903 .996 1.152 
R2 .090 .097 .106 
se( B ) .286 .299 .335 
200-days 
A" 
a .0013 .0011 .0002 
g .914 .991 1.148 
r2 „ .090 .096 .105 
se( 3 ) .244 .254 .277 
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Effect of Firm Size 
Several recent studies indicate that measured equity returns are 
negatively correlated with company size (6, 90). Seasonally peaking 
in the early part of January, the small firm anomaly may arise from 
the previous month’s tax-loss-selling pressure (16, 69, 92). 
Moreover, the absolute firm return is also inversely proportional to 
the degree of research following devoted by investment and brokerage 
companies, a relationship that is stronger for the small firm (2). 
Whether these findings are a result of a misspecification in capital 
asset pricing, and certain variables (i.e., PE ratio, firm size, 
degree of security analysts’ attention) proxy for some unknown omitted 
common factor or simply due to a statistical artifact, sensitivity 
analysis is necessary to determine whether this sample is affected by 
any peculiar return effect. After adjusting for the market factor, 
firm returns are tested for a size relationship against a null 
hypothesis of no correlation between these two variables. 
Since any single return measurement may not be sufficiently 
flexible to identify a common size effect, various relevant 
30 
measurements of return are chosen therefore as follows: 
return group PRE preannouncement CAFE, 
return group ANN announcement day AFE, 
return group POST postannouncement CAFE, 
return group TOT total merger period CAFE. 
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The most direct procedure examines the distribution of the target 
firm OLS excess return measures. The sample of 167 target firms is 
split into five equal portfolios ranging from the smallest 
(i.e., group 1) to the largest (i.e., group 5) market capitalization 
of equity in the year preceding merger. The number of portfolios is 
dictated by data conservation rather than methodological concerns. 
Such segmentation (Table 18) does not show any apparent size 
effect. No consistently superior risk-adjusted returns are evident 
within the smallest market capitalization portfolio. While the 
group 1 preannouncement mean return is almost 2% greater than the 
nearest group, its postannouncement return is comparatively very low. 
Since target firm size has been shown not to be a characteristic of 
merger outcome, explaining this finding is difficult. No a priori 
reasoning suggests why the smallest sized target firms have such low 
returns. While the total and postannouncement excess returns for 
groups 2 and 5 are positively and strongly significant, these results 
seem random rather than systematic and follow no hypothesized 
relationship. 
Correlation analysis (Table 19) does not indicate any relationship 
between target firm size and any measure of excess merger period 
prediction error. While the hypothesized negative direction is seen 
in the preannouncement (PRE) and announcement (ANN) day retum/size 
correlations, the level of the correlation is very low. Examination 
of the correlation of size with individual portfolio return shows a 
varied effect. Portfolio 1 correlation yields the expected direction 
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Table 18 
Target Firm Excess Return Distribution 
according to Size 
(standard error in parentheses) 
Size($) PRE POST TOT 
Group 1 12,300,000 .1420 
(.044) 
.0150 
(.066) 
.1570 
(.097) 
Group 2 27,000,000 .1114 
(.024) 
.1960 
(.045) 
.3100 
(.052) 
Group 3 46,300,000 .1270 
(.031) 
.1000 
(.062) 
.2270 
(.066) 
Group 4 97,800,000 .1060 
(.022) 
.2210 
(.054) 
.3270 
(.056) 
Group 5 274,000,000 .1250 
(.031) 
.1170 
(.044) 
.2420 
(.058) 
Table 19 
Correlation of Target Firm Size and Excess Return 
(significance level in parentheses) 
Variable Pair Kendall Spearman Pearson 
Correlation Correlation Correlation 
PRE/size -.0135 -.0122 .0199 
(.40) (.44) (.40) 
ANN/size -.0032 -.0117 -.0738 
(.48) (.44) (.17) 
POST/size .0731 .1079 .0740 
(.08) (.08) (.17) 
TOT/size .0366 .0529 .0702 
(.24) (.25) (.18) 
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Table 20 
Correlation of Target Firm Excess Returns by Size 
(Spearman Correlation) 
(significance level in parentheses) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
PRE/size -.2971 
(.05) 
.0829 
(.32) 
.2380 
(.09) 
-.1800 
(.16) 
.1874 
(.14) 
ANN/size .1501 
(.20) 
.0805 
(.33) 
-.1624 
(.18) 
.0568 
(.38) 
.1109 
(.26) 
POST/size .1049 
(.28) 
.2668 
(.05) 
.1166 
(.26) 
.0132 
(.47) 
.3364 
(.02) 
TOT/size -.1648 
(.18) 
.3399 
(.03) 
.2002 
(.13) 
.0017 
(.50) 
.4311 
(.01) 
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Table 21 
Correlation of Bidder Firm Size and Excess Return 
according to Outcome 
(significance level in parentheses) 
Variable Pair Kendall Correlation Spearman Correlation 
Unsuccessful Mergers 
PRE/size .1052 .1821 
(.11) (.08) 
ANN/size -.0635 -. 0848 
(.23) (.25) 
POST/size .0079 .0085 
( .46) ( .47) 
TOT/size .0556 .0901 
(.26) (.24) 
Successful Mergers 
PRE/size -.0230 -.0255 
(.33) ( .37) 
ANN/size -.0935 -.1397 
(.04) (.04) 
POST/size .0012 .0027 
(.49) (.49) 
TOT/size -.0025 -.0004 
(.82) (.50) 
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Table 22 
Correlation of Target Firm Size and Excess Return 
according to Outcome 
(significance level in parentheses) 
Variable Pair Kendall Correlation Spearman Correlation 
Unsuccessful Mergers 
PRE/size .0060 .0214 
(.48) (.44) 
ANN/size .0247 .0211 
(.40) (.44) 
POST/size .0808 .1141 
(.21) (.22) 
TOT/size -.0094 .0057 
(.46) (.48) 
Successful Mergers 
PRE/size -.0238 -.0276 
(.35) (.38) 
ANN/size -.0252 -.0418 
(.34) (.33) 
POST/size .0642 .0942 
(.15) ( .16) 
TOT/size .0292 .0432 
(.32) (.32) 
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prior to the merger announcement, but changes afterwards. On the 
other hand, a positive size relationship occurs for portfolios 2 and 5 
particularly in the postannouncement period. Moreover, the subsequent 
segmentation (Tables 21 and.22) into successful and unsuccessful 
categories also shows no correlation of size and return. These 
findings imply that no systematic cross-sectional sample effect biases 
the merger returns and any size effect is mixed and isolated. 
Most researchers utilize a much larger and comprehensive data base 
when testing the size effect. Reinganum’s sample consisted of 566 
exchange-listed corporations (90), while others use either all NYSE 
(6, 16, 113) or all exchange-listed firms available on CRSP (69, 92). 
Their portfolios are much larger and include a wider range of 
observations; some cover a time horizon as long as 40 years. This 
particular sample of merger companies may be too small and from too 
limited a time span to capture a size effect. Also, it seems unlikely 
that the comparative size of portfolio 1 ($>12,300,000) is too large to 
capture the size effect since other researchers obtain positive 
risk-adjusted returns in comparable mean size portfolios (90, 113). 
The number of companies may be too limited and cover an insufficient 
duration to capture a size anomaly. No unique sample characteristics 
that can explain these findings can be identified. 
Further insights into this controversy are very confounding. 
While Brown et al. show that the small firm effect is not stable over 
time, they still show higher monthly returns to small firms in 
1974-1979, a period that coincides almost exactly with this data 
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sample (16). Gultekin and Gultekin show an international stock market 
seasonality that is not related to firm size, but mostly to 
January/December tax years (52). Additional evidence by Roll shows 
that serial dependence of stock returns positively biases small firm 
returns, especially when computed with arithmetic or rebalanced 
portfolio means. A buy-and-hold portfolio return reduces the abnormal 
small firm returns (98). 
Clearly no size relationship is measured and no bias in the sample 
is detected. Takeover activity may provide a commonality that 
overpowers the small firm effect. If most of the size effect occurs 
in January, randomly observed merger bids would smooth out any actual 
effect. Whether the size effect is real or a statistical artifact, no 
relationship is discovered for this data sample. Additional testing 
of the small firm effect examines the Scholes/Williams parameter 
estimates (equation 19). If nonsynchronous share trading is pervasive 
among smaller capitalized sample firms, the Scholes/Williams parameter 
estimates will eliminate any subsequent correlation and 
underassessment of estimated systematic risk. 
The preliminary outputs follow a fairly intuitive pattern. The 
first order correlation coefficients ( ) are fairly modest and 
distributed across the possible market proxies, as one would expect. 
The narrowest based proxy, the Standard and Poor’s 500 index proxy 
(SPR), has the lowest first order correlation, whereas the opposite is 
true for the CRSP equal-weighted index proxy (CEW), the broadest based 
construction. Such a trend is not surprising since the equal ^weighted 
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index gives more influence to smaller firms, the group most likely to 
be affected by nonsynchronous trading. On the other hand, both 
value-weighted index proxies proportionately emphasize the highly 
capitalized and actively traded firms and should be less susceptible 
to this problem. 
PSPR 
PCVW 
PCEW 
.2071 
.2394 
.4110 
Tables 23 and 24 contain the average results of the requisite 
leading, lagging, and simultaneous beta estimates. Again the figures 
are neither robust nor surprising. One would expect to see a 
noticeable pattern across the indices. If the independent variable of 
the estimation equation is a value-weighted proxy that proportionately 
weights higher capitalized firm returns, then the lagged coefficients 
should be significant. The movement of a smaller firm would be 
reflected subsequent to the measured and published value-weighted 
index proxy return. On the other hand, the leading coefficients of 
the equal-weighted index proxy derived parameters should have more 
explanatory power since any general movement in security prices would 
therefore be measured after occurring. 
While the coefficients follow the expected pattern, the movement 
is not powerful. Calculating the average Scholes/Williams CRSP 
value-weighted (CVW) based parameter estimate for bidder firms: 
(i.e., (.310 + 1.056 + .200)/! + 2 (.2394) = 1.059), 
yields a result very close to the ordinary OLS value (cf. Table 14). 
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TABLE 23 
Average Values of Scholes/Williams Estimators 
Target Firms 
Lagged Simultaneous Leading 
SPR Proxy 
/\ 
a .002 .001 .002 
6 .281 .897 .160 
R2 .022 .090 .008 
se( 3 ) .294 .284 .296 
CVW Proxy 
a .002 .001 .002 
g .301 .973 .215 
R2 . .023 .096 .009 
se( 3 ) .308 .296 .310 
CEW Proxy 
a .001 .000 .001 
g .333 1.147 .449 
R2 . .022 .106 .021 
se( 3 ) .346 .332 . 346 
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TABLE 24 
Average Values of Scholes/Williams Estimators 
Bidder Firms 
Lagged Simultaneous Leading 
SPR Proxy 
/s 
a .001 .001 .001 
8 .295 .988 .151 
R2 .026 .178 .011 
se( 8 ) .214 .198 .216 
CVW Proxy 
a .001 .000 .001 
8 .310 1.056 .200 
R2 .026 .184 .013 
se( 8 ) .224 .206 .225 
CEW Proxy 
/N 
a .001 -.001 .000 
g .306 1.149 .430 
R2 .021 .168 .029 
se( g) .251 .232 .249 
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Other estimates approximate the unadjusted coefficients. Thus, the 
Scholes/Williams derived excess return measures for the sample firms 
(Table 24) are no different than the ordinary OLS results. 
In a further test of the nonsynchronous trading phenomenon and the 
small firm effect, Dimson adjusted parameters are estimated. Again, 
if the small firm condition is sufficiently strong to affect these 
returns in a material way through some incidence of nonsynchronous 
share trading, the Dimson adjustment should reduce the positive bias 
in the excess return measure. 
Additional lagged values of the independent variable further 
reduce the understatement of systematic risk (30). Simple application 
of the Dimson adjustment does reduce the excess return measure as the 
return error statistics are comparatively lower for both target and 
bidder firms and more noticeably so in the cumulative statistics. 
This result conforms to expectations. 
The announcement day return contains more information about the 
extent of the small firm effect. The target firm average returns 
contained in Table 23 are only marginally lower than the unadjusted 
OLS results. Likewise the announcement day return (Table 26) for 
bidder firms, while negative, is nearly zero. In both cases the 
adjustment is greater for the error metrics derived from the 
equal-weighted index. In these simplest terms, the Dimson adjustment 
results support the previous conclusion of incidental sample firm 
size/retum bias. 
The cumulative error measures are indeed comparatively much lower 
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than the simultaneous OLS results. In fact, the error measures are so 
reduced that neither bidder nor target firms offer positive returns 
after the announcement of the merger. While the negative 
postannouncement target firm results are opposite to expectations, 
induced bias is the cause. 
Examination of the announcement day excess return over the 
different intervals of adjustment reveals a minor trend. As the 
number of lagging terms is increased, the excess error return measure 
declines, if only slightly, to agree with the nonsynchronous trading 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the cumulative preannouncement and 
total period returns increase in almost every case. 
The leading terms are clearly the source of the downward 
adjustment of the return measure. Then, as additional lagged terms 
are added, the influence of the leading terms is diminished. In 
addition the greater impact for the CEW derived results is very 
plausible. The leading index terms should be more important if they 
are estimated with an equal-weighted index. If nonsynchronous trading 
is pervasive within the index itself, the leading terms will produce 
the hypothesized downward movement in predicted performance measures, 
even if a small firm effect is not present in the sample. As the 
influence of the leading terms is reduced, one would forecast a less 
negative trend in the equal-weighted results. A performance study 
based on value-weighted index proxy results should be less affected as 
the interval is increased. The results contained in Tables 25 and 26 
reflect this expectation. 
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Table 25 
Excess Return Measures for Dimson Adjusted Parameters 
Target Firms 
Estimation 
Leading and 
Interval 
Lagging Terms (days) 
SPR 
Index 
CVW 
Proxy 
CEW 
-5 to +5 
PRE .1178 .1058 .0652 
ANN .1722 .1715 .1688 
TOT .2592 .2235 .1126 
-10 to +5 
PRE .1211 .1110 .0705 
ANN .1714 .1708 .1684 
TOT .2627 .2316 .1202 
-15 to +5 
PRE .1202 .1086 .0677 
ANN .1708 .1701 .1675 
TOT .2631 .2298 .1234 
-20 to +5 
PRE .1216 .1113 .0826 
ANN .1703 .1696 .1672 
TOT .2709 .2424 .1634 
-25 to +5 
PRE .1228 .1132 .0873 
ANN .1702 .1695 .1681 
TOT .2667 .2392 .1731 
Table 26 
Excess Return Measures for Dimson Adjusted Parameters 
Bidder Firms 
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Index Proxy 
SPR CVW CEW 
Estimation Interval 
Lagging and Leading Terms (days) 
-5 to +5 
PRE -.0041 -.0177 -.0632 
ANN -.0047 -.0054 -.0080 
TOT -.0417 -.0767 -.1840 
-10 to +5 
PRE -.0010 -.0135 -.0553 
ANN -.0047 -.0054 -.0077 
TOT -.0397 -.0712 -.1744 
-15 to +5 
PRE -.0021 -.0145 -.0508 
ANN -.0044 -.0049 -.0070 
TOT -.0419 -.0736 -.1654 
-20 to +5 
PRE -.0014 -.0122 -.0432 
ANN -.0048 -.0052 -.0069 
TOT -.0377 -.0667 -.1443 
-25 to +5 
PRE -.0011 -.0116 -.0397 
ANN -.0051 -.0055 -.0067 
TOT -.0378 -.0647 -.1331 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF MERGER ARBITRAGE INVESTMENTS 
Profitability of Merger Arbitrage Hedges 
Merger arbitrage hedge portfolios are constructed for the 167 
reported merger proposals of the sample set by purchasing shares of 
the target firm and simultaneously selling short a parity value of the 
31 
bidder firm. An equal-weighted portfolio of the individual 
arbitrage hedges is formed and is rebalanced on a daily basis. 
Beginning 23 days prior to the merger proposal announcement, the 
reported time series of the merger arbitrage hedge returns continues 
until the acquisition offer is resolved or after a maximum 40 day 
holding period. Thus the arbitrage returns are sequenced in event 
time and effectively measure the profitability of merger arbitrage 
4 32 
investment. 
The first return time series is generated from the mean-return 
33 
model, equation 5a, and is displayed in Figure 1. Because the 
merger bid has greater valuation implications for the target firm’s 
share price, the arbitrage hedge returns most resemble the target firm 
return. The indicated preannouncement return trends upward and 
becomes strongly positive within ten trading sessions of day 0. 
Approximately 50% of the preevent gain is realized within five trading 
days prior to the public announcement. The cumulative average 
absolute return increases and reaches 14.30% by day -1, the day prior 
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Figure 1 
Average Daily Hedge Returns. Figure 1 
reports both average and cumulative 
average daily hedge returns from day 
-25 to day 40. 
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to the public announcement of the bid. As expected the announcement 
day return is large and the average absolute return of 17.00% 
represents positive returns in 88% of the individual two stock hedge 
portfolios. Subsequently, daily average absolute portfolio returns 
are generally small but positive and are nonnegative on 27 out of the 
40 reported trading days. The postevent cumulative average return 
peaks on day 23 at 35.16% and thereafter declines slightly. 
Extrapolating the measured postannouncement cumulative average 3.26% 
40 day holding period return yields a 19.78% compounded annualized 
rate of return. 
The average returns are tested according to the comparison period 
test of equation 6. Initially reported by Masulis (83) and 
subsequently by Dann (29), this methodology tests for differences 
between the mean daily preevent (i.e., comparison period) and merger 
(i.e., experimental period) period sample portfolio hedge returns. 
The mean daily portfolio return and sample standard deviation of the 
125 day comparison period from days -150 to -26 are 0.09% and 0.02% 
respectively. Similar statistics are calculated from the observed 
experimental hedge return series and test statistics are generated. 
To test merger arbitrage hedge investment thoroughly, many holding 
period returns (Table 27) of the entire experimental period are 
monitored. The holding period return intervals fall into three major 
categories: 
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a. early arbitrage activity (intervals 1 to 3) - returns from 
hedges created prior to the public announcement of the 
takeover offer; 
b. typical arbitrage activity (intervals 4 to 8) - return of 
hedges created near or after the public announcement; 
c. late arbitrage activity (intervals 9 to 12) - hedges 
created after the announcement and unraveled at the 
observation limit. 
Table 27 reveals that mean daily returns from each of the first 
group of hedges significantly exceed the premerger daily returns at a 
minimum of the 5% probability level. The average daily 
preannouncement return is 0.57% and significant at the 0% probability 
level (t value 9.12). Since the immediate preannouncement period 
contains significant positive returns, the likelihood of positive 
arbitrage hedge profits is highest in this interval. To a certain 
extent, the preperiod is positively biased because it does include 
returns of those firms that actually received a takeover bid but does 
not consider any companies that were speculated to be merger 
candidates. As such this test is clearly an ex post calculation. 
When the announcement day interval is included in the holding period, 
the test statistic drops sharply. The outlier status of the large 
positive and significant announcement day return is responsible for 
this downward adjustment. 
The statistical influence of the announcement day return is 
further emphasized when observing the second category of returns. The 
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Table 27 
Comparison Period Test Statistics 
All Hedges 
t(days) Mean return s2 t statistic 
1. -25 to -1 .0057 .0058 9.12** 
2. -25 to 0 .0120 .0327 3.78** 
3. -5 to 40 .0059 .0252 2.21* 
4. 0 to 40 .0049 .0265 1.70 
5. 1 to 40 .0008 .0025 -.31 
6. 1 to 10 .0017 .0024 3.44** 
7. 1 to 20 .0015 .0026 2.64** 
8. 1 to 30 .0010 .0026 .61 
9. 11 to 40 .0005 .0022 -1.82 
10. 21 to 40 .0001 .0022 -3.65** 
11. 31 to 40 .0001 .0020 -3.98** 
Comparison Period 
Interval (days) -150 to -26 
Mean .0009 
S]_ .0002 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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average daily hedge return of the arbitrageur who invests in the hedge 
portfolio instantaneously upon the public announcement of the takeover 
bid prior to any price reaction is 0.49% (test statistic 1.70) and not 
significantly greater than the comparison-period mean at the required 
two-tailed probability level. While the average daily hedge return 
far exceeds the comparison-period mean, its sample standard deviation 
is much higher and the null hypothesis of normal returns cannot be 
rejected. A more conservative formulation, return 5, assumes that the 
arbitrageur cannot form the hedge until the day subsequent to the 
takeover announcement. The t-statistic is small (-.31) and supports 
the conclusion that 0.08% return 5 is not significantly different from 
the premerger mean return. 
The remainder of the tests examine variants of the arbitrageur’s 
activity. First, a shorter holding period strategy of an arbitrageur 
who forms the hedge immediately after the announcement but does not 
maintain his or her investment to the observation limit is tested. 
This manipulation reveals that the sooner the arbitrageur unravels the 
hedge, the more likely the comparison-period return will be exceeded. 
Both holding period mean return 6 (0.17%) and 7 (0.15%) are 
significantly greater than the premerger average at the 1% confidence 
level. The significantly greater portfolio returns are lost when the 
hedge is maintained beyond a 30 day postannouncement holding period. 
This result implies that profitable postannouncement arbitrage 
opportunities must be quickly taken. Uncertainty of the merger bid's 
outcome still prevails after the announcement day of a merger bid. As 
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new relevant news is received, the uncertainty is resolved and 
suitable price adjustments occur (3). Thus these positive arbitrage 
returns are consistent with a quick resolution of an information void 
in an efficient capital market. 
To complement this approach, a "wait and see" attitude of the 
arbitrageur is tested to determine whether a delayed strategy enhances 
the hedge return. The mean return of the latter hedges drops the 
longer the arbitrageur waits to construct the hedge. The t-statistics 
of the comparison periods tests of returns 9, 10, and 11 are 
sufficiently high to conclude at a reasonable probability level that 
the arbitrageur who waits to construct the hedge is unlikely, on 
average, to exceed or match the preevent average return. In fact, the 
return of hedges constructed more than four trading weeks after the 
merger announcement consistently average below the comparison-period 
return at the 1% significance level. 
The sample of the merger arbitrage hedge portfolios is 
subsequently divided into categories based on the outcome of the 
merger proposal. The time series exhibits in Figure 2 show that the 
successful group yields higher average daily hedge portfolio returns 
than the failed category. Not only is the preevent cumulative average 
daily return of the failed group lower (i.e., 15.63% to 11.15%) but 
the postannouncement hedge returns are actually negative. The 
portfolio returns of the successful mergers have a postannouncement 
return of 5.80%, much higher than the unsuccessful group’s 4.82% 
loss. This contrast is fairly intuitive since failure 
Figure 2 
Average Daily Hedge Returns of Groups 
according to Acquisition Offer Outcome. 
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of a merger offer is clearly perceived negatively. The negative trend 
of the failed group does not begin in earnest, however, until the 
portfolio has been held in excess of 10 postevent trading days and 
approximately 20% of the merger proposals have been terminated. 
The comparison-period test sheds additional light on the trend of 
the intergroup hedge profitability. Table 28 displays t-statistics of 
the various holding periods returns. These results indicate that the 
hedges of successful takeovers formed on day 1, returns 3, 6, 7, and 
8, have significantly greater mean returns. This implies that the 
arbitrageur who has perfect foresight of the outcome and invests only 
in successful bids does not have to construct the hedge immediately on 
the day of the announcement and does not need to capture any of the 
large announcement gain to attain significantly positive excess 
returns. Moreover, the arbitrageur may be unable to construct the 
hedge at the preannouncement price if exchange trading is halted and 
no third market, over-the-counter trading in the affected firm’s 
shares occurs. If this is so, the prices at the end of the 
announcement day may closely approximate the prices at the beginning 
of day 1. Again the hedge must be constructed quickly after the 
public announcement of the proposal if the arbitrage is likely to be 
profitable. While holding period returns 6, 7, and 8 are all greater 
than the comparison period return at the 1% confidence level, returns 
9, 10, and 11, indicate that the significant excess profitability is 
lost when the hedge construction is delayed until weeks after the 
announcement. Again this is consistent with a quick resolution of the 
Table 28 
Comparison Period Test Statistics 
Successful Mergers 
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t(days^ ) Mean Return s2 t statistic 
1. -25 to -1 .0063 .0064 9.05** 
2. -25 to 0 .0133 .0365 3.75** 
3. -5 to 40 .0071 .0280 2.44* 
4. 0 to 40 .0060 .0294 1.91 
5. 1 to 40 .0015 .0024 2.12* 
6. 1 to 10 .0020 .0022 4.22** 
7. 1 to 20 .0022 .0024 5.11** 
8. 1 to 30 .0021 .0024 2.80** 
9. 11 to 40 .0013 .0024 1.24 
10. 21 to 40 .0007 .0022 -1.09 
11. 31 to 40 .0009 .0022 -.23 
Comparison Period 
Interval (days) -150 to -26 
Mean .0010 
Si .0005 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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takeover bid’s uncertainty. 
The subsample of hedges of unsuccessfully terminated takeover bids 
in Table 29 likewise shows significantly positive preannouncement 
average daily returns. Returns 1 and 2, which include the highly 
profitable announcement day return, are significantly greater at the 
1% probability level. All other holding returns have in common the 
daily returns after the public announcement. As the distance from the 
announcement day is increased, the negative effect of failure on hedge 
return is perceived. This is true even for return 3 that includes the 
preannouncement and entire merger period return. Returns 6 and 7 are 
positive but not significantly greater than the comparison period 
mean. The market may express little confidence in some merger bid's 
probability of success, but much higher expectations concerning other 
offers. Having anticipated the quick cancelation of the proposed 
acquisitions, the market's unbiased expectation is failure. Therefore 
the market is not surprised by immediate breakoffs in negotiations and 
does not revise stock prices downward. In the 10 day interval after 
the merger announcement, although successful mergers immediately 
provide a significantly higher average return than its comparison 
period, failed merger arbitrage hedges do not. While little penalty 
accrues to the arbitrageur who decides soon after the announcement 
that the merger will not occur as planned, later failures may not be 
fully expected and the significantly negative holding period return 
represents the market's subsequent downward adjustment of the previous 
positive expectation. All other daily mean returns are negative, and 
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Table 29 
Comparison Period Test Statistics 
Failed Mergers 
t(days) Mean Return S£ t statistic 
1. -25 to -1 .0046 .0069 6.33** 
2. -25 to 0 .0093 .0250 3.85** 
3. -5 to 40 .0027 .0203 1.10 
4. 0 to 40 .0019 .0213 .62 
5. 1 to 40 -.0013 .0072 -2.96** 
6. 1 to 10 .0009 .0073 .36 
7. 1 to 20 -.0004 .0064 -1.77 
8. 1 to 30 -.0007 .0074 -2.05* 
9. 11 to 40 -.0020 .0072 -4.09** 
10. 21 to 40 -.0022 .0081 -3.90** 
11. 31 to 40 -.0030 .0069 -5.84** 
Comparison Period 
Interval (days) -150 to -26 
Mean .0005 
si .0002 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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with the exception of return 6, they are statistically less than the 
comparison period mean. 
To complement the comparison-period test of the mean-return model 
two market-based return models are employed to predict and test ex 
post merger arbitrage hedge profitability. The first market-based 
model is a constant market adjustment, equation 5b, that forecasts 
the market return as the day t return of each individual asset. Any 
return not explained by its predicted value, the broadly based CRSP 
value-weighted index proxy, flows through to the error term. The 
time series of the average (APE) and cumulative average (CAFE) 
forecast errors is displayed in Figure 3. 
These returns do not reflect a materially different trend of 
merger arbitrage hedge profitability than the preceding mean-return 
model. The time series shows a similar positive preannouncement and 
announcement day return pattern. Beginning 7 days before the 
announcement, the forecast errors become significantly positive and 
with few exceptions this trend continues until the announcement day. 
The postannouncement cumulative excess forecasted return is lower 
than the mean-return model data and is 1.99% by day 40. 
Significance tests of the daily AFE (Table 44) show the 
significant positive hedge returns immediately prior to the takeover 
bid announcement. These statistically nonzero hedge forecast errors 
are significant at very high probability levels. From day -7 to 
day 0, both nonparametric tests reject the null hypothesis with few 
exceptions. Thereafter, the results do not seem as sensitive. 
Figure 3 
Average Daily Forecast Errors Calculated 
from Simple Market Adjusted Return Model. 
Figure 3 reports both average and cumulative 
average forecast errors from day -25 to day 40. 
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rejecting the null seldom and without confirmation by the paired 
tests. Only on day 32 is the null hypothesis rejected by the Sign 
test in favor of a small positive forecast error. The lack of 
significant profits is somewhat surprising since 55% (23 out of 40) 
of the AFE are positive and the measured cumulative average forecast 
error is positive. 
The nonparametric Sign and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests generally 
agree that the daily excess forecast error return is significant in 
the immediate preannouncement period and insignificantly nonzero 
during the merger period. Since the Sign test considers only the 
direction of the forecast error, the same weighting is given to large 
positive as well as very small negative returns. The Wilcoxon test 
also considers the size of the forecast error in addition to the 
direction. A priori the Wilcoxon test is expected to be more 
sensitive toward rejecting zero excess forecast return in the 
speculative premerger period and thereafter less sensitive. 
The tests of the cumulative returns (Table 30) indicate that the 
hedges formed prior to the announcement are significantly positive. 
Also, the zero mean excess holding return of the arbitrage hedges 
which include the announcement day is rejected. On the other hand, 
no postannouncement holding period returns can be described as 
greater than the market return. Neither nonparametric test rejects 
the null hypothesis of zero mean excess return over all other holding 
periods. Unlike the mean-return model, no early arbitrage hedge 
profitability nor any later losses are measured. Both the Sign and 
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Table 30 
Significance Tests 
Cumulative Excess Portfolio Returns 
Simple Market Model 
t(days) CAFE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
1. -25 to -1 .1347 2038/1620 3.48** -5.90** 
2. -25 to 0 .3040 2175/1836 5.30** -6.67** 
3. -5 to 40 .2620 3415/3078 4.17** -6.33** 
4. 0 to 40 .1901 2963/2771 2.52* -3.84** 
5. 1 to 10 .0137 765/759 .13 -.43 
6. 1 to 20 .0253 1493/1475 .31 -.92 
7. 1 to 30 .0233 2179/2145 .50 -1.13 
8. 1 to 40 .0199 2826/2753 .96 -1.31 
9. 11 to 40 .0062 2061/1994 1.04 -1.27 
10. 21 to 40 -.0054 1389/1354 1.06 -.95 
11. 31 to 40 -.0037 664/641 1.07 -.68 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
Table 31 
Average OLS Parameter Estimates 
All Hedge Portfolios 
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SPR 
Index Proxy 
CVW CEW 
/s 
.001 .001 .001 
3 .033 .054 .144 
R2 .032 .033 .033 
se ( 3 ) .053 .056 .060 
Wilcoxon tests fail to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the 
1.99% 40 day merger arbitrage excess holding gain. The simple market 
adjustment implies that merger arbitrage returns are normal. In a 
semistrong efficient market, publicly available information is quickly 
assimilated into the prices of the participant firms. According to 
the forecast errors of the simple market model, the bid conveys all 
necessary information and no residual uncertainty remains over the 
merger period. 
The second market-based return model, equation 5c, the widely used 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) single index market model, augments the 
preceding results. First, the OLS single index market model 
(equation 5c) coefficients are estimated over the 150 day interval 
prior to the experimental period for each hedge portfolio. These 
parameter estimates are then applied to the merger arbitrage hedge 
portfolio event period returns and according to equations 6 and 7, 
excess forecast errors are calculated. 
The parameter estimates calculated using the CRSP value-weighted 
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index proxy (Table 31) are very small. The estimated alphas are low 
and the cross-sectional CVW systematic risk parameter estimate cannot 
be described as nonzero. This is an important and noteworthy finding, 
because the arbitrageur a priori hypothesizes that the merger 
arbitrage hedge effectively reduces or eliminates market risk and, 
second, that the investor is at the risk of the merger. The low 
coefficient of variation indicates that the OLS market model explains 
only 3% of the variability of the hedge return. As a result of the 
low systematic risk parameter, the majority of the hedge return will 
not be explained by systematic sources and will flow through to be 
measured as return in excess of its market and risk-adjusted 
forecasted value. 
The time series exhibit of average daily and cumulative average 
daily OLS prediction errors in contained in Figure 4. On the whole 
preannouncement return trend is similar to the absolute mean return. 
The average daily excess forecasted return (AFE(t)) shows a positive 
trend and becomes strongly positive approximately 10 trading days 
prior to the merger offer announcement. Also, similar to the returns 
generated by the other two return models, the announcement day excess 
return, AFE (0), is approximately the same magnitude. The 
postannouncement return series is somewhat different as a modest 
increase in the cumulative return in excess of the forecasted value of 
zero occurs over the first 20 trading days of the merger period. 
Table 45 reveals 7 significant AFE according to the Wilcoxon test in 
the ten day preannouncement interval. The OLS residuals show a 
Figure 4 
Average Daily Forecast Errors Calculated 
from the OLS Market Model. Figure 4 
reports both average and cumulative 
average forecast errors from day -25 
to day 40. 
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negative trend in the average hedge investment. The Wilcoxon test 
rejects a zero daily mean error only once in the postannouncement 
period in contrast to the Sign test rejecting a zero daily mean error 
three times. This small difference must follow from the smaller hedge 
returns in this interval. 
The time series is partitioned into many holding periods to 
parallel the comparison-period test. The two nonparametric tests in 
Table 32 frequently disagree over the significance of the cumulative 
average forecast errors. Unexpectedly the Sign test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of zero for the most broadly defined investment 
holding period, days -5 to 40. If the Sign test alone was referenced, 
the arbitrageur who forms a merger arbitrage hedge one week prior to 
the merger proposal announcement, motivated perhaps by insider 
information, unbiased expectations, or fortuitous speculation, would 
not show a significantly nonzero return over the subsequent 46 day 
holding period, even though the cumulative average portfolio is 23.15% 
in excess of its forecasted value. The Wilcoxon test, which weights 
the size of the individual forecast errors in addition to their 
direction, on the other hand, rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
excess return at the 1% probability level. This contradiction 
indicates that the Sign test is insensitive to a large significant 
return and therefore an inappropriate test. 
A second favorably defined investment holding period, day 0 to 40, 
includes the sizable (17.33%) announcement day forecast error. 
Neither nonparametric test rejects the null hypothesis of zero excess 
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Table 32 
Significance Tests Of Cumulative Excess Portfolio Returns 
OLS Market Model 
t(days) CAFE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
1. -25 to -1 .1274 2014/1844 2.72** -5.11** 
2. -25 to 0 .2972 2151/1862 4.55** -7.92** 
3. -5 to 40 .2326 3290/3203 1.07 -3.72** 
4. 0 to 40 .1783 2844/2890 .59 -1.02 
5. 1 to 10 .0085 729/795 1.66 -.79 
6. 1 to 20 .0106 1430/1538 1.96* -1.24 
7. 1 to 30 .0039 2082/2242 2.42* -1.39 
8. 1 to 40 -.0077 2707/2872 2.20* -1.65 
9. 11 to 40 -.0162 1978/2077 1.54 -1.44 
10. 21 to 40 -.0183 1277/1334 1.10 -1.06 
11. 31 to 40 -.0116 625/630 .11 -.86 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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return for this holding period. As subsequent holding periods are 
examined, the Sign test rejects the null hypothesis in favor of a 
negative excess cumulative forecast return. The third column of Table 
32 shows that the positive forecast errors are outnumbered by the 
negative observations. The Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis 
only once for the holding period day 1 to 40. Surprisingly after day 
20, neither test rejects the null in favor of the negative trend of 
the CAFE. 
Choice of a Return-Generating Model 
Tests on excess returns show the sensitivity of the results to the 
choice of the particular return-generating model. The statistics 
contained in Tables 21, 30, and 32 indicate that uniformity occurs 
across the three models only in the preannouncement period. All tests 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level in favor of 
significantly positive preannouncement returns. 
When the holding period is expanded to include the entire 40 day 
merger period, diversity among the models is evident. The null 
hypothesis of no excess performance is rejected for the mean-return 
holding period. The null is also rejected by both nonparametric tests 
for simple market adjusted forecast errors. The Sign test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of the OLS forecast errors in either case, 
but the Wilcoxon test rejects for the day -5 to 40 holding period. 
Brown and Warner (18) test the effectiveness of event study 
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methodology in detecting abnormal performance and find no difference 
between the two market models. When the relevant event is clustered, 
they detect a tendency for the mean-return model to reject the null 
hypothesis of normal returns when it is true, a type 1 error. Since 
the merger proposal announcement dates are noncontemporaneous, 
cross-sectional sample firm return correlation is not a problem and 
the mean-return model is not likely to be overly sensitive to 
committing a type 1 error. 
The two market models do not confirm the comparison-period test of 
the mean-return model for holding periods 1 to 10, 1 to 20, 21 to 40, 
and 31 to 40. The direction of the returns is the same across the 
three models. When the mean-return model rejects the null in favor of 
significant positive (negative) returns, the sign of the insignificant 
market model forecast errors is positive (negative). Repudiating the 
mean-return model seems overly severe, especially when the null is 
rejected in these instances at such high probability levels. A more 
conservative statement is that the conclusions are indeed sensitive to 
the return-generating model employed. 
Another methodological concern is the appropriateness of the 
nonparametric Sign and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests. In an earlier 
study Brown and Warner conclude that application of these tests to 
monthly excess returns is biased (17). Since monthly returns are 
skewed to the right, the symmetry assumption of these tests is 
violated and type 1 errors result. Tables 30 and 32 do not indicate 
any tendency of the nonparametric tests to reject the null in favor of 
Figure 5 
Comparison of Return Measures for the 
Competing Return-Generating Models, 
Average Return Model, Simple Market 
Adjusted Model, and OLS Market Model. 
-H
)O
b
b
l 
131 
-r * t> 
4 * « + * * 
4 * ♦ 
T * * 
4 * * 
4 # 0 
4 1* * 
4 * « 
4 * « 
4 * ♦ 
4 » 0 
4 * « 
Ndni3y 30C 3U 
I N
 
U
J 
1'JN
l lU
N
N
d 
U
 1 
IA
 I id
 
I 
Id 
d
A
d
d
 
132 
positive excess performance. The Sign and Wilcoxon Signed Ranked test 
are less sensitive in rejecting the null than the t statistics, a test 
that rests on invoking the Central Limit Theorem and approximating a 
O / 
normal distribution in large samples. 
Another facet to this discussion involves the differential output 
of the three return models for holding periods day -5 to 40 and day 0 
to 40 that include the significantly positive announcement day 
return. While under the mean-return model the null hypothesis is not 
rejected for the 0 to 40 holding period, the null is rejected for both 
market model returns. The Sign test does not reject the null for the 
OLS -5 to 40 holding period returns and neither nonparametric test 
rejects for 0 to 40. 
Why all tests do not reject the null in favor of the large 
positive returns is difficult to fathom. The OLS model fails to 
reject the null hypothesis when it is false, a type 2 error. If the 
significance level is relaxed to the one-tailed probability, however, 
the null is rejected for the mean-return results and agreement is 
reached between the simple market and mean-return model. These 
results cast doubt on Brown and Warner’s conclusion that the OLS model 
is well-specified and continue to show the dependence of the results 
on a particular methodology. 
As the proxy is broadened from the Standard and Poor's 500 (SPR) 
to the CRSP equal-weighted index, the daily systematic risk parameter 
estimates increase. The equal-weighted index is likely to exhibit an 
understated daily variance as a result of nonsynchronous 
Figure 6 
Effect of Index Proxy on Simple Market 
Adjusted Model Forecast Errors. This compares 
excess performance measures generated 
from Standard and Poor’s 500 (SPR), CRSP 
value-weighted (CVW), and CRSP equal-weighted 
(CEW) index proxies. 
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Figure 7 
Effect of Index Proxy on OLS Market 
Model Forecast Errors. This compares 
return measures generated from Standard 
and Poor’s 500 (SPR), CRSP value-weighted 
(CVW), and CRSP equal-weighted (CEW) 
index proxies. 
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trading of securities. For any positive return, CEW forecast errors 
are likely to be higher; for any negative returns, CEW forecast errors 
are likely to be lower than the value-weighted results. 
This trend is noticed in Figure 3 and is much more pronounced for 
the simple market model forecast errors. The mean-return results, 
unadjusted by any process, are highest and almost are matched by the 
simple-market SPR results. For the entire merger period, the 
difference between the SPR and the CEW is near 6%. The OLS results 
are lower and not as sensitive. While the CEW forecast errors are 
lower in two of the three holding periods, the effect is much weaker 
than the above and not as consistent. 
Sample Set Adjustments 
If a sample contains multiple observations of merger proposals 
occurring on the same day, common market effects may produce 
cross-sectional correlation. These simultaneous returns are averaged 
and treated as one observation to eliminate any positive bias in their 
significance tests (63). Since the cross-sectional duration of merger 
negotiations is not standard and there is no reason to expect the 
negotiation period of one acquisition offer to equal another, a pure 
averaging technique cannot be applied to this data sample. A 
sensitivity test must therefore be accomplished in an indirect 
fashion, by eliminating these multiple daily observations from the 
sample. The testable null hypothesis states no change between the 
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Table 33 
Comparison-Period Test Statistics 
Adjusted Sample 
Interval(days) Mean return s2 t statistic 
1. -25 to -1 .0049 .0062 8.77** 
2. -25 to 0 .0120 .0329 3.78** 
3.-5 to 40 .0058 .0253 2.23* 
4. 0 to 40 .0049 .0266 1.72 
5. 1 to 40 .0008 .0026 -.05 
6. 11 to 40 .0006 .0026 -.91 
7. 21 to 40 .0001 .0026 -2.28* 
8. 31 to 40 -.0000 .0028 -3.01* 
9. 1 to 10 .0014 .0026 2.29* 
10. 1 to 20 .0015 .0024 2.28* 
11. 1 to 30 .0010 .0028 1.08 
Comparison Period 
Interval (days) -150 to -26 
Mean return .0008 
s^ .0003 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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Table 34 
Significance Tests Adjusted Sample 
Cumulative Excess Portfolio Return 
Simple Market Model 
t(days) CAFE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-5 to 40 .2619 3128/2868 3.34** 5.45** 
0 to 40 .1893 2722/2577 1.99** 3.30** 
1 to 40 .0196 2597/2559 .52 -.25 
1 to 10 .0104 692/712 .51 -.36 
1 to 20 .0275 1376/1362 .25 -.94 
1 to 30 .0250 2006/1989 .25 -.87 
11 to 40 .0090 1905/1847 .93 -1.33 
21 to 40 -.0081 1221/1197 .47 -.35 
31 to 40 -.0056 591/570 .59 -1.19 
Table 35 
Significance Tests Adjusted 
Cumulative Excess Portfolio 
OLS Market Model 
Sample 
Return 
t(days) CAFE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-5 to 40 .2281 3031/2965 .84 2.79** 
0 to 40 .1580 2629/2670 .55 .45 
1 to 40 -.0116 2504/2652 2.05* -2.06* 
1 to 10 .0036 660/744 2.22* -1.76 
1 to 20 .0093 1323/1415 1.74 -1.45 
1 to 30 .0031 1932/2063 2.06* -1.60 
11 to 40 -.0152 1844/1908 1.02 -1.27 
21 to 40 -.0209 1181/1237 1.12 -1.59 
31 to 40 -.0147 572/589 .47 -1.34 
* 
** 
significant at the 5% probability level 
significant at the 1% probability level 
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full sample and the reduced, and presumably unbiased, subsample. 
Twelve pairs of merger proposals are identified as having been 
announced on the same day. The excluded observations are split 
between 16 successful and 8 unsuccessful bids. This division 
(i.e., 67%/33%) is fairly close to the full sample outcome frequency 
(i.e., 70%/30%) and this procedure should not introduce any 
distortions. 
The significance statistics for each of the three competing 
return-generating models are examined. First, the sensitivity of the 
mean-return model can be seen by comparing Tables 27 and 33. While 
the magnitude of the t-statistics is somewhat lower for the adjusted 
sample, the level of significance does not change. Significantly 
greater average return is still measured in the preannouncement and 
early postannouncement periods and the null is still not rejected for 
holding period return 0 to 40 at the required probability level. The 
average absolute level of profitability is somewhat lower, while the 
comparison-period daily means remain stable at 0.08%. Since more 
successful than unsuccessful mergers are eliminated, this result is 
not surprising. The longer holding periods, 3 and 6, still reject the 
null in favor of a significantly lower return, but the shorter holding 
periods do reject in favor of a significantly higher return. 
The market-based models remain invariant to the procedure. First, 
the significance tests of the simple-market adjusted model contained 
in Table 34 are entirely unaffected by the adjustment, and in 
addition, the actual measured returns in most cases are little 
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different. The test results still reject the null for return periods 
1 and 2. All hedges formed after the announcement date are 
insignificantly different from zero. The OLS results have lower 
significance levels but the conclusions remain essentially unaltered. 
The Sign test does not reject the null hypothesis for the 1 to 20 day 
holding period, but does for the 1 to 10 day holding return. The 
Wilcoxon test now rejects the null for the 1 to 40 day holding period 
return. This is the first instance of agreement between the two 
nonparametric tests in the postannouncement period. These mixed 
results further indicate the instability of the OLS model. 
Analysis of Trading Frictions 
Because the previous results do not take trading frictions into 
account, brokerage commissions and the opportunity cost of interest 
expense are now examined in detail. In some instances, trading 
profits are small, and therefore investigating the effect of these 
costs is prudent. First, equity and cash offers are separated into 
V 
distinct categories. One would expect that merger arbitrage 
investment involving cash offers would generate lower trading costs 
since fewer equity positions are required. Second, one would assume 
cash offers should exceed the value of an equity offer. If only for 
tax reasons, bidder firms should make higher cash offers to 
equilibrate the immediate net wealth of a nontaxable offer and 
recognize that a cash offer is fully taxable, while most stock offers 
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are usually not. Since an equity exchange does not involve 
discontinuity of target firm shareholder ownership, such merger offers 
are usually ruled nontaxable by the Internal Revenue Service. In 
addition, if bidder firms avoid the incumbent firm management by 
proceeding directly to the target firm shareholders with a cash offer, 
an additional incentive (i.e., a cash premium) might be included in 
the terms to induce the shareholders to tender to the bidder. 
Unsurprisingly, the returns of cash acquisition offers 
substantially exceed that of stock offers; however, the size of the 
difference is very unexpected. The cash offer hedge holding returns 
in periods -5 to 40 and 0 to 40 are almost twice as high as the 
latter. Furthermore, this phenomenon is consistent across the three 
return models (Tables 36, 37, and 38) and indicates that this is not a 
result of model misspecification nor a measurement bias. 
The full application of arbitrage trading costs have negative 
implications for investors. The mean-return model tests contained in 
Table 36 show little indicated hedge profitability. Only when a hedge 
is formed prior to the announcement is a cash hedge return 
significantly greater than the comparison-period mean. Again the same 
pattern of high returns occurs but with accompanying high variance 
when the test period includes the announcement day. Stock merger 
hedges do not show any positive return and are negative after the 
announcement. 
The simple market model shows a similar pattern of diminished net 
profitability. Cash offers show the same greater measured returns. 
Table 36 
Mean Return Model Arbitrage Hedge Returns 
Less Trading Frictions 
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t(days) Mean return S£ t statistic 
Stock Offers 
-5 to 40 .0034 .0206 1.70 
0 to 40 .0026 .0183 1.42 
1 to 10 -.0007 .0060 -1.57 
1 to 20 -.0011 .0055 -2.57** 
1 to 30 -.0006 .0048 -1.91 
1 to 40 -.0007 .0044 -2.36* 
Cash Offers 
-5 to 40 .0065 .0287 2.05* 
0 to 40 .0054 .0274 1.75 
1 to 10 .0060 .0051 1.30 
1 to 20 .0017 .0044 1.09 
1 to 30 .0010 .0040 -.53 
1 to 40 -.0007 .0036 -1.35 
Comparison Period 
Interval (days) -150 to -26 
Mean return .0012 
si .0004 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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Table 37 
Simple Market Model Arbitrage Hedge Returns 
Less Full Trading Frictions 
t(days) CAFE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
Stock Offers 
-5 to 40 .1450 1147/1090 1.18 -2.29* 
0 to 40 .0943 997/972 .54 -.75 
1 to 10 -.0090 491/609 3.53** -3.73** 
1 to 20 -.0282 483/543 1.84 -1.81 
1 to 30 -.0275 706/778 1.84 -2.74** 
1 to 40 -.0387 939/975 .80 -.68 
Cash Offers 
-5 to 40 .2839 2382/2268 1.65 -3.59** 
0 to 40 .1992 2076/2028 .34 -2.98** 
1 to 10 .0091 491/609 3.52** -3.73** 
1 to 20 .0187 1030/1108 1.66 -1.44 
1 to 30 .0149 1526/1589 1.11 -.97 
1 to 40 .0071 1947/2044 1.52 -1.18 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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Table 38 
OLS Model Arbitrage Hedge Returns 
Less Full Trading Frictions 
t(days) CARE(t) N+/- Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
Stock Offers 
-5 to 40 .1342 1153/1085 1.41 -1.71 
0 to 40 .0846 997/972 .51 -.75 
1 to 10 -.0152 291/241 2.12* -2.11* 
1 to 20 -.0355 557/469 2.71 -2.77** 
1 to 30 -.0353 773/712 1.58 -2.09* 
1 to 40 -.0498 977/933 0.87 -1.54 
Cash Offers 
-5 to 40 .2429 2252/2398 2.12* -.40 
0 to 40 .1612 1953/2151 3.08** -1.35 
1 to 10 .0104 470/630 4.78** -4.16** 
1 to 20 .0019 972/1166 4.17** -3.51** 
1 to 30 -.0118 1418/1697 4.98** -3.94** 
1 to 40 -.0298 1831/2160 5.19** -4.68** 
* significant at the 5% probability level 
** significant at the 1% probability level 
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The results in Table 42 clearly demonstrate how burdensome the 
frictions of trading are, especially in light of the low level (1%) of 
imputed commissions. Again the Wilcoxon test can be seen to reject 
the null hypothesis in the two preannouncement holding periods. This 
is again in contrast to the Sign test that is insensitive to the large 
positive cumulative average forecast error. The postannouncement 
holding periods return results are mixed. The postannouncement hedge 
returns are significantly negative in the shortest holding period, 
perhaps because the duration of this investment may not be 
sufficiently long to permit absorbing the allocated commissions 
costs. In contrast, the higher cash offers can support these costs, 
although the trading frictions reduce the previously measured 
profitability. 
The OLS model (Table 38) continues to show a more negative return 
than the two competing models. For the first time, the cash offer 
statistics allow rejecting the null at a very high significance level 
and excess returns have a negative trend relative to the stock 
offers. The negative trend is best highlighted as the Sign test 
rejects the null hypothesis for the -5 to 40 day holding interval 
despite a measured 24% cumulative excess risk-adjusted return. The 
application of trading frictions diminishes the merger arbitrage 
returns and weakens the case for profitable opportunities. 
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Discussion 
In light of the evidence provided in this thesis, the discussion 
will now turn to arbitrage activity and its hypothesized goals of 
valuation and risk bearing are considered (66). No direct evidence 
supports a conclusion that arbitrage investment assists the target’s 
shareholders in valuing an acquisition bid. When merger returns are 
examined, the differentially higher announcement day pricing of a 
merger offer that is ultimately successful implies but does not prove 
a valuation process. Moreover, to support this statement one would 
assume that arbitrage activity begins prior to the public announcement 
of the takeover bid. Capital market returns, however, are not 
segmented according to the identity of the bidder and target firms. 
The arbitrage activity does provide a service by accepting the 
risk of the failure of the bid. A portfolio manager may be willing to 
sell his or her shares of a target or bidder firm after the 
acquisition offer is announced. Given this risk assumption 
conservative arbitrage activity does not return any more than a normal 
return. The pure costless arbitrage activity does tend to be 
profitable on average soon after the merger is announced but loses its 
excess risk-adjusted profitability within several weeks. This finding 
is consistent with the resolution of uncertainty subsequent to its 
public announcement. 
Merger arbitrage gains have been estimated in a conservative yet 
148 
plausible manner. Arbitrage returns are extrapolated from aggregate 
wealth relative return data. This capital market research falls short 
of a complete test of a professional arbitrageur’s trading activity. 
According to New York Stock Exchange Constitution and Rule 325(b), an 
individual/member firm arbitrageur has certain advantages vis-a-vis an 
individual investor. The professional arbitrageur has the option of 
financing the merger hedge according to the Alternate Net Capital 
35 
Requirement or the Aggregate Indebtedness Net Capital 
3 6 
Requirement. These institutional requirements allow the 
professional arbitrageur to invest less capital in the merger hedge, 
and the higher leverage magnifies the potential profit. Individual 
investors are limited by the Federal Reserve Bank regulations dealing 
with margin and are further hampered by the usual brokerage firm 
short-sale maintenance requirement. Given the tendency of at 
least one model to reject the null hypothesis in favor of significant 
returns, the greater leverage of a professional arbitrageur suggests 
that investment industry insiders have substantial advantages over 
individual investors. 
CHAPTER VI 
Conclusions 
Merger arbitrage hedge investment has been examined in a detailed 
efficient markets analysis. First, for some holding periods a naive 
merger arbitrage investment strategy based on publicly available 
information has been shown to produce returns in excess of expected 
values. Profits must be exploited soon after the takeover bid is 
announced and prior to the resolution of the market’s uncertainty of 
the outcome. After an interval of several weeks, merger firm stock 
prices become fairly valued according to their risk and return 
characteristics. In addition, trading frictions are shown to be a 
difficult hurdle for the individual investor since these costs quickly 
erode arbitrage profits. These results are consistent with the 
semistrong form of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
An arbitrageur is hypothesized to provide the valuation and assume 
the risk-bearing functions associated with a corporate takeover. 
Since the gross exploitable gain occurs, on average 20, trading days 
after the offer announcement, but no net excess return is realized, an 
investor should be willing to sell target firm securities to an 
arbitrageur. In this fashion, as ownership of target firm securities 
shifts, risk is displaced to the arbitrageur. In addition, individual 
investors do not have the means or the motivation to analyze the 
valuation implications of the bid. For instance, the individual 
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usually does not have access to insider information nor does the 
individual investor maintain close relationships with security 
analysts and corporate executives. Moreover, the investment strategy 
of the investor without an instantaneous source of information is 
limited by the lag between the time the takeover bid is announced and 
the time the investor obtains this information. 
The sensitivity analysis performed suggests that applications of 
various methodologies are important in supporting certain hypotheses. 
For instance, the return-generating model has a specific bias in 
determining and distinguishing low levels of profitability. The 
comparison measure is also important. In certain instances the 
conclusions of a statistical test can be reversed according to the 
particular employed return-generating model and specific market index 
proxy. Moreover, the problem of applying statistical tests to the 
experimental period data sets that include outlier data is very 
important. 
No information is provided as to whether the small gross return 
originates in the value shift between bond and stockholders or in an 
assessment of future synergies. In light of the possible arbitrage 
gain, resolution of uncertainty is a reasonable explanation. 
Conclusions reached from this research should not extend beyond some 
narrowly based trading rule. 
Finally, the conclusions contained in this thesis suggest future 
research topics. First, evidence of the actual economic or 
institutional function of a professional arbitrageur could be examined 
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by obtaining the actual trading data of an arbitrageur. Second, 
additional analysis onto the type of the bid is needed to determine 
the probability of success. Such efforts will expand and refine this 
specialized segment of the corporate takeover literature. 
ENDNOTES 
1. An efficient capital market values assets using relevant 
information and produces a return distribution which 
is the same as the return distribution obtained if the market 
discounted all available information. The operational 
form of this theory used in this report is the fair game. 
This theory states that the actual return will equal the 
expected return. In other words, if market efficiency holds, 
then trading on any particular item of information will not 
gain investment returns greater than one would expect. Market 
efficiency appears to hold with respect to most publicly 
available information (i.e., stock splits (44), annual earnings 
reports (15), accounting changes (68, 115) and money supply 
figures (99)) while much less so regarding nonpublic 
information (i.e., insider trading (46, 64), price earnings 
multiples (8, 9), end-of-year tax loss trading (13) and 
investment advisory service rankings (11)). 
2. Although most financial theories are based on equilibrium, 
Vickers (116) argues for the existence of a continuous state of 
disequilibrium. He views firms as unique entities, and as 
decisions are made concerning the capital investment, firms no 
longer remain the same. Since the outcomes of these 
investment decisions are unique because the decision itself is 
not replicable, they cannot be described by an ordinary 
probability density function. 
Similarly Vickers believes the CAPM reliance on static 
equilibrium is also incorrect. CAPM is based 
on transactions at equilibrium prices. But, "the equilibrium 
CAPM theory has no room for sequential trading at all. 
It addresses itself only the "equilibrium conditions" 
implicit in its special assumptions. But it is trading 
behavior, and an investor’s action under real and volatile 
market conditions, to which our analysis needs 
to be able to point" (116, p. 243). 
The notion that equilibrium theories such as capital 
asset pricing model or the value additivity principle 
are flawed could be devastating. A realistic approach, 
however, is the treatment of equilibrium "as if" it 
exists. 
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3. For a discussion of reverse synergy related to corporate 
spin-offs, see Hite and Owers (60). 
4. Stillman and Eckbo investigate the market power inducement of 
merger. Stillman (112) hypothesizes that a monopoly power 
derived from a horizontal merger results in higher prices. If 
this occurs, rival firms will likewise benefit from the 
increase in corporate revenues and possibly profits. Market 
return show that rival of horizontal merger firms do not show a 
positive return bias. Eckbo (33) hypothesizes that a 
horizontal merger reduces the number of intraindustry 
producers and may facilitate collusion among the remaining 
firms. Alternatively, if the market power is increased by the 
large scale of the horizontal merger, rival firms will be 
damaged by the firm’s increase in market share. Eckbo is 
unable to show from market returns that the rival firms are 
neither helped nor damaged by a horizontal merger. Both 
authors conclude that monopoly aims do not motivate merger. 
5. Existing federal tax laws (codes 381, 382, and 383) allow 
transfer of the target firm’s carryovers (i.e., net operating 
loss carryovers, capital loss carryovers, foreign tax credits, 
investment tax credit carryovers, etc.) to the acquiring firm 
except when the acquisition is motivated solely by tax 
considerations. Two limitations to the carryovers apply. 
First, if more than 50% of the target firm’s ownership is 
exchanged in a cash transaction and the corporation does not 
substantially continue its same business, carryover is 
disallowed. Second, if the target’s ownership is 20% or less 
of the amalgamated firm according to the terms of a stock 
transaction, the allowable carryover is limited to five times 
the target’s percentage of ownership. 
6. Such empirical work aims at establishing merger firm profiles 
For instance, from a small sample of acquired firms Carelton 
et al. (22) show a significant negative correlation between the 
probability of being acquired and target firm liquidity, 
leverage, price earnings multiple, and size. More important, 
they show that firms acquired in cash transactions 
as opposed to security exchanges have significantly lower 
dividend payout ratios and lower market to book value (MV/BV) 
ratios. While little support is given for the payout ratio, a 
low MV/BV ratio is intuitively consistent with several facets 
of acquisitions. First, if low MV/BV is a result of 
managerial inefficiency, the bidder firm can sidestep the 
incumbent management team and proceed directly to shareholders 
with their cash bid. Secondly, if low MV/BV implies low 
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investor holding gains, shareholders may be more willing to 
accept a cash bid and recognize a tax liability. Last, since 
a cash transaction is accounted as a purchase, the acquiring 
firm is motivated to make a cash offer for a low MV/BV target 
firm. Lower goodwill will be recognized and earnings will be 
less depressed. 
7. Although the term "tender offer” will be made interchangeably 
with "merger bid," the two are not necessarily 
the same. A firm may tender an offer without 
the objective of merger. For instance, a firm may 
desire to reduce the number of its outstanding shares 
and will tender to accomplish that goal. 
8. Halpem (54) was the first to use an additional explanatory 
variable of an industry index in his market model. 
His results suffer from multicollinearity between the 
market and industry indices. The CAR of acquiring and 
target firms were aggregated to explain the overall wealth 
effect of the merger. For these reasons the comparability 
of his results with other research is limited. 
9. The five principles of cardinal utility are: 
(1) comparability - an individual can say he or she prefers one 
outcome to another; (2) transitivity - if an individual 
prefers outcome A to B and B to C, then he or she prefers A to 
C; (3) strong independence - an individual's preference 
between two outcomes does not change when they are 
respectively combined with a third outcome; 
(4) uniqueness - an individual will be indifferent to two 
ranked outcomes at a unique probability of occurrence; 
and (5) order preservation - an individual will be 
indifferent between any outcome and a gamble at some unique 
probability and will always prefer any combination with the 
highest probability. 
10. An unsuccessful acquisition bid still furnishes information on 
the potential target firm value. If the merger is canceled 
at the election of the bidder or the target firm does not 
receive a subsequent offer, the inital gain is lost. In 
addition, the bidder who loses a bidding war to another firm 
experiences a significant loss. Control of the target firm is 
valuable and a residual positive abnormal target firm gain 
signals the market's belief that the target will be acquired. 
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11. Since this project will use historical stock prices, the 
inevitable ex-post-facto testing problem will arise. 
Even if the expected finding is reached, the link between 
mergers and arbitrage remains somewhat suspect because of 
the nonexperimental nature of this research. Campbell 
and Stanley’s (21) discussion of correlation applies to 
this ex-post-facto design: "If a high correlation occurs, 
the credibility of the hypothesis strengthened in that it 
has survived a chance for disconfirmation. To put the 
matter another way, correlation does not imply causation, 
but a causal law of the type producing mean differences in 
experiments does imply correlation" (21, p. 64). This drawback 
is acknowledged but must be accepted since the researcher 
is prevented from any meaningful manipulation of the 
experimental companies. 
12. A negative can occur when a subsequent, higher merger 
bid is discounted into the postannouncement target firm’s 
selling price. 
13. A representative of the Wall Street Journal indicated in a 
telephone conversation that the main criterion was a value 
requirement of $3,000,000. 
14. Madden (79) shows substantial preannouncement but little 
postannouncement excess returns in partial takeover bids. 
15. For example, contested merger bids are considered. This would 
include white knight offers in which a well-meaning bidder 
rescues a target firm from the hands of an undesirable 
corporate suitor. 
16. These are: single index market model; Sharpe/Lintner risk 
free CAPM model; Black zero beta CAPM model; two factor 
zero beta model including an unsystematic risk variable; 
and differential market risk model. 
17. Historically brokerage commissions were fixed according to the 
per share price and volume of a stock transaction. On 
May 1, 1975 brokerage commissions became negotiable. While 
most full service brokerage firms did not change their 
commission schedule, many smaller firms began offering lower 
commission rates to attract customers. Discount commissions 
are usually a function of the size of the transaction and 
establishing a percentage cost of any transaction is elusive. 
Given that discount brokerage firms advertize 25%-75% 
reductions from the full line rates, a 1% average fee is a 
reasonable approximation as a transaction cost. 
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18. Brown (19) hypothesized that some preperiod bias would exist 
as some anticipation is temporarily added to the 
market pricing mechanism and subsequently washes out 
after the event. This tendency may, in fact, be possible 
when the specific experimental factor is a regular, cyclically 
occurring accounting, financial, or economic event. 
A market anticipation is fairly likely and a reflection in 
the parameter estimates would not be surprising. Merger 
bids are announced on a random basis and while some firms 
may be considered likely targets, the systematic bias that 
could occur elsewhere is not possible on a spillover basis. 
19. Dodd and Ruback (32) found some beta instability in a 
minority of their sample on a before and after the tender 
offer event and therefore used a pooled estimation 
period. 
20. The absence of postmerger returns of successfully purchased 
targets creates an operational problem since subsequent 
observations exist for all other sample firms. Mandelker (81) 
simulated the postperiod seller systematic risk coefficient 
with the successful buyer beta and reported little influence 
on his results. 
21. A second problem of estimating daily systematic risk 
coefficients is the potential for understatement of the 
parameter itself. Hawawini (57) shows a substantial reduction 
on average in both beta estimates and the coefficient of 
determination for fifty randomly selected stocks as the 
investment holding period is reduced from one month to one 
day. While Roll (97) suggests that higher autocorrelation is 
induced from portfolios of infrequently traded securities, 
Hawawini attributes the downward bias to first order 
autocorrelation. Cross-sectional independence is highly likely 
when forming portfolios of noncontemporaneous arbitrage 
hedges, but the autocorrelation cannot be remedied with a 
portfolio treatment. If the market model parameter estimates 
are biased over short intervals, the coefficients calculated 
from longer investment holding periods may reduce the 
autocorrelation. Therefore, monthly beta estimates may be 
closer to the true unobservable systematic risk parameter. 
Data availability will limit the extension of the investment 
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holding period. The risk coefficients and the forecast errors 
of the OLS market model were tested for the effect of a daily 
bias. First, parameter estimates were calculated for sample 
companies with monthly return data. These coefficents were 
higher than the daily results and the CEW betas were lower 
than the value weighted index proxy based parameters. 
Subsequently, when these parameter estimates were applied to 
the daily returns a negative bias was measured by the 
residuals. The source of the bias was not identified and 
could not be explained. 
22. Research based on CAPM, however, faces a vigorous challenge 
from the criticism of Roll (94, 95, 96) who argues that the 
market portfolio, the foundation of the testable ex-post 
CAPM, is unmeasurable because of the problems of including 
real estate and other tangible assets. Furthermore, previous 
work that utilizes a stock market proxy for the true 
market portfolio is not a test of the underlying model but 
rather of the proxy's efficiency. If the proxy is mean 
variance efficient, linearity results and no abnormal 
performance can be measured. If the proxy is inefficient, 
then any performance ranking can result depending on which 
inefficient index is used. While this questions the validity 
of CAPM based research, Roll (96) admits that residual 
analysis does not suffer from these defects because 
of the large number of observations and also the randomness 
of the tested event’s occurrence (i.e., publicly announced 
merger offer) on the affected companies. 
23. This frequency compares very favorably to Asquith (69.9%) and 
Bradley et al. (65%) but much less so to Dodd (47%). 
24. For instance, the frequency of success differs across the 
sample subgroups in the following manner: 
Group 1 62% 
Group 2 73% 
Group 3 
bidder 1 20% 
bidder 2 73% 
Group 4 100% 
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25. The validity of the SIC code as an accurate indicator of 
industry membership is not without question. Only 23% of 
target and 9% of bidder firms operate within a single 
reported business segment. In addition, 72% of bidder and 
34% of target firms have subsidiaries in more than three 
segments. While the two-digit SIC code is not a perfect 
choice, nonetheless, it does describe the largest business 
segment and can serve as a useful proxy of industry 
classification. 
26. If one assumes that one month contains an average of 22 
trading days, the range of data provided is approximately 6 
months and is directly comparable to these previous studies. 
27. Monthly beta estimates are calculated for bidder 
firms using a 60 month estimation interval. The monthly CEW 
derived estimates are indeed smaller as forecast. 
28. 
SPR 
Index 
CVW CEW 
/\ 
a 
/\ .000 .001 .005 
8 1.144 1.196 1.005 
R2 „ .274 .328 .355 
SE( 6) .236 .218 .170 
A sensitivity test on the effect of the estimation interval 
on the OLS forecast errors reveals the following: 
interval (days) 
return 50 100 150 200 
day -1 CAFE .1258 
target 
.1227 
firms 
.1248 .1275 
day 0 AFE .1710 .1711 .1713 .1713 
day 40 CAFE .2747 .2694 .2769 .2864 
day -1 CAFE .0111 
bidder 
.0076 
firms 
.0053 .0036 
day 0 AFE -.0044 -.0048 - .0050 -.0055 
day 40 CAFE -.0128 -.0189 - .0237 -.0297 
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29. To provide a sensitivity analysis the target firm intercept 
was constrained to zero and target firm return regressed 
through the origin. Constraining the alpha to zero should 
shift all return not explained by market forces to the error 
term and increase the positive trend of the residuals. 
Neither the beta estimates or the explanatory power of the 
model increase. While the cross-sectional day 0 AFE almost 
equals to the OLS observation (i.e. 17.23% - 17.19%), the 
postannouncement excess returns cumulate to a higher level. 
For instance, the highest the value-weighted OLS CAFE are 
0.99%, when the intercept is constrained, the postannouncement 
CAFE reaches 3.69%. The trend of increasing return after the 
announcement but decreasing after approximately 20 days after 
the announcement remains the same. Regression through the 
origin does not change the postannouncement return for all 
formulations. 
30. The first test is the preannouncement period return. This 
return interval contains the preannouncement anticipation 
and speculation and the mean return is relatively high. 
These concentrated measures of return display the highest 
mean daily returns and not suprisingly are accompanied by 
significant positive t statistics. 
31. This is generally true except in the case of a merger 
proposal offered to a U.S. domestic company by a foreign 
bidder firm, whose stock is not available for short sale. 
32. The effective announcement day is the first day of trading 
upon the public disclosure of the merger. Any missing data 
around the announcement is presumed to reflect suspended 
trading in the shares of the participant companies as a 
result of an unbalance of orders, disorderly trading, or 
other institutional factors. Since missing data is treated 
as no return, the effective data of the announcement may be 
shifted back; therefore day 0 reports a portfolio return 
consisting of all individual 167 merger arbitrage hedges. 
33. Exact results are contained in Table 31 which is located in 
the Appendix. 
34. Each statistical test has been found to be somewhat 
inappropriate. These measurement problems stem from the 
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large announcement day adjustment. When this occurs, a 
substantial positive return is sometimes rejected by the 
statistical tests. The tendency of the nonparametric Sign 
test not to reject the null hypothesis is understandable. 
Further, if one examines the total distribution of the error 
terms (Table 54) a small negative bias is detected. This 
violates the assumptions of our tests that the mean of the 
errors is a normal or symmetric distribution around zero. 
35. Under the Alternate Net Capital Requirement the member 
firm/individual must internally finance 15% of the market 
value of the long position plus 30% market value of the 
short position which exceeds 25% of the long position; or 
finance 25% of the greater of the market value of either 
the long or the short position. 
36. Under the Aggregate Indebtedness Net Capital Requirement 
an arbitrageur must finance 30% of the greater of the long 
or short position subject to a maximum 15 to 1 liability 
to capital ratio. 
37. Wsyer-Pratte concludes "[w]hen you also figure that the 
2.5 risk (possible loss/expected gain) ratio may yield 
122% capital for the NYSE member, and that the 4.4 risk 
ratio may yield 14.36% then it may be said that it is 8.5 
times more advantageous-from a viewpoint of return on 
capital-for a NYSE member than for a private 
investor" (120, p .31). 
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Table 39 
Sample Set of Bidder and Target Firms 
Target Firm Announcement Date Bidder Firm 
Copper Range 741106 Amax 
Simon & Schuster 750129 Gulf & Western 
Clark Oil 750507 Esmark 
Austral Oil 750806 St. Joe Minerals 
Bates Manufacturing 750903 Great Western United 
Falcon Seaboard 750916 MAPCO 
Cameo 750918 N L Industries 
Aristar 751006 American Financial Co. 
G. P. Putnam & Sons 751008 MCA 
Londontown 751111 Interco 
American Chain & Cable 751119 Babcock & Wilcox Ltd.* 
Garlock 751119 Colt Industries 
Utah International 751215 General Electric 
Riviana Foods 760212 Colgate Palmolive 
Incoterm 760213 Data General 
Consyne 760304 American Hospital 
Supply 
Sprague Electric 760309 Cabot Corporation 
S. W. Industries 760323 BTR Ltd.* 
Signal Companies 760426 Dresser Industries 
Unitek 760511 Airco 
Tropicana 760527 Kellogg 
Richmond 760527 Continental Group 
Systron Donner 760701 Tracor 
Rucker 760907 N L Industries 
Eckerd Drugs 760908 Jack Eckerd 
Sherwood Medical Ent. 760915 Brunswick 
Carbon Industries 760920 ITT 
MPB 760921 Wheelabrator Frye 
Data Documents 760927 Dictaphone 
Damson Oil 761004 Barnwell Industries 
Universal Leaf & Tobacco 761012 Congoleum 
Hoerner Waldorf 761026 Champion Industries 
Ex-Cell-0 761026 Bendix 
Milgo Electronics 761110 Racal Ltd* 
Sprague Electric 761112 General Cable 
Copper Range 761117 Louisiana Land & 
Exploration 
Stanray 761206 IC Industries 
Deseret Pharmaceuticals 761207 Warner Lambert 
Dixilyn 761221 Panhandle Eastern 
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Table 39 (continued) 
Target Firm Announcement Date Bidder Firm 
Koehring 770106 Fruehauf 
Viacom International 770111 Storer Broadcasting 
Intermedco 770113 Thomas Tilling Ltd* 
Pickwick International 770119 American Can 
Harmon International 770131 Beatrice Foods 
Texstar 770207 Avnet 
Menasco 770208 Colt Industries 
Inmont 770211 Esmark bl 
770803 Carrier b2 
Fresnillo 770302 Rosario Resources 
Elgin National 770307 Pittston 
Victor Comptometer 770308 Walter Kidde 
Allied Thermal 770309 Interpace bl 
771017 Jim Walter b2 
Babcock & Wilcox 770320 United Technologies 
770802 J. Ray McDermott b2 
Molycorp 770404 Union Oil 
Mammouth Mart 770418 King’s Department 
Stores 
Daniel Industries 770419 Fluor 
Sola Basics 770420 General Signal 
Gerber Products 770420 Anderson Clayton 
Hughes & Hatcher 770503 Outlet Companies 
Eason Oil 770505 ITT 
Avis 770518 Fuqua Industries 
Weatherhead 770523 Dana bl 
770606 Norton Simon b2 
Pick N Pay 770524 W R Grace 
Medenco 770524 INA 
Pizza Hut 770617 Pepsico 
Falcon Seaboard 770622 Raytheon 
Hospital Affiliates 770625 INA 
House of Vision 770629 Frigitronics 
Book-of-the-Month Club 770706 Time 
Compo Industries 770711 Pandell Bradford 
Lewis Businesss Products 770728 Duplex Products 
Chemetron 770803 Crane bl 
770812 Alleghany Ludlum b2 
McCord 770901 Ex Cell 0 
Lehigh Portland Cement 770906 Portland-Zementwerke 
Heidelberg AG* 
Miles Laboratories 770928 Bayer AG* 
Hoffman Electronics 771020 Gould 
Alcon Laboratories 771017 Nestle S.A.* 
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Table 39 (continued) 
Target Firm Announcement Date Bidder Firm 
Medusa 771017 Moore McCormack 
Carborundum 771102 Kenneccott bl 
771116 Eaton b2 
Baker Industries 771107 Borg Warner 
Diamond M 771111 Kaneb Services bl 
771114 Western Company of 
North America b2 
Whiting 771103 Wheelabrator Frye 
S C A Services 771103 Waste Management 
Emery Industries 771117 National Distillers 
Leath 771201 Gamble Skogmo 
National Starch & Chemical 771212 Unilever* 
Budd 771213 Thyssen AG* 
Marshall Field 771214 Carter Hawley Stores 
Clarkson Industries 780110 Thomas Tilling Ltd.* 
Culligan International 780112 Beatrice Foods 
Systron Donner 780112 Leeds & Northrup 
Verex 780116 Greyhound 
Fibreboard 780127 Louisiana Pacific 
Ohio Brass 780221 Harvey Hubbell 
Peter Paul 780222 Cadbury Schweppes Ltd.* 
Resistoflex 780209 UMC bl 
780217 Bundy b2 
Foodway National 780227 H. J. Heinz 
AMBAC 780302 United Technologies 
Rockower Brothers 780309 Woolworth 
Automation Industries 780310 General Cable 
Hardee’s 780320 Pet Foods 
Rowan Companies 780321 Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Den Tal Ez 780403 Syntex 
Shenendoah Oil 780404 Union Pacific 
Medusa 780417 Kaiser Cement 
Globe Union 780502 Square D bl 
780509 Johnson Controls b2 
Combined Communications 780508 Ganne t 
Dymo Industries 780516 Esselte AB* 
Inland Container 780519 Time 
Skagg’s 780613 Jewel Companies 
Citation Company 780718 Bliss & Laughin 
Olinkraft 780718 Texas Eastern bl 
781010 Johns Manville b2 
American Air Filter 780728 Allis Chalmers 
Servomation 780728 GDV bl 
780804 Liggett b2 
174 
Table 39 (continued) 
Target Firm Announcement Date Bidder Firm 
Del Monte 780804 R. J. Reynolds 
Neptune International 780804 Wheelabrator-Frye 
Pebble Beach Corp 780828 Twentieth Century-Fox 
Green Giant 780918 Pillsbury 
McKee Corp 780921 Davy International* 
Olin Corp 781003 Celanese 
Technicare 781005 Johnson and Johnson 
Filmways International 781010 American International 
Cosco 781012 
Pictures 
Walter Kidde 
P. R. Mallory 781015 Dart Industries 
Falcon Seaboard 781019 Diamond Shamrock 
Risdon 781019 Metal Box Ltd.* 
A. B. Dick 781120 British General 
Hess 781124 
Electric Ltd.* 
Marshall Field 
Dictaphone 781219 Pitney-Bowes 
Basic Industries 781220 Combustion Engineering 
Skil Corp 790102 Emerson Electric 
Western Publishing 790109 Mattel 
McGraw-Hill 790110 American Express 
Narco Scientific 790111 Rorer Group 
Gardner-Denver 790122 Cooper Industries 
Chicago Rivet 790123 Mite Corporation 
Stone Container 790123 Boise Cascade 
Washington Steel 790124 Talley Industries 
Sterndent 790205 Cooper Labs 
United Finacial Corp 790327 National Steel 
of California 
Continental Illiois 790327 Boverie Properties* 
Properties 
National CSS 790327 Dun & Bradstreet 
Cyprus Mines 790412 Standard Oil Indiana 
Fairchild Camera 790426 Schlumberger bl 
790522 Gould b2 
Maremont Corp 790614 Schweizerische 
Eltra Corp 790629 
Aluminum AG* 
Allied Chemical 
Integon 790724 Anderson Clayton 
790809 C. I. T. Financial 
Studebacker Worthington 790725 McGraw-Edison 
Flintkote Corp 790730 Genstar Ltd.* 
Marathon Oil 790813 Penn Central 
Reserve Oil 790815 Getty Oil 
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Table 39 (continued) 
Target Firm Announcement Date Bidder Firm 
Harrah* s 790904 Holiday Inns 
Smith’s Transfer Co 790906 ARA Services 
Howard Johnson 790910 Imperial Group Ltd.* 
V S 1 Corp 790917 Emhart 
Amcord Inc 791001 Gifford-Hill 
Beech Aircraft 791002 Raytheon 
Hall’s Motor Transport 791004 Tiger International 
Tappan 791012 AB Electrolux* 
Silo 791016 Cyclops 
C. F. Braun 791106 Santa Fe International 
Wylain 791127 TRE bl 
791224 Marley Corp. 
Jantzen 791128 Blue Bell 
Allergan Pharmaceutical 791207 Smithkline 
Gamble Skogmo 791212 Wickes 
Leesona 800125 John Brown Co.* 
Ampex 800219 Signal 
Colwell 800220 Baldwin United 
* foreign bidder firm 
bl first bidder firm in bidding war 
b2 second bidder firm in contested merger offer 
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Table 40 
Average Arbitrage Hedge Portfolio Returns 
t(days) AR( t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0001 -.0001 167 .486 .514 
-24 -.0005 -.0006 167 .465 .535 
-23 .0051 .0044 167 .510 .490 
-22 .0040 .0085 167 .507 .493 
-21 -.0028 .0056 167 .507 .493 
-20 .0070 .0126 167 .541 .459 
-19 .0017 .0143 167 .523 .477 
-18 .0037 .0179 167 .483 .517 
-17 .0010 .0190 167 .514 .486 
-16 .0019 .0208 167 .483 .517 
-15 .0028 .0236 167 .557 .443 
-14 .0031 .0267 167 .507 .493 
-13 .0039 .0306 167 .517 .483 
-12 .0052 .0358 167 .517 .483 
-11 .0018 .0376 167 .483 .517 
-10 .0037 .0413 167 .570 .430 
-9 .0060 .0473 167 .483 .517 
-8 .0039 .0512 167 .524 .476 
-7 .0145 .0657 167 .638 .362 
-6 .0079 .0735 166 .628 .372 
-5 .0042 .0778 166 .537 .463 
-4 .0109 .0886 166 .607 .393 
-3 .0199 .1086 164 .655 .345 
-2 .0170 .1255 163 .648 .352 
-1 .0175 .1430 156 .622 .378 
0 .1700 .3130 167 .882 .118 
1 .0053 .3183 167 .553 .447 
2 .0006 .3189 167 .507 .493 
3 .0009 .3198 166 .427 .573 
4 -.0011 .3186 165 .483 .517 
5 .0050 .3237 164 .538 .462 
6 -.0013 .3224 162 .467 .533 
7 .0011 .3235 162 .525 .475 
8 .0019 .3254 160 .543 .457 
9 -.0009 .3245 160 .493 .507 
10 .0062 .3307 159 .575 .425 
11 .0026 .3334 157 .542 .458 
12 .0020 .3353 156 .519 .481 
13 -.0040 .3313 156 .397 .603 
14 .0004 .3317 155 .534 .466 
15 -.0009 .3308 152 .522 .478 
16 .0044 .3352 150 .530 .470 
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Table 40 (continued) 
(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive %negative 
17 .0037 .3389 150 .630 .370 
18 .0023 .3412 149 .469 .531 
19 .0009 .3421 148 .481 .519 
20 .0010 .3431 149 .542 .458 
21 .0023 .3454 148 .535 .465 
22 .0038 .3491 148 .605 .395 
23 .0018 .3510 147 .455 .545 
24 .0007 .3516 145 .573 .427 
25 -.0038 .3479 143 .458 .542 
26 -.0013 .3465 143 .444 .566 
27 -.0035 .3430 143 .520 .480 
28 -.0025 .3405 142 .479 .521 
29 .0023 .3428 140 .548 .452 
30 .0012 .3440 139 .525 .475 
31 .0001 .3441 138 .533 .467 
32 .0022 .3463 136 .552 .448 
33 -.0015 .3449 135 .528 .472 
34 .0025 .3474 . 133 .576 .424 
35 -.0019 .3455 132 .518 .482 
36 .0004 .3459 130 .552 .448 
37 .0007 .3466 128 .472 .526 
38 .0028 .3493 127 .553 .447 
39 -.0018 .3476 125 .496 .504 
40 -.0019 .3456 122 .551 .449 
Table 41 
Average Arbitrage Hedge Portfolio Returns 
Successful Mergers 
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t(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0012 -.0012 
-24 -.0021 -.0034 
-23 .0053 .0020 
-22 .0041 .0061 
-21 .0002 .0063 
-20 .0036 .0099 
-19 .0047 .0147 
-18 .0047 .0194 
-17 .0007 .0202 
-16 .0020 .0222 
-15 .0024 .0246 
-14 .0034 .0280 
-13 .0050 .0330 
-12 .0089 .0419 
-11 .0021 .0440 
-10 .0034 .0474 
-9 .0076 .0549 
-8 .0016 .0565 
-7 .0135 .0700 
-6 .0065 .0765 
-5 .0059 .0824 
-4 .0146 .0970 
-3 .0192 .1161 
-2 .0194 .1355 
-1 .0208 .1563 
0 .1893 .3457 
1 .0058 .3514 
2 .0014 .3528 
3 .0003 .3531 
4 -.0024 .3507 
5 .0039 .3546 
6 .0029 .3575 
7 .0024 .3598 
8 .0010 .3609 
9 .0018 .3627 
10 .0031 .3658 
11 .0026 .3684 
12 .0031 .3716 
13 -.0031 .3685 
14 .0034 .3719 
15 .0017 .3736 
16 .0069 .3805 
117 .470 .530 
117 .392 .608 
117 .529 .471 
117 .505 .495 
117 .495 .505 
117 .535 .465 
117 .553 .447 
117 .480 .520 
117 .529 .471 
117 .500 .500 
117 .549 .451 
117 .539 .461 
117 .500 .500 
117 .520 .480 
117 .515 .485 
117 .559 .441 
117 .515 .495 
117 .465 .535 
117 .637 .363 
116 .633 .367 
116 .570 .430 
116 .673 .323 
115 .604 .396 
114 .660 .340 
107 .688 .312 
117 .886 .114 
117 .569 .431 
117 .505 .495 
117 .417 .583 
117 .454 .546 
117 .500 .500 
117 .511 .489 
117 .552 .448 
117 .530 .470 
117 .495 .505 
116 .559 .441 
116 .538 .462 
115 .542 .458 
115 .376 .634 
116 .568 .432 
116 .500 .500 
115 .548 .452 
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Table 41 (continued) 
t(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0043 .3848 114 .644 .356 
18 .0007 .3855 113 .457 .543 
19 .0027 .3882 113 .511 .489 
20 .0010 .3892 113 .558 .442 
21 .0041 .3933 113 .532 .468 
22 .0003 .3936 113 .584 .416 
23 .0003 .3939 112 .442 .558 
24 .0016 .3954 111 .571 .429 
25 -.0048 .3906 111 .443 .557 
26 -.0007 .3899 111 .462 .538 
27 .0003 .3902 111 .533 .467 
28 .0002 .3905 110 .506 .494 
29 .0019 .3924 110 .588 .412 
30 .0022 .3946 no .538 .462 
31 .0008 .3954 no .544 .456 
32 .0029 .3983 109 .570 .430 
33 -.0011 .3972 108 .510 .490 
34 .0031 .4003 108 .571 .429 
35 -.0011 .3991 108 .506 .494 
36 .0024 .4015 106 .600 .400 
37 -.0011 .4004 106 .429 .571 
38 .0042 .4046 105 .567 .433 
39 .0012 .4059 103 .506 .494 
40 -.0021 .4037 100 .549 .451 
Table 42 
Average Arbitrage Hedge Portfolio Returns 
Unsuccessful Mergers 
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t(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 .0029 .0029 
-24 .0039 .0068 
-23 .0044 .0111 
-22 .0030 .0141 
-21 -.0112 .0029 
-20 .0145 .0174 
-19 -.0045 .0126 
-18 .0009 .0138 
-17 .0011 .0149 
-16 .0008 .0157 
-15 .0022 .0179 
-14 .0037 .0216 
-13 .0011 .0227 
-12 -.0010 .0217 
-11 .0016 .0223 
-10 .0040 .0272 
-9 .0043 .0316 
-8 .0093 .0409 
-7 .0170 .0580 
-6 .0104 .0684 
-5 .0002 .0686 
-4 .0033 .0719 
-3 .0220 .0939 
-2 .0126 .1065 
-1 .0090 .1115 
0 .1272 .2427 
1 .0053 .2480 
2 -.0006 .2474 
3 .0028 .2502 
4 .0010 .2512 
5 .0083 .2595 
6 -.0113 .2483 
7 -.0032 .2451 
8 .0026 .2477 
9 -.0088 .2389 
10 .0129 .2518 
11 .0031 .2549 
12 -.0031 .2519 
13 -.0048 .2471 
14 -.0089 .2381 
15 -.0092 .2289 
16 -.0009 .2280 
50 .575 .425 
50 .636 .364 
50 .463 .537 
50 .465 .535 
50 .488 .512 
50 .512 .488 
50 .477 .523 
50 .488 .512 
50 .476 .524 
50 .419 .581 
50 .558 .442 
50 .476 .524 
50 .537 .463 
50 .535 .465 
50 .439 .561 
50 .581 .419 
50 .432 .568 
50 .643 .357 
50 .651 .349 
50 .581 .419 
50 .465 .535 
50 .488 .512 
49 .744 .256 
49 .634 .366 
49 .512 .488 
50 .864 .136 
50 .545 .455 
50 .535 .465 
49 .452 .548 
48 .500 .500 
47 .610 .390 
45 .385 .615 
45 .415 .585 
43 .558 .444 
43 .459 .541 
43 .595 .405 
41 .529 .471 
41 .441 .559 
41 .432 .568 
41 .424 .576 
40 .571 .429 
40 .528 .472 
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Table 42 (continued) 
(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0017 .2297 38 .563 .438 
18 .0080 .2377 37 .545 .455 
19 -.0039 .2338 37 .408 .594 
20 .0018 .2355 36 .548 .452 
21 -.0033 .2322 35 .533 .467 
22 .0147 .2469 35 .645 .355 
23 .0079 .2548 35 .516 .484 
24 -.0021 .2527 34 .586 .414 
25 -.0005 .2522 32 .500 .500 
26 -.0036 .2486 32 .370 .630 
27 -.0174 .2318 32 .500 .500 
28 -.0126 .2185 32 .393 .607 
29 .0066 .2251 30 .500 .500 
30 -.0035 .2216 29 .480 .520 
31 -.0027 .2189 28 .500 .500 
32 .0004 .2195 27 .480 .520 
33 -.0048 .2146 27 .522 .478 
34 .0040 .2187 25 .565 .435 
35 -.0057 .2130 24 .571 .429 
36 -.0077 .2052 24 .348 .652 
37 .0095 .2148 22 .700 .300 
38 -.0036 .2112 22 .500 .500 
39 -.0164 .1949 22 .400 .600 
40 -.0030 .1919 22 .500 .500 
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Table 43 
Simple Market Adjusted Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
CVW Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0009 -.0009 167 .452 .548 
-24 -.0008 -.0016 167 .456 .542 
-23 .0049 .0033 167 .529 .471 
-22 .0032 .0064 167 .497 .503 
-21 -.0027 .0037 167 .471 .529 
-20 .0066 .0102 167 .523 .477 
-19 .0016 .0118 167 .542 .458 
-18 .0037 .0155 167 .529 .471 
-17 .0008 .0163 167 .484 .516 
-16 .0013 .0176 167 .497 .503 
-15 .0021 .0197 167 .510 .490 
-14 .0021 .0217 167 .510 .490 
-13 .0013 .0235 167 .477 .523 
-12 .0049 .0283 167 .516 .484 
-11 .0007 .0290 167 .471 .529 
-10 .0027 .0316 167 .555 .445 
-9 .0064 .0381 167 .497 .503 
-8 .0036 .0417 167 .497 .503 
-7 .0134 .0511 167 .606 .394 
-6 .0068 .0619 166 .623 .377 
-5 .0047 .0666 166 .513 .487 
-4 .0104 .0770 166 .558 .442 
-3 .0202 .0971 164 .632 .368 
-2 .0166 .1137 163 .684 .316 
-1 .0200 .1338 156 .680 .320 
0 .1702 .3040 167 .884 .116 
1 .0042 .3082 167 .542 .458 
2 .0000 .3082 167 .477 .523 
3 -.0003 .3079 166 .455 .545 
4 -.0014 .3064 165 .474 .526 
5 .0050 .3115 164 .523 .477 
6 -.0017 .3097 162 .454 .546 
7 .0012 .3110 162 .513 .487 
8 .0016 .3125 160 .540 .460 
9 -.0008 .3118 160 .520 .480 
10 .0059 .3177 159 .523 .477 
11 .0025 .3202 157 .517 .483 
12 .0017 .3219 156 .524 .476 
13 -.0036 .3181 156 .435 .565 
14 .0001 .3182 157 .476 .524 
15 -.0002 .3181 156 .555 .445 
16 .0046 .3226 155 .497 .503 
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Table 43 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0042 .3268 152 .562 .448 
18 .0023 .3291 150 .489 .511 
19 -.0003 .3288 150 .466 .532 
20 .0005 .3293 149 .529 .471 
21 .0026 .3319 148 .561 .439 
22 .0040 .3359 148 .554 .446 
23 .0021 .3380 147 .496 .504 
24 .0010 .3390 145 .547 .453 
25 -.0031 .3359 143 .474 .526 
26 -.0013 .3346 143 .474 .526 
27 -.0043 .3303 143 .511 .489 
28 -.0035 .3268 142 .470 .530 
29 .0006 .3274 140 .485 .515 
30 .0003 .3276 139 .481 .519 
31 -.0008 .3268 137 .496 .504 
32 .0023 .3291 136 .592 .408 
33 -.0008 .3283 135 .566 .434 
34 .0021 .3304 133 .551 .449 
35 -.0024 .3280 132 .472 .528 
36 -.0010 .3270 130 .528 .472 
37 .0006 .3276 128 .504 .496 
38 .0022 .3298 127 .537 .463 
39 -.0026 .3272 125 .430 .570 
40 -.0034 .3239 122 .471 .529 
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Table 44 
Nonparametric Significance Statistics 
Simple Market Model 
(two-tailed probability in paretheses) 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 1.12 (.26) -.38 (.70) 
-24 .96 (.34) -1.12 (.26) 
-23 .64 (.52) -1.10 (.27) 
-22 0.00 (1.0) -.41 (.68) 
-21 .64 (.52) -1.04 (.30) 
-20 .48 (.63) -1.32 (.17) 
-19 .96 (.34) -.66 (.51) 
-18 .64 (.52) -1.00 (.32) 
-17 .32 (.75) -.06 (.93) 
-16 0.00 (1.0) -.47 (.64) 
-15 .16 (.87) -.56 (.38) 
-14 .16 (.87) -.22 (.82) 
-13 .48 (.63) -.22 (.82) 
-12 .32 (.75) -.82 (.54) 
-11 .64 (.52) -.08 (.94) 
-10 1.28 (.20) -1.60 (.11) 
- 9 0.00 (1.0) -.42 (.67) 
- 8 0.00 (1.0) -.99 (.32) 
- 7 2.57 (.01) -2.95 (.00) 
- 6 2.82 (.00) -2.29 (.02) 
- 5 .08 (.94) -.70 (.49) 
- 4 1.37 (.17) -2.82 (.00) 
- 3 2.84 (.00) -4.37 (.00) 
- 2 3.97 (.00) -4.14 (.00) 
- 1 3.13 (.01) -3.84 (.00) 
0 9.48 (.00) -9.75 (.00) 
1 .96 (.34) -1.22 (.22) 
2 .48 (.63) -.27 (.79) 
3 1.05 (.39) -1.55 (.12) 
4 .56 (.57) -.60 (.55) 
5 .48 (.63) -1.16 (.25) 
6 1.05 (.29) -1.30 (.19) 
7 .24 (.81) -.36 (.72) 
8 .90 (.37) -.70 (.48) 
9 .41 (.68) -.31 (.76) 
10 .49 (.62) -1.43 (.15) 
11 .33 (.74) -1.18 (.24) 
12 .50 (.62) -.26 (.80) 
13 1.48 (.14) -1.61 (.11) 
14 .50 (.62) -.16 (.87) 
15 1.24 (.21) -.90 (.37) 
185 
Table 44 (continued) 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
16 0.00 (1.0) 
17 1.17 (.24) 
18 .17 (.87) 
19 .67 (.50) 
20 .59 (.55) 
21 1.36 (.18) 
22 1.19 (.24) 
23 0.00 (1.0) 
24 1.02 (.30) 
25 .52 (.61) 
26 .52 (.61) 
27 .17 (.86) 
28 .60 (.54) 
29 .26 (.79) 
30 .35 (.73) 
31 0.00 (1.0) 
32 2.02 (.04) 
33 1.41 (.16) 
34 1.06 (.29) 
35 .53 (.59) 
36 .54 (.59) 
37 0.00 (1.0) 
38 .72 (.47) 
39 1.46 (.15) 
40 .55 (.58) 
-.58 (.36) 
-1.91 (.06) 
-.16 (.88) 
i . o (.49) 
-.24 (.81) 
-1.84 (.07) 
-1.82 (.07) 
-.11 (.91) 
-.78 (.44) 
-1.23 (.22) 
-.88 (.38) 
-.17 (.86) 
-.59 (.55) 
-.04 (.97) 
-.25 (.80) 
-.39 (.70) 
-1.49 (.14) 
-.75 (.46) 
-1.39 (.17) 
-.58 (.56) 
-.11 (.91) 
-.13 (.89) 
-.76 (.45) 
-.40 (.69) 
-.82 (.41) 
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Table 45 
Average OLS Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
CVW Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0007 -.0007 167 .477 .523 
-24 -.0009 -.0016 167 .458 .542 
-23 .0037 .0022 167 .516 .484 
-22 .0030 .0052 167 .471 .529 
-21 -.0034 .0017 167 .490 .510 
-20 .0060 .0077 167 .497 .503 
-19 .0006 .0084 167 .510 .490 
-18 .0028 .0112 167 .497 .503 
-17 .0001 .0113 167 .471 .529 
-16 .0007 .0120 167 .477 .523 
-15 .0027 .0148 167 .542 .458 
-14 .0026 .0173 167 .490 .510 
-13 .0020 .0193 167 .490 .510 
-12 .0040 .0233 167 .490 .510 
-11 .0013 .0246 167 .477 .523 
-10 .0036 .0282 167 .568 .432 
-9 .0057 .0340 167 .503 .497 
-8 .0027 .0367 167 .484 .516 
-7 .0131 .0497 167 .613 .387 
-6 .0064 .0562 166 .604 .396 
-5 .0042 .0603 166 .506 .494 
-4 .0107 .0711 166 .565 .435 
-3 .0204 .0914 164 .632 .368 
-2 .0158 .1072 163 .671 .329 
-1 .0195 .1267 156 .633 .367 
0 .1698 .2965 167 .884 .116 
1 .0046 .3011 167 .535 .465 
2 -.0003 .3008 167 .477 .523 
3 -.0004 .3004 166 .429 .571 
4 -.0020 .2985 165 .448 .552 
5 .0038 .3023 164 .510 .490 
6 -.0015 .3008 162 .408 .592 
7 .0005 .3012 162 .493 .507 
8 .0004 .3017 160 .487 .513 
9 -.0015 .3002 160 .493 .507 
10 .0048 .3050 159 .503 .497 
11 .0011 .3061 157 .490 .510 
12 .0008 .3070 156 .490 .510 
13 -.0047 .3023 156 .381 .619 
14 -.0004 .3020 157 .503 .497 
15 -.0017 .3002 156 .514 .486 
16 .0032 .3034 155 .448 .552 
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Table 45 (continued) 
t(days) AR( t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0022 .3057 152 .573 .427 
18 .0011 .3068 150 .461 .539 
19 .0000 .3067 150 .468 .532 
20 .0004 .3071 149 .529 .471 
21 .0012 .3083 148 .482 .518 
22 .0032 .3115 148 .518 .482 
23 .0001 .3116 147 .439 .561 
24 -.0008 .3108 145 .518 .482 
25 -.0039 .3068 143 .452 .548 
26 -.0015 .3053 143 .437 .563 
27 -.0035 .3018 143 .548 .452 
28 -.0032 .2986 142 .425 .575 
29 .0015 .3001 140 .492 .508 
30 .0004 .3004 139 .496 .504 
31 -.0012 .2993 137 .489 .511 
32 .0011 .3004 136 .538 .462 
33 -.0024 .2980 135 .473 .527 
34 .0014 .2994 133 .528 .472 
35 -.0023 .2971 132 .520 .480 
36 -.0017 .2954 130 .512 .488 
37 -.0012 .2942 128 .472 .528 
38 .0015 .2957 127 .496 .504 
39 -.0035 .2923 125 .471 .529 
40 -.0034 .2888 122 .479 .521 
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Table 46 
Nonparametric Significance Statistics 
OLS Market Model 
(two-tailed probability in parentheses) 
(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
-25 .48 (.63) -.25 (.80) 
-24 .96 (.34) -1.27 (.20) 
-23 .31 (.75) -.70 (.48) 
-22 .64 (.52) -.18 (.86) 
-21 .16 (.87) -1.06 (.29) 
-20 0.00 (1.0) -.89 (.37) 
-19 .16 (.87) -.19 (.85) 
-18 0.00 (1.0) -.36 (.72) 
-17 .64 (.52) -.30 (.76) 
-16 .48 (.63) -.04 (.97) 
-15 .96 (.34) -.68 (.50) 
-14 .16 (.87) -.15 (.88) 
-13 .16 (.87) -.49 (.62) 
-12 .16 (.87) -.15 (.88) 
-11 .48 (.63) -.03 (.98) 
-10 1.61 (.11) -1.81 (.06) 
- 9 0.00 (1.0) -.14 (.89) 
- 8 .32 (.75) -.54 (.59) 
- 7 2.73 (.01) -2.63 (.01) 
- 6 2.34 (.02) -2.34 (.01) 
- 5 -.08 (.94) -.62 (.53) 
- 4 1.53 (.13) -3.00 (.00) 
- 3 2.84 (.00) -4.51 (.00) 
- 2 3.81 (.00) -4.03 (.00) 
- 1 2.31 (.02) -3.70 (.00) 
0 9.48 (.00) -9.74 (.00) 
1 .80 (.42) -1.29 (.20) 
2 .48 (.63) -.52 (.60) 
3 1.69 (.09) -1.47 (.14) 
4 1.21 (.23) -1.01 (.31) 
5 .16 (.87) -.57 (.57) 
6 2.19 (.03) -1.79 (.07) 
7 .08 (.94) -.03 (.98) 
8 .25 (.81) -.95 (.34) 
9 .08 (.94) -.04 (.97) 
10 0.00 (1.0) -.23 (.62) 
11 .16 (.87) -.50 (.62) 
12 .16 (.87) -.27 (.79) 
13 2.80 (.01) -.43 (.67) 
14 0.00 (1.0) -2.47 (.01) 
15 .25 (.80) -.00 (1.0) 
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Table 46 (continued) 
t(days) Sign Test Wilcoxon Test 
16 1.16 (.24) -.26 (.80) 
17 1.67 (.09) -.99 (.32) 
18 .84 (.40) -.68 (.49) 
19 .67 (.50) -.67 (.50) 
20 .59 (.55) -.06 (.95) 
21 .34 (.73) -1.07 (.28) 
22 .34 (.73) -1.15 (.25) 
23 1.36 (.18) -1.38 (.17) 
24 .34 (.73) -.08 (.94) 
25 1.03 (.30) -1.75 (.08) 
26 1.38 (.17) -1.30 (.20) 
27 1.03 (.30) -.70 (.49) 
28 1.64 (.10) -1.17 (.24) 
29 .09 (.93) -.53 (.59) 
30 0.00 (1.0) -.26 (.80) 
31 .18 (.86) -.74 (.46) 
32 .79 (.40) -.77 (.44) 
33 .53 (.60) -.65 (.52) 
34 .53 (.59) -1.16 (.24) 
35 .36 (.72) -.55 (.58) 
36 .18 (.86) -.87 (.38) 
37 .54 (.59) -.84 (.40) 
38 0.00 (1.0) -.63 (.53) 
39 .54 (.54) -.82 (.41) 
40 .37 (.71) -.84 (.40) 
190 
Table 47 
Effect of Index Proxy on Hedge Performance Measures 
Holding Period 
-25 to 0 1 to 40 -25 to 40 
Mean Return Model 
.3130 .0326 .3457 
Simple Market Model 
SPR .3144 .0276 .3420 
CVW .3049 .0157 .3248 
CEW .2858 -.0025 .2833 
OLS Market Model 
SPR .2960 -.0072 .2888 
CVW .2974 -.0077 .2895 
CEW .2962 -.0094 .2868 
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Table 48 
Simple Market Adjusted Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
S & P 500 Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0007 -.0007 167 .465 .535 
-24 -.0005 -.0011 167 .465 .535 
-23 .0051 .0040 167 .535 .465 
-22 .0035 .0075 167 .503 .497 
-21 -.0025 .0050 167 .471 .529 
-20 .0068 .0118 167 .542 .458 
-19 .0018 .0136 167 .542 .458 
-18 .0040 .0176 167 .523 .477 
-17 .0012 .0188 167 .490 .510 
-16 .0015 .0203 167 .497 .503 
-15 .0023 .0226 167 .529 .471 
-14 .0023 .0249 167 .523 .477 
-13 .0020 .0269 167 .477 .523 
-12 .0053 .0322 167 .503 .497 
-11 .0009 .0331 167 .477 .523 
-10 .0030 .0361 167 .561 .439 
-9 .0067 .0429 167 .503 .497 
-8 .0039 .0468 167 .510 .490 
-7 .0138 .0606 167 .626 .374 
-6 .0070 .0676 166 .623 .377 
-5 .0049 .0725 166 .519 .481 
-4 .0106 .0832 166 .558 .442 
-3 .0204 .1036 164 .632 .368 
-2 .0169 .1205 163 .678 .322 
-1 .0204 .1409 156 .673 .327 
0 .1704 .3114 167 .884 .116 
1 .0045 .3159 167 .561 .439 
2 .0004 .3163 167 .477 .523 
3 -.0000 .3163 166 .442 .558 
4 -.0012 .3151 165 .500 .500 
5 .0052 .3203 164 .536 .464 
6 -.0016 .3187 162 .454 .546 
7 .0014 .3202 162 .513 .487 
8 .0019 .3221 160 .560 .440 
9 -.0004 .3216 160 .513 .487 
10 .0061 .3277 159 .550 .450 
11 .0028 .3304 157 .524 .476 
12 .0019 .3323 156 .531 .469 
13 -.0036 .3288 156 .435 .565 
14 .0003 .3291 157 .503 .497 
15 .0002 .3293 156 .555 .445 
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Table 48 (continued) 
t(days) AR( t) CAR(t) N % positive % negative 
16 .0047 .3340 155 .503 .497 
17 .0045 .3385 152 .559 .441 
18 .0024 .3409 150 .482 .518 
19 -.0000 .3409 150 .482 .518 
20 .0009 .3418 149 .529 .471 
21 .0029 .3447 148 .568 .432 
22 .0043 .3491 148 .568 .432 
23 .0024 .3515 147 .511 .489 
24 .0012 .3526 145 .547 .453 
23 -.0030 .3496 143 .481 .519 
26 -.0012 .3484 143 .481 .519 
27 -.0040 .3444 143 .519 .481 
28 -.0031 .3412 142 .507 .493 
29 .0009 .3421 140 .492 .508 
30 .0005 .3426 139 .496 .504 
31 -.0004 .3423 137 .496 .504 
32 .0028 .3450 136 .608 .392 
33 -.0004 .3446 135 .589 .411 
34 .0024 .3470 133 .559 .441 
35 -.0021 .3449 132 .472 .528 
36 -.0007 .3443 130 .520 .480 
37 .0009 .3452 128 .512 .488 
38 .0023 .3475 127 .528 .472 
39 -.0024 .3450 125 .413 .587 
40 -.0030 .3420 122 .504 .496 
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Table 49 
Simple Market Adjusted Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
CEW Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0011 -.0011 167 .452 .548 
-24 -.0014 -.0025 167 .439 .561 
-23 .0039 .0013 167 .490 .510 
-22 .0024 .0037 167 .477 .523 
-21 -.0034 .0003 167 .477 .523 
-20 .0061 .0064 167 .523 .477 
-19 .0010 .0075 167 .510 .490 
-18 .0032 .0107 167 .484 .416 
-17 -.0001 .0105 167 .490 .510 
-16 .0007 .0112 167 .503 .497 
-15 .0016 .0128 167 .510 .490 
-14 .0016 .0144 167 .523 .477 
-13 .0009 .0152 167 .458 .542 
-12 .0038 .0190 167 .503 .497 
-11 .0000 .0191 167 .445 .555 
-10 .0019 .0209 167 .574 .426 
-9 .0055 .0264 167 .465 .535 
-8 .0028 .0292 167 .477 .523 
-7 .0124 .0416 167 .594 .406 
-6 .0063 .0479 166 .604 .396 
-5 .0041 .0520 166 .506 .494 
-4 .0098 .0618 166 .545 .455 
-3 .0191 .0809 164 .625 .375 
-2 .0160 .0969 163 .645 .355 
-1 .0194 .1163 156 .639 .361 
0 .1695 .2858 167 .884 .116 
1 .0037 .2895 167 .510 .490 
2 -.0011 .2884 167 .471 .529 
3 -.0008 .2876 166 .409 .591 
4 -.0020 .2855 165 .461 .539 
5 .0046 .2902 164 .484 .516 
6 -.0020 .2882 162 .421 .579 
7 .0004 .2886 162 .507 .493 
8 .0009 .2895 160 .493 .507 
9 -.0016 .2879 160 .487 .513 
10 .0059 .2938 159 .510 .490 
11 .0021 .2958 157 .510 .490 
12 .0017 .2975 156 .551 .449 
13 -.0042 .2933 156 .429 .571 
14 -.0002 .2930 157 .483 .517 
15 -.0009 .2921 156 .514 .486 
16 .0041 .2962 157 .476 .524 
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Table 49 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0039 .3001 152 .573 .427 
18 .0018 .3019 150 .461 .539 
19 -.0005 .3014 150 .433 .567 
20 -.0001 .3013 149 .521 .479 
21 .0017 .3029 148 .525 .475 
22 .0033 .3063 148 .540 .460 
23 .0015 .3077 147 .424 .576 
24 .0009 .3086 145 .540 .460 
25 -.0031 .3055 143 .511 .489 
26 -.0015 .3040 143 .467 .533 
27 -.0048 .2992 143 .504 .496 
28 -.0043 .2950 142 .470 .530 
29 .0000 .2950 140 .492 .508 
30 -.0005 .2945 139 .481 .519 
31 -.0020 .2925 137 .450 .550 
32 .0009 .2934 136 .531 .469 
33 -.0017 .2917 135 .543 .457 
34 .0017 .2934 133 .543 .457 
35 -.0031 .2903 132 .465 .535 
36 -.0015 .2888 130 .488 .512 
37 -.0003 .2885 128 .463 .537 
38 .0020 .2904 127 .528 .472 
39 -.0029 .2875 125 .430 .570 
40 -.0042 .2833 122 .471 .529 
Table 50 
Simple Market Adjusted Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
Successful Mergers 
195 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0029 -.0029 
-24 -.0041 -.0070 
-23 .0063 -.0007 
-22 .0037 .0030 
-21 -.0005 .0025 
-20 .0047 .0072 
-19 .0044 .0116 
-18 .0039 .0155 
-17 .0018 .0173 
-16 .0013 .0186 
-15 .0022 .0209 
-14 .0025 .0234 
-13 .0018 .0252 
-12 .0066 .0319 
-11 .0016 .0335 
-10 .0022 .0357 
-9 .0056 .0413 
-8 .0032 .0444 
-7 .0116 .0561 
-6 .0062 .0623 
-5 .0067 .0690 
-4 .0121 .0811 
-3 .0198 .1009 
-2 .0211 .1219 
-1 .0249 .1468 
0 .1881 .3349 
1 .0035 .3384 
2 .0001 .3385 
3 -.0015 .3370 
4 -.0037 .3332 
5 .0038 .3370 
6 .0030 .3400 
7 .0034 .3434 
8 .0003 .3438 
9 .0016 .3454 
10 .0045 .3499 
11 .0033 .3532 
12 .0039 .3572 
13 -.0029 .3543 
14 .0052 .3594 
15 .0029 .3623 
16 .0061 .3684 
117 .427 .573 
117 .368 .632 
117 .581 .419 
117 .470 .530 
117 .479 .521 
117 .556 .444 
117 .547 .453 
117 .556 .444 
117 .538 .462 
117 .504 .496 
117 .547 .453 
117 .421 .479 
117 .487 .513 
117 .521 .479 
117 .487 .513 
117 .504 .496 
117 .521 .479 
117 .470 .530 
117 .598 .402 
116 .621 .379 
116 .569 .431 
116 .569 .409 
115 .591 .298 
114 .702 .243 
107 .757 .111 
117 .889 .444 
117 .556 .538 
117 .462 .556 
117 .444 .581 
117 .419 .521 
117 .479 .547 
117 .453 .470 
117 .530 .444 
117 .556 .479 
117 .521 .500 
116 .500 .440 
116 .560 .452 
115 .548 .591 
115 .409 .509 
116 .491 .466 
116 .534 .504 
115 .496 .412 
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Table 50 (continued) 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
17 .0049 .3733 114 .588 .496 
18 -.0000 .3732 113 .504 .487 
19 .0025 .3757 113 .513 .487 
20 -.0008 .3749 113 .513 .487 
21 .0038 .3787 113 .566 .434 
22 -.0008 .3779 113 .504 .496 
23 .0001 .3780 112 .455 .545 
24 .0010 .3790 111 .514 .486 
25 -.0033 .3756 111 .495 .505 
26 -.0004 .3752 111 .505 .495 
27 -.0004 .3749 111 .532 .468 
28 .0007 .3756 110 .509 .491 
29 .0001 .3757 110 .482 .518 
30 .0012 .3769 110 .473 .527 
31 .0001 .3769 109 .514 .486 
32 .0019 .3789 109 .587 .413 
33 -.0002 .3787 108 .556 .444 
34 .0030 .3817 108 .546 .454 
35 -.0011 .3806 108 .472 .528 
36 .0005 .3812 106 .547 .453 
37 -.0009 .3802 106 .481 .519 
38 .0033 .3836 108 .524 .476 
39 .0001 .3836 103 .388 .612 
40 -.0022 .3814 100 .470 .530 
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Table 51 
Simple Market Adjusted Arbitrage Hedge Forecast 
Unsuccessful Mergers 
Errors 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 .0026 .0026 50 .500 .500 
-24 .0032 .0057 50 .600 .400 
-23 .0016 .0074 50 .400 .600 
-22 .0017 .0090 50 .500 .500 
-21 -.0073 .0018 50 .460 .540 
-20 .0115 .0133 50 .480 .520 
-19 -.0061 .0073 50 .540 .460 
-18 .0015 .0087 50 .520 .480 
-17 -.0016 .0071 50 .400 .600 
-16 .0015 .0086 50 .520 .480 
-15 .0044 .0129 50 .500 .500 
-14 -.0027 .0103 50 .500 .500 
-13 -.0022 .0091 50 .420 .580 
-12 -.0031 .0050 50 .540 .460 
-11 .0037 .0086 50 .500 .500 
-10 .0113 .0199 50 .640 .360 
-9 .0011 .0210 50 .400 .600 
-8 .0136 .0347 50 .560 .440 
-7 .0076 .0422 50 .580 .420 
-6 .0065 .0488 50 .540 .460 
-5 .0011 .0499 50 .420 .580 
-4 .0046 .0545 50 .420 .580 
-3 .0240 .0785 49 .735 .265 
-2 .0105 .0890 49 .612 .388 
-1 .0150 .1039 49 .612 .388 
0 .1354 .2394 50 .860 .140 
1 .0015 .2409 50 .500 .500 
2 -.0023 .2386 50 .440 .560 
3 .0021 .2407 49 .408 .592 
4 .0049 .2456 48 .563 .438 
5 .0067 .2523 47 .553 .447 
6 -.0116 .2406 45 .400 .600 
7 -.0043 .2363 45 .489 .511 
8 .0087 .2450 43 .581 .419 
9 -.0051 .2398 43 .535 .465 
10 .0117 .2515 43 .581 .419 
11 .0027 .2542 41 .512 .465 
12 -.0043 .2499 41 .463 .419 
13 -.0060 .2439 41 .512 .483 
14 -.0082 .2357 41 .415 .585 
15 -.0063 .2295 40 .625 .375 
16 -.0034 .2261 40 .425 .575 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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Table 51 (continued) 
AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
.0037 .2297 38 .500 .500 
.0058 .2355 37 .486 .514 
-.0055 .2300 37 .378 .622 
.0025 .2325 36 .500 .500 
-.0047 .2278 35 .514 .486 
.0150 .2428 35 .686 .314 
.0082 .2510 35 .571 .429 
.0003 .2513 34 .618 .382 
-.0010 .2503 32 .406 .594 
-.0047 .2456 32 .406 .594 
-.0172 .2283 32 .500 .500 
-.0147 .2136 32 .406 .594 
.0022 .2158 30 .467 .533 
-.0052 .2106 29 .448 .552 
-.0047 .2059 28 .536 .464 
.0027 .2087 27 .519 .481 
-.0042 .2045 27 .556 .444 
-.0062 .1984 25 .480 .520 
-.0086 .1898 24 .500 .500 
-.0106 .1792 24 .375 .625 
.0079 .1871 22 .591 .409 
-.0045 .1826 22 .591 .500 
-.0148 .1678 22 .500 .500 
-.0056 .1622 22 .455 .545 
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Table 52 
Average OLS Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
S & P 500 Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0007 -.0007 167 .484 .516 
-24 -.0010 -.0016 167 .458 .542 
-23 .0037 .0021 167 .516 .484 
-22 .0030 .0051 167 .490 .510 
-21 -.0034 .0017 167 .490 .510 
-20 .0060 .0077 167 .497 .503 
-19 .0007 .0064 167 .529 .471 
-18 .0026 .0112 167 .484 .516 
-17 .0001 .0113 167 .477 .523 
-16 .0006 .0119 167 .484 .516 
-15 .0027 .0146 167 .542 .458 
-14 .0025 .0172 167 .490 .510 
-13 .0020 .0191 167 .484 .516 
-12 .0040 .0232 167 .490 .510 
-11 .0013 .0245 167 .490 .510 
-10 .0037 .0282 167 .568 .432 
-9 .0056 .0338 167 .510 .490 
-8 .0027 .0365 167 .477 .523 
-7 .0131 .0496 167 .626 .374 
-6 .0064 .0560 166 .597 .403 
-5 .0041 .0602 166 .513 .487 
-4 .0106 .0708 166 .565 .435 
-3 .0202 .0910 164 .632 .368 
-2 .0157 .1067 163 .664 .336 
-1 .0195 .1263 156 .646 .354 
0 .1698 .2960 167 .884 .116 
1 .0047 .3007 167 .529 .471 
2 -.0003 .3004 167 .477 .523 
3 -.0002 .3002 166 .435 .565 
4 -.0018 .2983 165 .448 .552 
5 .0037 .3020 164 .497 .503 
6 -.0015 .3005 162 .414 .586 
7 .0005 .3010 162 .493 .507 
8 .0003 .3014 160 .480 .520 
9 -.0015 .2999 160 .493 .507 
10 .0048 .3047 159 .497 .503 
11 .0012 .3059 157 .490 .510 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
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Table 52 (continued) 
AR( t) CAR(t) N 
.0009 .3068 156 
-.0047 .3021 156 
-.0005 .3016 157 
-.0016 .2999 156 
.0031 .3031 155 
.0022 .3053 152 
.0011 .3064 150 
-.0000 .3063 150 
.0004 .3067 149 
.0011 .3078 148 
.0031 .3109 148 
.0001 .3111 147 
-.0008 .3103 145 
-.0040 .3063 143 
-.0016 .3047 143 
-.0036 .3011 143 
-.0032 .2979 142 
.0014 .2994 140 
.0004 .2997 139 
-.0011 .2987 137 
.0012 .2999 136 
-.0024 .2975 135 
.0015 .2991 133 
-.0022 .2968 132 
-.0017 .2951 130 
-.0011 .2941 128 
.0015 .2956 127 
-.0035 .2921 125 
-.0034 .2888 122 
% positive % negative 
.483 .517 
.374 .626 
.503 .497 
.521 .479 
.462 .538 
.559 .441 
.461 .539 
.468 .532 
.514 .486 
.489 .511 
.525 .475 
.439 .561 
.526 .474 
.452 .548 
.437 .563 
.548 .452 
.425 .575 
.500 .500 
.496 .504 
.481 .519 
.546 .454 
.473 .527 
.512 .488 
.520 .480 
.520 .480 
.472 .528 
.520 .480 
.471 .529 
.487 .513 
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Table 53 
Average OLS Arbitrage Hedge Forecast Errors 
CEW Index Proxy 
t(days) AFE(t) CAFE(t) N % positive % negative 
-25 -.0009 -.0009 167 .465 .535 
-24 -.0008 -.0017 167 .458 .542 
-23 .0040 .0023 167 .548 .452 
-22 .0029 .0052 167 .458 .542 
-21 -.0034 .0018 167 .490 .510 
-20 .0059 .0077 167 .490 .510 
-19 .0004 .0080 167 .503 .497 
-18 .0029 .0109 167 .497 .503 
-17 .0000 .0109 167 .471 .529 
-16 .0011 .0120 167 .484 .516 
-15 .0029 .0149 167 .535 .465 
-14 .0024 .0173 167 .484 .516 
-13 .0019 .0191 167 .477 .523 
-12 .0039 .0230 167 .503 .497 
-11 .0009 .0240 167 .490 .510 
-10 .0032 .0272 167 .561 .439 
-9 .0057 .0329 167 .503 .497 
-8 .0027 .0356 167 .471 .529 
-7 .0129 .0485 167 .613 .387 
-6 .0068 .0552 166 .591 .409 
-5 .0043 .0595 166 .513 .487 
-4 .0107 .0702 166 .578 .422 
-3 .0205 .0907 164 .651 .349 
-2 .0163 .1070 163 .651 .349 
-1 .0193 .1264 156 .633 .367 
0 .1698 .2962 167 .884 .116 
1 .0047 .3009 167 .529 .471 
2 -.0007 .3002 167 .458 .542 
3 -.0010 .2992 166 .416 .584 
4 -.0024 .2968 165 .429 .571 
5 .0042 .3010 164 .497 .503 
6 -.0017 .2993 162 .421 .579 
7 -.0000 .2993 162 .480 .520 
8 .0007 .3000 160 .493 .507 
9 -.0015 .2985 160 .480 .520 
10 .0049 .3033 159 .497 .503 
11 .0011 .3044 157 .490 .510 
12 .0003 .3047 156 .490 .510 
13 -.0049 .2998 156 .367 .633 
14 -.0001 .2997 157 .497 .503 
15 -.0017 .2980 156 .527 .473 
16 .0036 .3016 155 .469 .531 
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Table 53 (continued) 
(days) AR(t) CAR(t) N % positive % negativ' 
17 .0029 .3044 152 .566 .434 
18 .0015 .3059 150 .433 .567 
19 .0001 .3060 150 .468 .532 
20 .0004 .3064 149 .514 .486 
21 .0015 .3079 148 .518 .482 
22 .0034 .3114 148 .518 .482 
23 .0002 .3115 147 .439 .561 
24 -.0010 .3105 145 .511 .489 
25 -.0037 .3068 143 .467 .533 
26 -.0014 .3054 143 .444 .556 
27 -.0036 .3018 143 .533 .467 
28 -.0031 .2987 143 .433 .567 
29 .0015 .3001 140 .477 .523 
30 -.0003 .3004 139 .496 .504 
31 -.0015 .2989 137 .473 .527 
32 .0008 .2998 136 .492 .508 
33 -.0026 .2972 135 .473 .527 
34 .0010 .2982 133 .535 .465 
35 -.0028 .2954 132 .465 .535 
36 -.0017 .2937 130 .488 .512 
37 -.0013 .2925 128 .447 .553 
38 .0015 .2939 127 .496 .504 
39 -.0033 .2906 125 .455 .545 
40 -.0038 .2868 122 .504 .496 
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Table 54 
Allocation of Excess Return Measure Around 
Predicted Value 
/ l positive % negative 
Bidder Firms 
OLS Model 
SPR Index Proxy 47.86 52.13 
CVW Index Proxy 47.77 52.22 
CEW Index Proxy 47.63 52.36 
Simple Market Model 
SPR Index Proxy 49.52 50.38 
CVW Index Proxy 48.73 51.27 
CEW Index Proxy 46.54 53.46 
Average Return Model 46.30 53.70 
Target Firms 
OLS Model 
SPR Index Proxy 46.49 53.51 
CVW Index Proxy 46.42 53.58 
CEW Index Proxy 45.89 54.11 
Simple Market Model 
SPR Index Proxy 52.32 47.47 
CVW Index Proxy 51.62 48.38 
CEW Index Proxy 47.83 52.16 
Average Return Model 42.58 57.42 

